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Preface 
Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (ULT) was formed in 1918 when six 
American leaf tobacco dealers consolidated and extended a leaf tobacco 
buying business originally established in 1888. Leaf tobacco dealers 
make no consumer products. Their business is selecting, purchasing, 
processing, and storingleaf tobacco for sale to manufacturers, who then 
make it into the various tobacco products used by the public. As South-
ern businesses go, Universal can be considered to be an old company. It 
is also largely unknown because Universal markets no products directly 
to the public, advertises little, and prefers a quiet approach to its busi-
ness. It is also an unusual company, and study of it reveals much about 
the United States economy as a whole, and about the economy of the 
South in particular. 
Universal is the largest independent leaf tobacco dealer in the world. 
It deals in tobacco grown in all parts of the globe for the manufacture 
of tobacco products. The company's ~rocessing plants are located world-
wide and employ over fifteen thousand people full time and season-
ally. Headquarters are in Richmond, Virginia, with facilities in other 
states as well as in Europe, Africa, Central America, South America, the 
Far East, and Southeast Asia. Universal buys for resale in excess of 35 
percent of all the tobacco grown in the United States. 
To describe more precisely the company's function and purpose, 
some explanation of the leaf industry is required. Leaf tobacco is mar-
keted in different ways throughout the world, but in all instances the 
grade selection and establishment of price has to be done by a corps of 
experienced tobacco experts. Because tobacco is a perishable commod-
ity, it has to be quickly treated following its purchase to avoid deteriora-
tion. 
In order to understand the need for leaf dealers, one need only be 
aware of the fact that during the height of the tobacco buying season in 
the United States some fifty-six auctions are operating simultaneously. 
Only a few of the largest manufacturers have found it feasible or eco-
nomical to maintain a buying organization within the United States, 
much less worldwide, to cover such a vast market: but by using the 
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services of a company such as Universal any manufacturer can be as-
sured complete market coverage. With few exceptions, the world's manu-
facturers of tobacco products leave the selecting, buying, and process-
ing to leaf dealers, who service huge accounts from country to country 
with tacit permission from the home office to rely largely on their own 
judgment. 
Universal's business takes different forms with different custom-
ers. In some cases Universal selects, buys, and delivers the leaf to the 
customer for an agreed-upon commission. In other cases, business in-
volves both the purchasing and processing of the tobacco based on a 
customer's pre-season order. On some occasions, immediate delivery 
and payment are made. In others the company finances the manufac-
turer until time of delivery. Finally, the company also buys for its own 
account for later sale. In such cases the tobacco is stored until needed. 
The process of turning raw tobacco leaves from the fields into a 
finished product such as cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, snuff, and chew-
ing tobacco begins when the farmer harvests the crop and separates it 
into rough grades. According to government standards there are eight 
grades of tobacco, and six qualities within each grade. Also, there are 
eighteen different tobacco colors, plus several combinations of colors, 
making the various choices of coJors, qualities, and types of tobacco 
number in the thousands. Because they lack the knowledge to fine-
grade, farmers rough-grade only. They then take the tobacco to a ware-
house and consign it for sale. Universal's buyers acquire tobacco on the 
warehouse auction floors through the process of competitive bidding. 
After purchase, the tobacco is transported to Universal factories where 
it is cleaned, sorted, regraded, and blended. There its moisture content 
is stabilized and it is packed, either to be stored for future sale or to be 
shipped directly to the customer, a manufacturer who makes and sells 
tobacco products to the public. 
This book deals with all aspects of Universal Leaf Tobacco 
Company's history, including the purchase, treatment, storage, financ-
ing, packaging, and transportation of tobacco worldwide. The book 
also deals with the newly emerging Universal Corporation, a giant hold-
ing company whose interests are just now beginning to extend beyond 
tobacco into other commodities. 
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From the bloodshed and destruction of the American Civil War, the 
United States rose in one generation to become the world's industrial 
leader. The American people were quick to recognize and celebrate 
what they perceived to be the rags-to-riches ascension of the nation's 
new economic elite, the Armours, the Carnegies, the Rockefellers, the 
Swifts, and others. Horatio Alger wrote over a hundred novels revolv-
ing around the theme of "pluck-makes-luck," and almost everybody 
accepted the proposition that society's leaders were those who deserved 
all they got by force of will and strength of character. 
Often overshadowed by the attention given the new industrial gi-
ants were equally enterprising young men who came from farms rather 
than factories, from the rural South rather than the urban North, and 
whose rise from modest circumstances was no less dramatic than that of 
the captains of industry. In the tobacco business one could cite Wash-
ington Duke and his sons Brodie, Buck, and Ben of Durham Station, 
North Carolina, and a trio of Virginians-Richard Joshua Reynolds of 
Patrick County, Lewis Ginter of Richmond, and Jaquelin ("Jack") 
Plummer Taylor of Orange. The least known today of these early to-
bacco barons, Taylor improved upon his every opportunity until he 
eventually founded the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, which has 
long been regarded as the world's largest independent dealer in leaf 
tobacco and is now the centerpiece of a billion-dollar conglomerate with 
diverse global operations. 
Jaquelin P. Taylor started life in circumstances that were anything 
but modest. Born March 2, 1861, at Meadow Farm, Virginia, in the 
northern Piedmont county of Orange, Taylor had the immediate ad-
vantage of a distinguished ancestry. James Taylor, the first of the line, 
arrived in the Old Dominion from Carlisle, England, in the seventeenth 
century, and the family subsequently enjoyed both fame and fortune. 
James II became a militia colonel and a burgess and had been one of a 
handful of men invited by Governor Alexander Spotswood to journey 
from the long-established Tidewater region through the wilderness into 
the fertile Shenandoah Valley. The trek took place in 1716, and the 
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governor honored the participants by making them "Knights of the 
Golden Horseshoe." James Taylor II liked what he saw on the lush 
western slope of the Blue Ridge and later received a crown grant of 
perhaps fifteen thousand acres there. One of the region's first settlers, 
he built for his family-and heirs-a home he named Bloomsbury. 
Like the Jeffersons in Albemarle, the Marshalls in Fauquier, and 
the Madisons in Orange, the Piedmont Taylors cleared land and pros-
pered in planting and in politics. Favorable marriages and large house-
holds extended their influence, and by the 1850s the family could claim 
not only scores of local and state leaders but also Presidents James Madi-
son and Zachary Taylor, both sons of Orange. 
Young Jack Taylor's parents were established members of the Pied-
mont aristocracy. His father, Erasmus, educated at the University of 
Virginia, dabbled in law but more seriously lived the life of a gentle-
man planter, while Jack's mother, Roberta Stuart Taylor, was the daugh-
ter of Captain John Ashby of Fauquier County and thus the first cousin 
of future Confederate hero Turner Ashby. In the mid-1800s, on part 
of the original crown grant, Erasmus Taylor built Meadow Farm. 
Erasmus and Roberta had eleven children, of whom Jaquelin, named 
for a Huguenot ancestor, was the sixth. 
If Jack Taylor was fortunate in the place and family of his birth, he 
was much less so in its timing. A month after his birth in Aprill86l, a 
signal shot thundered across the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, 
beginning not only the Confederate bombardment of Fort Sumter but 
the American Civil War as well. 
Antebellum Orange boasted scenic beauty and a diversified 
economy, but war left its mark on the county and on the Taylor house-
hold. Tens of thousands of troops either passed through or encamped 
in the area, which figured prominently in the major campaigns of Sec-
ond Manassas and the Wilderness and served as winter quarters for the 
Army of Northern Virginia in 1863-64. General Robert E. Lee pitched 
his tent near Bloomsbury and once entertained Confederate President 
Jefferson Davis there. General James Longstreet on one occasion estab-
lished his headquarters on the grounds at Meadow Farm and on an-
other was brought to the main house following his near-fatal wounding 
in the Battle of the Wilderness. 
Although opposed to secession, Erasmus Taylor followed Virginia 
out of the Union "for good or ill." He became a Confederate staff of-
ficer in time for the battle of First Manassas in July 1861 and served 
intermittently until his surrender and parole at Appomattox in April 
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1865. His principal distinction was a lengthy stint as chief quartermas-
ter for the corps commanded by General Longstreet, after whom the 
Taylors would later name a son. 
Living directly in the path of war took its toll on the Taylor family, 
so much so that Roberta and the children relocated to Richmond. Al-
though the fighting stopped in the spring of 1865, in some ways the 
worst was yet to come. In 1860 Erasmus held personal property valued 
at over twenty-six thousand dollars, a handsome sum for the times, but 
by 1870 that amount shriveled to only three thousand dollars. With a 
growing family and diminishing resources, Erasmus struggled to hold 
Meadow Farm; he was finally moved to reckless speculation in an at-
tempt to recover his losses. Young Jack later recalled his family "living 
on very, very close rations," selling land and possessions, taking in board-
ers, and, as a last resort, mortgaging the estate itself. He also remem-
bered his father's bold gamble to mine mineral resources there. Rail 
lines were laid, equipment was installed and shafts sunk-all in a futile 
attempt to extract iron ore. 
The postbellum years thus compounded the hardships of the Con-
federate period, and the time came when Jack had to leave home both 
to make his own way and to help his family. In an earlier day he would 
have likely gone to a private academy and then to the University of 
Virginia, after which he would have embarked on a career as a gentle-
man-planter or lawyer-planter, in time inheriting some piece of the 
Taylor legacy. Instead, his education was limited to what he could ab-
sorb within the family and to a brief stint at The Meadows, a poverty-
ridden school operated in nearby Albemarle by a kinsman of the Taylors 
and an ancestor of the future military giant U.S. Army General George 
S. Patton. 
At the age of sixteen or seventeen, Jack left home for Richmond. 
He could not have known that the dusty road from Meadow Farm in 
time would stretch around the world to tobacco enterprises in dozens 
of countries or that his vision and drive would allow him to create what 
would become a multinational, billion-dollar conglomerate. 
It should be said that Taylor did not travel alone. Although fate 
had deprived him of a princely legacy in a material sense, it had re-
warded him in other ways. Necessity was his great teacher. His conser-
vative temperament was founded in his youthful experiences of frugal-
ity and hard times and in the lessons he derived from the recklessness 
of his father. Jack would be energetic and enterprising but never finan-
cially speculative-and he would rarely buy anything he could not pay 
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for. Taylor also took with him a love of family and place and a determi-
nation someday to restore Meadow Farm to its prewar splendor. Not 
the least of his assets was his name, one that would be known at each of 
his future stops. Because he was a Taylor he could get his foot in many 
doors along the way, but it was what he did that would open them fully. 
How much young Taylor knew at this point about tobacco is uncer-
tain. The leaf had been widely grown in Orange County, but the vari-
ety was the old Virginia type, likely cured by fire or air and thus unlike 
the bright, flue-cured variety on which his fortune would be made. It 
does seem clear, however, that he left Meadow Farm with the belief 
that, by diligent application, he could make money in tobacco. But first 
he would have to learn the business from the bottom up, which would 
be Richmond's initial contribution to the Taylor story. 
Antebellum Richmond had been the tobacco capital of the world in 
an era when one city resident said the leaf was "in almost everyone's 
mouth, either for mastication, fumigation, inhalation, or discussion." 
By the 1870s, however, the adversity of war and the ascendancy of other 
tobacco towns had conspired to diminish Richmond's standing in the 
trade, though the leaf continued to enjoy preeminent status in the local 
community. 
Jack Taylor arrived in the Virginia capital in 1878, just as the city 
was recovering from the worst effects of the national Panic of 1873. 
Through the family network he gained employment with one of Rich-
mond tobacco's "Big Four" firms-namely Alexander Cameron and 
Company located at Cary and Twenty-fourth Streets in the city's to-
bacco district. Three Cameron brothers had migrated from Scotland 
before the Civil War and had established themselves as tobacconists in 
Petersburg, some twenty miles from Richmond; by the 1870s, their 
empire had expanded to include such disparate places as Australia and 
Richmond. The Richmond branch consisted of two operations: 
Alexander Cameron and Company, a plug factory run by Alexander; 
and Cameron and Cameron, which George oversaw as a cigarette- and 
cheroot-producing concern. 
Cameron employed more workers than any other plant in Rich-
mond, and Alexander's marriage into the Haxall family, long associ-
ated with the city's internationally famous flour mills, combined with 
his civic-mindedness to establish him as one of the town's foremost citi-
zens. Cameron brands included "Venus," "Queen of the Seas," "Flower 
of All Nations," "Purity," and "Canuk." Managing one of the factories 
was William B. Taylor, perhaps a relative of Jack's and also a partner in 
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the Taylor Brothers Tobacco Company, a well-known chewing tobacco 
firm in Winston-Salem. 
Under the Cameron aegis, Jack Taylor entered the tobacco busi-
ness as a common laborer. Later he would tell a grandson to expect 
"long years of fairly menial type work," his grandson later reported, 
"because there was no other way to learn anything about tobacco." For 
his first job he put labels on containers; he lived in the attic of the 
Cameron household. However humble the conditions, Jack Taylor was 
ideally positioned to learn about the tobacco business. Richmond's sev-
enty-five tobacco factories ranked first among American cities and pro-
vided, in effect, a school as well as a testing ground for the fledgling 
entrepreneur. 
The manufactured product of the 1870s was mainly plug or chew-
ing tobacco with some attention given to smoking tobacco, snuff, and 
cigarettes. The latter product was positioned for a boom, however, and 
especially so under the leadership of the Richmond firm Allen and 
Ginter, which saw its daily output soar in the 1880s. In time, Allen and 
Ginter's "Richmond Straight Out No. 1" and "Pet" cigarettes would be 
known worldwide, thanks in part to Lewis Ginter's genius for advertis-
ing. His appealing if flamboyant boast was that the Allen and Ginter 
product contained only "the brightest, most delicate flavored and high-
est cost gold Leaf Tobacco grown in Virginia." 
Although Richmond could rightly claim present and future pri-
macy in cigarette manufacturing, it was losing its antebellum position 
as the nation's premier tobacco marketing center. On the eve of the 
Civil War, DeBow's Review had noted that "probably more tobacco was 
opened, inspected, and sold in Richmond than in any other city in the 
United States." The leaf arrived either loose in piles or tightly packed 
("prized") in hogsheads, and it came by wagon, by boat, and by oxen. 
From all points in the Tobacco Kingdom of Virginia and North 
Carolina, leaf found its way into Richmond, where state inspectors guar-
anteed quality and a local tobacco exchange oversaw sales both private 
and public. By the 1870s the erstwhile Confederate capital had serious 
rivals in small market towns throughout the burgeoning bright-leaf belt 
of North Carolina and Virginia and was experiencing strong competi-
tion from Danville, its neighbor to the west. 
Following this shift in market focus, Jack Taylor left Richmond in 
1881 to relocate in Danville. He had learned about the leaf and its manu-
facture in Richmond; now he would learn the business of buying and 
selling it in what locals claimed to be "the world's best tobacco market." 
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Founded in the late eighteenth century, Danville had long been a 
tobacco town. In its favor were good water and rail connections and a 
location in the heart of the area where bright leaf became king. Even 
before the Civil War, Danville had made its mark in the industry by 
implementing the loose-leaf auction system in warehouses built espe-
cially for the purpose. The "Danville system" spread rapidly, and by 
the 1880s ten large warehouses were active locally. A tobacco associa-
tion conducted two auctions simultaneously, each selling at least 150 
piles-which were larger than today's-per hour. In the year of Taylor's 
arrival, Danville sold over 30 million pounds of bright leaf, a figure far 
above Richmond, its closest rival. Add two dozen factories, and a local 
booster in 1885 could accurately assert that "the commercial and indus-
trial life of the Town may be said to be almost wholly dependent upon 
the Tobacco trade." 
Most of Danville's tobacco was sold to brokers, some 142 of whom 
were operating in the city by 1885. To buy low and to sell high was the 
dealer's art, and the 1880s was a golden age for speculative enterprise. 
Each sale tested one's judgment and nerve in what had become the 
nation's most competitive tobacco market. 
The twenty-year-old Taylor entered this sink-or-swim trade under 
the tutelage of James G. Penn. Born in 1845, Penn had switched from 
manufacturing to dealing when he formed a partnership in Danville 
with John H. Pemberton in 1872. The enterprise prospered, and in 
time the company not only sold its leaf throughout the United States 
and abroad but also bought on order for the Japanese governmental 
monopoly. 
Details are sketchy, but it is certain that Taylor became a successful 
dealer in Danville, earning enough money to take his first steps to save 
Meadow Farm from further deterioration and perhaps from the 
auctioneer's block. Taylor also recognized the boom-time potential of 
the bright leaf towns of North Carolina. Thus, with Penn's financial 
support, he moved again, once more following a trend. His destination 
was the hamlet of Henderson, where to the skills of a dealer he would 
add those of businessman and entrepreneur. 
By relocating to Henderson, Jack Taylor became part of a larger 
movement of Virginians eager to profit from a growth in the tobacco 
business in the Tar Heel state. This trend predated the Civil War; pro-
duction rose from 12 million pounds in 1850 to 33 million in 1860. 
This expansion had been spurred by the "discovery of a new type of 
leaf-the lemon-colored or bright leaf tobacco" and by the development 
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in Caswell County of a new curing process utilizing charcoal-fired heat 
fed into storage barns by wooden flues. The result was a leaf that could 
be grown on sandy soil once regarded as unpromising for tobacco. North 
Carolina counties from Halifax to Stokes grew the new leaf in bulk and 
sold it in the traditional markets of the Old Dominion. 
News of the quality of the bright leaf spread rapidly, in part be-
cause of an accident of history. In the spring of 1865, near Durham 
Station in the bright belt, Joseph E. Johnston's rag-tag Confederate army 
maneuvered to check a mammoth federal force under General William 
Tecumseh Sherman. Suddenly word arrived of Lee's surrender to Grant 
at Appomattox, and negotiations got underway for Sherman to receive 
a similar capitulation. Weeks passed and soldiers of the blue and gray, 
well over a hundred thousand strong, relaxed from the trials of combat 
and turned to the solace of tobacco. Many came to sample-and to like-
the yellow and mild leaf of the Durham region. The armies soon left, 
but the soldiers took with them a fond memory of bright tobacco and 
spread the word of its quality. 
Local farmers and entrepreneurs were quick to capitalize. John B. 
Green wisely changed the name of his smoking brand to "Bull Durham," 
thus launching a tobacco line soon familiar the world over. The Duke 
family-father Washington and his three sons-did well enough with 
their "Pro Bono Publico," but they also recognized the edge enjoyed by 
Green and his partners and thus switched in 1882 from pipe tobacco to 
the manufacture of cigarettes. This decision ultimately led to wealth 
the likes of which earlier tobacconists could scarcely have dreamed. 
With a combination of innovative machinery, creative advertising, 
and competitive zeal, the family, now paced by son James Buchanan 
("Buck") Duke, became industrywide pioneers and built an empire that 
in time included the American Tobacco Company as well as the world 
giant British American Tobacco. The number of cigarette factories in 
Carolina rose dramatically, and manufacturing centers developed in 
Durham, Winston-Salem, Reidsville, and elsewhere. The demand for 
Lord Bright likewise increased as the growing region spread into the 
Carolina coastal plain. Enterprising railroad executives also played their 
part as new market centers sprang up in the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century. Few of the new tobacco towns were so well located 
as the one to which Jack Taylor moved in the mid-1880s. 
Although incorporated in 1841, Henderson had languished in its 
early years. The population had numbered a mere 186 in 1860. The 
war era had extracted its price, and a fire in 1870 had destroyed the 
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town's business district. But suddenly the city's fortunes changed. The 
rapidly expanding bright belt offered new opportunities, cotton revived 
to the east, and several rail lines linked Henderson with cities in all 
directions. 
Farmers had formerly taken their crops by wagon into Virginia, 
but on january 29, 1873, David Y. Cooper had conducted the first local 
auction sale in a nondescript wooden building. Just four years later 
Cooper had a handsome brick structure, complete with a marble slab 
embellished with gilded leaves courtesy of Richmond's Allen and Ginter, 
and Cooper claimed to be selling "more tobacco than any other ware-
house in the world." Cooper enjoyed an extensive wagon trade as he 
serviced farmers from fifteen counties, garnering sales of 7 million 
pounds annually by the mid-1880s. 
Cooper soon had competitors. By 1881, when Vance County was 
incorporated, Henderson claimed a population of two thousand as well 
as four "real streets, eighteen saloons, eight attorneys, several auction 
warehouses, and five tobacco manufacturers." By 1885 when Taylor 
arrived, Henderson was the location of four major houses, from fifty to 
sixty regular buyers, and several prize houses, one of which was five 
stories tall. 
Jack Taylor wasted little time establishing himself in the expand-
ing market. Danville had taught him the ins-and-outs of judging and 
buying tobacco, and he arrived with the advantage of financial support 
from Pemberton and Penn, whom he represented at the outset, and of 
Taylor kinsmen already well known in the community. His rapid rise 
can be attributed to his drive and acumen and to his ability to enlarge 
upon his opportunities. 
After buying for Pemberton and Penn, Taylor formed his own com-
pany in 1886-a venture that by 1896 was referred to as "the great leaf 
shipping and exporting establishment of J.P. Taylor & Company, one 
of the largest in the South." Sometime within that first decade, Taylor 
also built or acquired a mammoth factory, hailed as "one of the most 
completely equipped" in the South. In the process he won the friend-
ship of Buck Duke and of other aspiring tobacco dealers in the Tar 
Heel state. 
J.P. Taylor also became president of the Henderson Storage and 
Inspection Company, incorporated in 1889, which was the state's first 
facility of its kind and evidence of Taylor's entrepreneurial spirit. The 
company stopped a large flow of tobacco to Richmond and Petersburg, 
and Taylor began to profit handsomely from handling tobacco as well 
as from buying and selling it. 
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Within a decade of settling in Henderson, Taylor displayed two 
other qualities that would propel him to later success: he was a good 
judge of young talent, and he was prepared to venture beyond his home 
base. Both points are illustrated in the case of Rommie Purefoy Watson. 
A farm boy from the region and a Wake Forest alumnus, Watson was 
still a teenager when he went to work for the J.P. Taylor Company in 
1888. Seven years later he went to Wilson, North Carolina, one of the 
most promising of the new markets on the Coastal Plains, to establish 
R.P. Watson and Company, destined to be one of the largest dealers in 
the trade. Watson's silent partner and sponsor was Jack Taylor. 
James I. Miller also caught Taylor's eye. Miller had arrived in 
Henderson in 1895 as an eighteen year old, with twenty dollars in his 
pocket and no guarantee of work. After warehouse employment distin-
guished largely by the fact that he married the owner's daughter, Miller 
took auditor positions with the telephone company and with J.P. Tay-
lor. He was soon working full time with Taylor, who became a close 
friend and mentor. Miller's rise can only be described as meteoric. When 
the J.P. Taylor Company was incorporated in North Carolina in 1904, 
one of its partners was James I. Miller. His incentive-heavy deal with 
Taylor was "base salary, plus bonus and stock options." Ultimately Miller 
became president of the Taylor Company and a founder of Universal. 
In 1924 he broke away, relocated in Wilson, and formed a company 
bearing his own name, eventually doing business on a global basis. 
While advancing the careers of younger men such as Miller and 
Watson, Taylor also began to venture into Kentucky, land of the burley 
and dark leaf, and showed some courage in buying, gun in holster, in 
the dark tobacco district during the violent days of the Black Patch War 
of the early 1900s. Taylor continued to be an active citizen in Henderson; 
he invested in several nontobacco enterprises and contributed much to 
the town's growth and development. Now in his early fifties, trim at six 
feet and 170 pounds, Taylor enjoyed an even temperament and excel-
lent health. The latter he attributed to his forswearing of hot sauces 
and his adoption of the practice of "Fletcherizing," by which he chewed 
his food what according to an observer seemed an interminable num-
ber of times before he swallowed. 
Taylor had a knack for quickly following trends in the industry, 
and in 1912, he aligned himself with the future once again-by return-
ing to Richmond. Almost forty years had passed since he had left 
Meadow Farm and first settled in Richmond. The city, now with a popu-
lation of over 132,000 had largely freed itself from the ravages of the 
1860s, though war memories remained and were enshrined in monu-
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ments, sites, and commemorative observances. Richmond's tobacco mix 
was also changing. The town no longer claimed preeminence in market 
size or in production. Although large amounts of tobacco continued to 
be brought, sold, and manufactured locally, the city had lost its pri-
macy in these basic categories to such competitors as Danville, Durham, 
Reidsville, and Winston-Salem. But to any tobacconist who could see 
the future, Richmond held several attractions. Popular taste in con-
sumption was moving rapidly toward cigarettes and away from cigars, 
pipes, and chewing tobacco. The Virginia capital was destined to serve 
several major cigarette manufacturers, who were following in the foot-
steps of the industry pioneer in the South, Major Lewis Ginter. Rich-
mond would also become a center for leaf dealers-entrepreneurs who 
neither grew nor manufactured tobacco but who, at risk, bought, 
handled, and sold it. Richmond's advantages in transportation and fi-
nancial resources and its proximity to major markets added to its ap-
peal. 
In Richmond dealers had access to the three most desirable types 
of American leaf for cigarette manufacture: the low-nicotine bright or 
flue-cured tobacco to the south and southwest; the highly absorbent, 
air-cured burley to the west; and the long-burning, air-cured Maryland 
type to the north. Richmond was not beyond reach of other key mar-
kets-namely, cigar leaf from Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Connecti-
cut, western Kentucky's dark-fired and dark air-cured leaf popular in 
snuff and chewing tobacco, and the flue-cured tobacco that spread 
down the Atlantic coast to South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. 
Jack Taylor's motives for relocating are unclear. Though he no 
doubt appreciated Richmond's strategic location, family considerations 
perhaps played a role. Married in 1895 to Katherine Wall of Maryland, 
he had lived comfortably in Henderson. But as children Mary and 
Jaquelin Erasmus began to grow up, Taylor decided to sell his house to 
partner James I. Miller and shift his headquarters to Richmond. 
In 1912 Taylor took his family on a pleasure trip to Europe-his 
only visit there-and returned to take up residence in Richmond. The 
Taylors lived in rental property while an impressive house was con-
structed for them at 2325 Monument Avenue, a suburban street only 
recently farm land but rapidly becoming a fashionable residential ad-
dress and one of the South's most renowned boulevards, which would 
be marked in time by impressive statues to honor Confederate heroes 
Lee, Stuart, Jackson, Davis, and Maury. 
With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, demand for American 
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tobacco soared, and Taylor took certain steps that served as necessary 
preliminaries to the founding of the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company 
in 1918. On June 30, 1916, the accounting firm of Ernst and Ernst 
presented reports on the financial status of the J.P. Taylor Company 
and its subsidiaries. A few days later, on July 11, came the incorpora-
tion of the J.P. Taylor Company of Virginia "for the purpose of taking 
over the business and property of the J.P. Taylor Company, a North 
Carolina Corporation, and continuing same as a going concern." For 
$814,815.85, Taylor of North Carolina was bought by Taylor of Vir-
ginia, which authorized initial capital stock of $1 million, divided into 
shares with a par value of $100 each. 
Taylor became president of the new corporation and James I. Miller 
secretary-treasurer; lawyer Lewis C. Williams served briefly as vice presi-
dent before being replaced by Thomas B. Yuille, late of the American 
Tobacco Company. Officers would serve as directors, and initial sala-
ries were set. Legal counsel was asked to "domesticate" the company in 
North Carolina and Kentucky for purposes of doing business in those 
states. General offices were located in the Allison Building at 8031;2 
East Main Street in Richmond's financial district. 
By the time of incorporation, Jack Taylor had built a multistate 
enterprise. The company's business, simply put, was "to buy, sell and 
deal in, and deal with leaf tobacco whether for its own account or on 
commission." Assets exceeded liabilities by $720,000 and Taylor's fi-
nancial management was adjudged by Ernst and Ernst as sound and 
"conservative." In addition to headquarters in Richmond, there were 
branches in Henderson and in the Kentucky towns of Lexington, 
Maysville, Carrollton, and Shelbyville. 
Business was also conducted through agents elsewhere in the United 
States and abroad and through companies into which Taylor had bought 
or with which he worked on the basis of joint accounts. The Taylor-
associated companies in 1916 included the W.A. Adams Company of 
Oxford, North Carolina; the C.B. Cheatham Company of Farmville, 
North Carolina; the Person-Garrett Company of Greenville, North Caro-
lina; the R.P. Watson Company of Wilson, North Carolina; the W.A. 
Willingham Company of Danville; and the W.H. Winstead Company 
of Baltimore, Goldsboro, North Carolina, and Owensboro, Kentucky, 
among others. Cash deposits were divided among banks in Kentucky, 
New York, North Carolina, and Virginia. 
It is clear that J.P. Taylor's business was not only profitable but 
extensive enough to deal in a variety of tobacco types. In addition to the 
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flagship in Henderson, redrying and storage facilities were located in 
all major belts. In an era when a few hogsheads constituted a respect-
able sale, Taylor's customers were numerous in both this country and 
abroad, with two of the most significant being the Japanese monopoly 
and the legendary Nan yang Brothers of Shanghai, China. 
The records of 1916 also reveal the names of several tobacconists 
who later became indispensable props in the Universal system. Andrew 
Jamieson (of W.A. Adams), C.B. Cheatham, James I. Miller, Thomas 
A. Person and his soon-to-be partner G.R. Garrett, W.H. Willingham, 
and W.H. Winstead were all leading dealers in their own right by World 
War I. Among the lesser figures of 1916 destined for larger roles later 
were Kenneth R. Edwards ("buyer, Lexington"), Robert L. Kimbrough 
("Manager, Cynthiana"),J.B. Strickland ("Manager, Lexington branch"), 
William Donnell ("Manager, Springfield, Ky., plant"), and F.J. Weil 
("Manager, Carrollton plant"). 
Working with these and other dealers, Taylor had become a master 
of the multiple deal, sometimes involving three or more participants. 
Joint accounts and ventures were common, as when a local company or 
partner might buy and pack the leaf on its own market with Taylor 
assuming responsibility for purchase, transportation and storage, and 
the ultimate sale. Then, as later, a man's word was his bond; written 
contracts were-and still are in the tobacco business-virtually unknown, 
with the system operating in a manner personal and informal, if a bit 
chaotic. 
By 1916 almost forty years had passed since Jack Taylor had left 
Orange County taking with him little in the way of material wealth. He 
had started as a laborer in a Richmond factory and had moved with the 
trends of his day, relocating in response to opportunity. In the process 
he had mastered each phase of tobacco marketing and production and 
had learned the tobacco business from the ground up. 
By 1916 Taylor ranked as one of the most prominent and prosper-
ous dealers in America. With Meadow Farm reclaimed and his family 
settled in comfortable style, Jack Taylor, now in his late fifties, might 
reasonably have rested. But his enterprising spirit dictated yet another 
move. This move would be entrepreneurial, not physical, and it would 
propel Jack Taylor beyond his previous accomplishments in America's 
tobacco belts. Indeed, it would place him squarely in the center of a 
global stage. 
2 
Founding and Early Years 
Universal Leaf was typical in many ways of corporations that came into 
being during World War I. At first, demand virtually guaranteed suc-
cess and encouraged sudden and at times reckless growth, but a post-
war depression brought disaster. The organizers of Universal aimed 
high and fell hard before they adjusted to a moderate course and fi-
nally achieved success. Along the way corporate leadership changed 
dramatically; virtually all Universal's founders retired, left the com-
pany, or assumed passive roles as younger men assumed control. 
Although the exact date is unknown, at some point during the war 
years Jaquelin P. Taylor set upon a scheme to create the largest dealer 
organization in the world. He planned to accomplish this by combining 
his own holdings with those of several prominent tobacconists who for-
merly had been active in the American Tobacco Company, a trust "per-
haps, the most amazing in all the chronicles of high finance." The com-
pany would buy leaf tobacco from the farmer, store it, and later resell it 
at a profit. 
Under the leadership of Taylor's old friend, James B. Duke, the 
American Tobacco Company had been founded in 1890. The "trust"-
as the company soon became known----combined the country's five lead-
ing cigarette manufacturers and controlled perhaps 90 percent of the 
market. Twenty years later, with Duke as president, American claimed 
80 percent control of all aspects of the nation's tobacco industry, except 
cigars. This growth bred antagonism and eventually led to prosecution 
under the terms of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. In 1911 the 
United States Supreme Court ordered the American Tobacco Company 
broken up, a task so complicated that, ironically, it had to be supervised 
by Buck Duke himself. From the wreckage emerged cigarette's "Big 
Four"-American, Liggett and Myers, P. Lorillard, and R.J. Reynolds-
as well as an array of snuff, cigar, and other tobacco companies. 
Jack Taylor knew many of the principal figures in the old Ameri-
can organization and shared their appreciation of the opportunities 
available in a competitive marketplace fueled by the wartime demand 
for tobacco. The mechanism for action was simple: Taylor had his hold-
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ings formally assessed; his prospective partners did likewise; and stock 
in the old companies was exchanged for stock in a new one. 
After general principles had been decided, Taylor's lawyers -from 
the Richmond firm of Williams and Mullen-moved in to incorporate 
what became the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company. Early 1918 passed 
in legal preliminaries: on January 25, the Virginia State Corporation 
Commission issued a charter of incorporation. The following day a 
maximum of 16 million shares of capital stock was authorized, and on 
February 13, fixed capital stock was set at $10,750,000. 
The new stock was exchanged on an agreed-upon formula for all 
capital stock of companies bearing the names of J.P. Taylor, Patrick H. 
Gorman, Oscar C. Gregory, C.B. Cheatham, and W.H. Winstead. Al-
ways conservative, Jack Taylor and his J.P. Taylor Company took all 
the 7,500 shares of Class A preferred stock as well as a controlling por-
tion (52,000 shares) of two classes of common; Pat Gorman received 
20,000 shares in common stock, and the other three individuals split 
the remaining 9,316 shares. (Stock allocations would be subsequently 
amended.) Bylaws were approved, and on February 28 a provisional 
board of directors was chosen. 
On March 1, 1918, at the Taylor offices in Richmond, the lawyer-
incorporators stepped aside, and the first real officers were chosen. 
Jaquelin P. Taylor became chairman of the board, with Thomas B. 
Yuille president. Vice president and secretary was William A. 
Willingham. Vice president and treasurer was James I. Miller, with 
Patrick H. Gorman serving as vice president. The assistant secretary-
treasurer was S.J. Shivers. 
Universal's initial leadership came evenly from the two founding 
sources: the Taylor group (Taylor, Willingham, and Miller) and the 
old American group, consisting of Yuille, Gorman, and Shivers. Shiv-
ers played only a secondary role before his death in mid-1919, but the 
others were men of consequence in the tobacco business. 
Willingham (1872-1945) came from South Boston, Virginia, a town 
destined to provide Universal with key officers down to the modern 
era. He attended business school in New York, then returned home to 
begin over a half century's career as a tobacconist. After a stint with 
American, and also with Yuille, he formed his own trading company in 
Danville and then joined forces with Taylor, serving as an early officer 
of the J.P. Taylor Company of Virginia. 
James I. Miller rose from clerk to become Taylor's right-hand man 
and resident manager of J.P. Taylor's Henderson operation. Born in 
1877, he had by 1916 come to be one of three original directors of the 
Founding and Early Years 15 
Virginia company, and in 1920 he replaced Taylor as its president. In 
the meantime Miller moved to Richmond and lived with his family in 
one of the city's best-known residences, the former mansion of Major 
Lewis Ginter at 901 West Franklin Street. Miller died in 1964. 
Universal's first true president, Thomas B. Yuille, ranked among 
the leading tobacconists in the country. From an old-line Scots family 
in the Valley of Virginia, he started in the business as a buyer for Dibrell 
Brothers in Danville in 1886, when he was only seventeen years old. A 
few years later he joined the leaf department of the newly formed 
American combine. By 1901 he headed the leaf purchasing division of 
the trust and was a resident of New York City. After the breakup in 
1911, Yuille remained with American as vice president in charge of 
tobacco leaf purchasing and manufacturing. 
Five years later, Yuille left American to become vice president and 
director of J.P. Taylor in Virginia and no doubt helped to plan the 
formation of Universal. Serving on numerous boards in the financial 
and business communities in Richmond and in New York, he was re-
garded as a shrewd individual and a tough trader. Until his death in 
1934, Yuille brought to Universal not only standing in the leaf world 
but connections in New York City and within the old trust system. 
From the American stable also came Patrick Henry Gorman (1873-
1946), who, like Taylor and Yuille, had risen to the top in the late nine-
teenth century. Born in Raleigh, North Carolina, Gorman entered the 
business as a floor sweep at age thirteen. Five years later he made his 
first trip abroad "trying to get the English tobacco merchants to buy 
direct from him and not go through intermediary English tobacco bro-
kers." At age nineteen he initiated the first sale held in Greenville, North 
Carolina. At twenty-one he headed the P.H. Gorman Company, a high-
volume dealership in the emerging Eastern belt in North Carolina and 
was soon named president of the Greenville Tobacco Board of Trade. 
Along the way, Gorman's interests expanded to include cigar leaf, 
and in 1900 he joined the trust to buy its cigar tobacco in Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and the Netherlands. He became fluent in the Spanish language 
in the process. By 1912 he had become a director of American and vice 
president of the American Cigar Company. Four years later he resigned 
and "reorganized the Patrick H. Gorman Company as a worldwide com-
mission buyer of tobacco" with branches in all major American belts 
and headquarters in Durham. His strengths included a knowledge of 
both cigar and cigarette leaf and a buying and selling organization that 
was strategically placed. 
The original board of directors of Universal consisted of the five 
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principal officers plus five other well-known tobacconists. The 
nonofficers included three men within the company-W.H. Winstead, 
Oscar C. Gregory, and WilliamS. Luckett-and two-John B. Cobb and 
Joseph F. Cullman Jr.-from the outside. Gregory (1875-1930) and 
Winstead (1876-1962) were North Carolinians who had started in the 
tobacco industry at early ages and who headed Universal subsidiaries; 
Luckett, a Kentuckian, had been associated with Gorman at American 
Cigar and would be elected a Universal vice president in 1918. 
The two outside directors-Cobb and Cullman-had in common 
friendships with several Universal officers and distinguished careers in 
the business. Moreover, both were positioned to help the fledgling cor-
poration in markets beyond the Old Dominion. A Virginia native, John 
Blackwell Cobb (1857-1923) came from a prominent tobacco family 
and went on to become an expert buyer and eventually head of the leaf 
department of Duke's trust. Finally, he served as president of the Ameri-
can Cigar Company. Diversifying his interests, Cobb acquired holdings 
in drug and chemical companies and enjoyed a reputation for philan-
thropy in his adopted home of New York City. 
Joseph F. Cullman Jr. was, simply put, a rising star in what was 
quickly becoming a dynasty in America's tobacco industry. His father, 
Joe Senior, was well established as a New York cigar leaf dealer and 
also had a brief stint on the Universal board in 1918 while Joe Junior, 
born in 1882, was serving in the military. In time, the Cullmans moved 
into the cigarette area of the business and acquired Benson and Hedges. 
Philip Morris later acquired them, and the Cullmans led both firms to 
success and expansion. Joe Junior, who died in 1955, is still remem-
bered as one of the most important tobacconists of the twentieth cen-
tury. 
Universal's founding fathers were long-time tobacco men with ex-
cellent connections in all major leaf areas and also with the giant manu-
facturers who appeared after the trust was dissolved in 1911. Although 
most of Universal's leaders could claim only limited academic training, 
virtually all had grown up in the tobacco business and had prospered in 
an era of unrestrained competition followed by another era of consoli-
dation that forced out many dealers and small manufacturers. A Vir-
ginia or North Carolina heritage also united most of the new officers 
and directors. Almost all, however, were in the final stages of their 
careers. 
Although they were practical tobacconists, the founders were al-
most euphoric about the prospects of the corporation they pretentiously 
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had named "Universal." J.P. Taylor predicted "the business to be had 
was limited only by the ability of the organization to handle and fi-
nance it." An early advertisement described Universal as "Dealers in 
Leaf Tobacco from Everywhere to Everywhere," and an early news story 
noted that "the company handles all grades and sells to snuff, cigarette, 
cigar, smoking, and chewing tobacco manufacturers." From the point 
of view of these men, there was no limit to the success that the company 
might enjoy. 
In many ways such optimism was justified. By forming one com-
pany from many, buying power was consolidated, competition among 
partners removed or at least restricted, and uncoordinated sales made 
part of an orchestrated network. Moreover, financial resources were 
combined, processing plants shared, and orders could be filled "with-
out delay for any class or grade of tobacco and upon any market" and at 
prices made attractive by volume buying. The new venture would be 
run by seasoned tobacconists, individuals united in the belief that profit 
was to be made by providing a service to foreign and domestic manu-
facturers. 
The timing also seemed favorable. World War I had proved abo-
nanza for American tobacconists, especially cigarette manufacturers. 
Antismoking sentiment, never strong in that era, quickly faded; more 
and more women took up the cigarette habit. Oriental or Turkish 
blended cigarettes gave way to those made essentially from American 
leaf, and in 1917 and 1918 doughboys popularized American brands 
throughout Europe. Cigarette production in the United States rose from 
under 9 million in 1910 to well over 16 million in 1914 then to over 57 
million in 1918. Cigarettes soon replaced cigars as the most popular 
form of smoking in America. 
Tobacco, almost regardless of type or quality, was in demand, and 
the opportunity for profit was great. Each of the manufacturing "Big 
Four" had its own leaf-buying division, but each also bought from in-
dependents. Among the latter, consolidation was in the air, as the total 
number of dealers declined from four thousand in 1913 to three thou-
sand in 1918. Preceding Universal as a major new combine was the 
International Planters Corporation, organized in 1916, with subsidiar-
ies throughout the principal buying belts. 
Functioning as a new concept in the tobacco business, the infant 
Universal would largely be a holding company. That is, it would "hold" 
varying amounts of stock in a variety of both subsidiary and partner 
companies, owning 100 percent of some and offering leadership to all. 
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To oversee this complex network, Universal initially had two adminis-
trative headquarters-one in New York City, which was responsible for 
sales and corporate administration, and another in Richmond, which 
supervised leaf purchasing and processing. 
In 1918 New York City was a worldwide center in the tobacco trade. 
Most European buyers had their principal offices there, as did the gi-
ant American Tobacco Company and other leading domestic firms. 
The port itself was a leader in leaf shipping, and the city's financial 
resources were vital for large tobacco deals. The leaf barons of New 
York lived affluently and set the tone for aspiring companies through-
out the industry. 
Universal's New York office was located at 21 East Fortieth Street 
on the corner of Madison Avenue; the company occupied the entire 
tenth floor and part of the ninth. A dozen private offices decorated 
with Persian rugs opened from a spacious and well-appointed recep-
tion area. The tobacco sample room was as likely to be stocked with 
whiskey as with leaf-hospitality was the hallmark of the leading New 
York tobacconists. 
Headed by the flinty Tom Yuille and the jovial Pat Gorman, the 
New York office was manned largely by former employees of the Ameri-
can Tobacco Company. In addition to running the company, the prin-
cipal officers served as the sales force; other nonofficers worked in 
support of salesmen. The company's secretary and its treasurer each 
had assistants, and all enjoyed the support of a coterie of accountants, 
bookkeepers, clerks, and secretaries. At the outset the transportation 
manager was located in New York, as was a "book man" or accountant 
for each of the principal subsidiaries. 
Universal's Richmond office remained that of the J.P. Taylor Com-
pany at 803lh East Main Street, occupying space that was relatively small 
and had its seedy aspects. Taylor remained the principal officer in resi-
dence. Also likely to be on hand were such leaf experts as K.R. Edwards 
and O.C. Gregory, who oversaw the buying and who had contacts with 
the "Big Four," several of whom also had leaf headquarters in Rich-
mond. Through the Taylor Company, Universal also operated a pro-
cessing plant in the city. 
Universal boasted that it bought on all major markets, and this was 
made possible by a network of affiliated companies, all of which had 
been or were still independent dealers whose combined geographic 
range did in fact cover the spectrum of market possibilities. Universal 
had resident companies buying not only throughout the bright and the 
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burley regions but also in cigar leaf and in such exotic types as western 
Kentucky's "Green River" and "One Sucker." Universal's control of 
affiliated companies ranged from one-third to 100 percent. 
From the beginning, Universal affiliates had considerable latitude. 
"The operating people in each company," wrote one veteran tobacco 
man, were "almost autonomous." Universal might "supply help for fi-
nancing and selling but in management... [it would] capitalize on the 
abilities of the partners." The companies Universal owned 100 percent, 
such as J.P. Taylor, were run by the front office. Universal's president 
traditionally was also the Taylor president, but affiliates in which the 
company controlled 50 percent or less functioned more like partners 
than subsidiaries. Some of the partners were old-time tobacco barons 
accustomed to success-and to success on their own terms. Typically, a 
subsidiary bought on designated markets, which were usually local, and 
used its plants, which were usually small, to receive, regrade, process, 
package, and store the tobacco for subsequent sale. Most had estab-
lished their own clients, and, to complicate matters, some, like W.A. 
Adams, had foreign customers as well. A few subsidiaries also had their 
own subsidiaries! 
As much as possible, Universal drew on the strengths of its subsid-
iaries and allowed them to continue profitable patterns that were well 
established, even if it meant one arm of the family might be competing 
with another in a given market-or even for a particular customer. 
Multiple accounts were common, with as many as four subsidiaries be-
ing involved in various phases of a particular deal. Tobacco might be 
bought by one subsidiary, processed by another, billed to a third, and 
sold by a fourth. 
In the beginning not all the subsidiaries were leaf dealers. Within 
the Universal network were at least two steamship companies, a proces-
sor that "rehandled" tobacco for the African trade, a storage company, 
and a Kentucky distillery. Foreign subsidiaries included a tobacco com-
pany to cultivate leaf tobacco in Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo as 
well as a trading company as far away as Canada. 
Business at the fledgling company was at the outset equal to Taylor's 
optimism, as Universal purchased about 10 percent of the market dur-
ing the 1918 and 1919 crop years. In 1918 the company bought about 
100 million pounds, of which 44 million were in turn sold to the Big 
Four and other manufacturers created by the breakup of American. 
The principal customer was P. Lorillard, long tied to the Taylor Com-
pany, with roughly 20 million pounds. Most of this business was sold 
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on order, but some was disposed of on a speculative basis wherein Uni-
versal bought the leaf on its own and then sold it later-for example, to 
American, which purchased almost 6 million pounds in this way. It is 
significant that Universal did considerable business with the "Big Four," 
each of which had its own buying arm but none of which could cover 
all markets as effectively as could Universal and its affiliates. 
In addition to doing business with the heirs of the old trust system, 
Universal sold heavily to smaller manufacturers, such as Continental (a 
predecessor of Philip Morris) and Stephana Brothers of Philadelphia, 
within this country and abroad. The demand for American leaf was so 
heavy that foreign sales were often made "on description"-as opposed 
to "on inspection"-of a sample, as manufacturers in Europe clamored 
for all the tobacco the United States could deliver. 
Lesser amounts were sold to such substantial accounts as the giant 
British American Tobacco conglomerate, Nanyang Brothers in China, 
and the Japanese government monopoly. Again, sales came both from 
direct orders and from purchases made from the company's inventory. 
On-order deals promised sure, but often only modest, profits; a specu-
lative purchase could bring either reward or disaster-selling prices some-
times fell as holdings increased. In either case, for its leaf procure-
ment-and especially for leaf that went into inventory-Universal bor-
rowed heavily, mainly from banks in New York. But, in both buying 
and selling, deals were made on a handshake: a man's word was his 
bond, and a man who broke his word faced ostracism. 
Although Universal immediately established itself as a major dealer, 
competition came from such independents as Dibrell Brothers, an old-
line firm in Danville, Virginia, from the newer International Planters 
Corporation, and from numerous family-owned companies. A govern-
ment report in 1920 estimated that Universal and International together 
had bought "from forty to fifty percent of the tobacco that is not taken 
by the leading foreign and domestic manufacturers in the heaviest pro-
ducing areas, with Universal's being the more active of the two." 
Credit for Universal's successful launching must be divided among 
several of the founders at the upper echelons as well as among scores of 
individual tobacconists. But as the excitement of a new beginning gave 
way to the pattern of a daily routine, leadership settled into the capable 
hands of two men-Thomas B. Yuille, Universal's first true president, 
and, second in influence, James I. Miller. 
The narrowing of authority to these two men resulted not only from 
the drive and talents of Yuille and Miller but from the retirements and 
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deaths of other founders. J.P. Taylor, for example, resigned as chair-
man in early I 922, expressing his intention "to be relieved of all busi-
ness responsibilities" in preference for the pursuit of personal happi-
ness at Meadow Farm. Taylor remained an influential director until his 
death in I 950, serving along the way as a conservative voice on the 
finance committee and maintaining an interest in (and some influence 
on) company affairs. Essentially, however, he was an elder statesman in 
his late years. 
Although shrewd businessmen and respected tobacconists, Yuille 
and Miller offered sharp contrasts. Yuille, the older of the two, had 
been educated by Buck Duke, and some believed that Duke himself 
had manipulated Yuille into the presidency of Universal in an effort to 
check the "unfriendly" consolidation of independent dealers. Though 
a Southerner, Yuille understood New York City and its world of bank-
ing, finance, and stock exchanges and preferred to live there in an af-
fluent style at a prestigious address on Fifth Avenue. A short, genial 
individual, he moved comfortably in the elite circles of business and of 
society. 
Miller was no less self-made than Yuille, but Miller's rise had been 
within the Taylor system and within a world that stretched basically 
from Henderson, North Carolina, to Richmond. He had relocated from 
the former to the latter easily enough and established himself as an 
earnest, upright individual, a director of several local institutions, and 
a popular Sunday School teacher at Richmond's First Baptist Church. 
Perhaps even before J.P. Taylor's retirement, Miller was the force be-
hind the Taylor Company and served as the Richmond counterpart to 
Yuille. Both men contributed heavily to Universal's success, but within 
six years of the founding, both would be gone from the scene; each 
would take with him censure as well as acclaim. 
Aided by Miller, Gorman, and to a lesser extent by others, Yuille 
presided over the company as it refined the disparate conglomerate of 
I 9 I8 into a working and ongoing business system. Some subsidiaries 
were dissolved or liquidated; others were added as territorial responsi-
bilities were rearranged; and buying in the bright and the burley mar-
kets was coordinated by a central committee. The Richmond plant-
and others-closed, but space was acquired for relocation of the Rich-
mond office in the new Richmond Trust Building at Seventh and Main 
Streets. In addition, foreign agents were hired for South America and 
the Far East, and ties were strengthened with long-standing representa-
tives such as I.C. Solberg (in Norway), Frank Watson (who operated 
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both in London and in Liverpool), Luis Almeida (in Portugal), and 
Charles H. Suhling (in Germany). In 1920 officer-director WilliamS. 
Luckett established a European branch by converting an apartment on 
Paris's Champs Elysees into a luxury office complete with the obliga-
tory Persian rugs. When Luckett fell ill, his fellow Kentuckian F.J. Weil 
replaced him. 
Within top management, a finance committee was established in 
1920; chaired by Yuille, it met monthly in New York. Later, subcom-
mittees were named for both inventory and audit. In 1919, the presi-
dent confessed his inability to prepare an annual report despite his "most 
diligent efforts" because of confusion within the subsidiary companies' 
stock holdings and because of the complex demands of new federal 
regulations. Townsend, Dix, and Pogson of New York City became 
Universal's auditors and issued the first of many annual statements; 
because of its simplicity and color, the report was called "the blue blot-
ter." As for government regulations, the company survived a 1920 in-
vestigation by the Federal Trade Commission, which combed the to-
bacco industry for antitrust violations. The Richmond firm of Williams 
and Mullen became general counsel for Universal and its subsidiaries 
in 1922; Mullen himself would serve as a director for decades. 
Universal's board met mainly in Richmond but occasionally in New 
York, and the annual meeting shifted from the third Tuesday in Febru-
ary to the same day in September, thus making it possible to have an 
annual report geared to the fiscal year. In these early years a sinking 
fund was established to begin retiring the company's large amount of 
outstanding preferred stock, and the officers approved numerous ex-
changes and realignments of stock among the affiliates. They also took 
steps to streamline the financing of affiliates. 
Early on, the New York and Richmond accounting departments 
were consolidated in Richmond; a young bookkeeper named Harry 
Hitchcock physically guarded and traveled with the records, sleeping 
on them in the drawing room of a train from New York and supervis-
ing a team of Red Caps and taxis to move them. 
A "contingent compensation" policy was also implemented. Initially 
only for ranking officers, it was later extended to include others in the 
company. Thus in the 1920s was born the forerunner of Universal's 
current bonus system. The plan also reflected the early development of 
one of the company's ongoing principles-financial incentives tied to 
performance. 
Yuille also oversaw several plans to impose order on the expanding 
Founding and Early Years 23 
number of partners and subsidiary companies. In 1922, a single buying 
and processing arm was successfully established in the burley region 
under the name of Southwestern; a similar venture in the bright mar-
kets, called Southern States, had failed. More ambitiously, an attempt 
was made in the same year to consolidate most of Universal's non-ciga-
rette leaf enterprises under one umbrella called Industrial Leaf. This 
new part of the business was to be funded by a complex arrangement in 
which Universal stockholders exchanged their common for Industrial's 
8 percent preferred, with Industrial using the dividends of the company's 
common to pay for companies it took over. 
In the category of corporate good citizenship, in 1922 Universal 
subscribed to government war bonds, contributed to the Japanese Re-
lief Fund, and gave $250 to the Virginia Historical Pageant Association 
"in connection with the tobacco floats to be exhibited during Pageant 
week." As a pat on the back of a promising young employee, the board 
gave K.R. Edwards its congratulations and a check for $500 on the 
occasion of his wedding. 
At a meeting of the board in Richmond, the directors professed 
surprise and regret at having received a brief notice of resignation, 
dated May 29, 1923, from President Thomas B. Yuille. Yuille stated 
simply that he was moving on to other challenges in the business. He 
had agreed to serve as chairman of Tobacco Products Corporation, then 
a vital cog in the Duke empire, and would also later serve as TPC's 
president. His departure from Universal must have been friendly, since 
he later returned as a company director. In one sense he deserved the 
thanks of the Universal family because, as its first president, he had 
played a central role in its construction, launching, and early voyage. 
And yet, he was also leaving it amid troubled times of financial distress. 
When Yuille resigned the presidency of Universal in May 1923, 
the company's future was far from secure. After its founding in 1918, 
Universal had enjoyed immediate success, but as the decade of the 1920s 
got underway, financial difficulties plagued the infant corporation. 
Some problems came from adverse market conditions, others from flaws 
within the company, but all combined to produce Universal's first cri-
sis. The solution came in part from the emergence of a new generation 
of officers headed by Frederick N. Harrison, whose twenty-two-year 
presidency began officially in September 1924. 
Financial analysts would have little trouble spotting danger signs 
within the Universal system in the early 1920s. Bank borrowing rose 
sharply, inventory levels increased, the quarterly dividend on common 
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stock was cut a third and then suspended entirely, and, most ominously, 
the company's capital stock depreciated sharply. Net profits fell from 
about $1.5 million in fiscal year 1923 to $950 thousand in fiscal year 
1924. Also alarming was the borrowing by subsidiaries on their own 
authority and the virtual collapse of the giant affiliate, Industrial Leaf. 
Despite its youth, the company had already employed four treasurers 
and five assistant treasurers. 
In some ways, Universal was a victim of the times. World War I had 
been a bonanza for American farmers and tobacconists alike, with its 
soaring prices, production, and profits. The war ended in 1918, but 
not, however, the farmer's optimism, and the 1919 and 1920 crops were 
unusually good. Then came a worldwide collapse in commodity prices 
triggered by overproduction combined with war-torn Europe's inabil-
ity to buy and compounded by trade and credit problems. 
The Great Depression for agriculture started not in 1929 but years 
earlier, and the entire nation buckled under a recession at the outset of 
the 1920s. Burley prices, for example, fell from 33 cents per pound to 
13.4; in early 1921, bids opened between 10 and 15 cents only to plum-
met to between 3 and 5. Violence broke out in Lexington, Kentucky's 
great market, and buying stopped there and elsewhere. The farmers' 
bitterness led to a cooperative movement and to a Federal Trade Com-
mission investigation of the industry. 
The European market also collapsed. As James I. Miller reported 
in late 1920, overseas trade was "thoroughly demoralized," and En-
gland in particular was "badly congested with Bright tobaccos." Post-
war instability and a glut proved too much for International Planters, 
which collapsed in 1922. 
Management decisions also contributed to Universal's plight. As 
market prices fell, the company's speculative purchases rose. Universal 
built up a sizable inventory but began to find sales more difficult to 
conclude. The inventory included "old tobacco" that had been bought 
even earlier at higher prices. One major customer, Nanyang Brothers 
of Shanghai, had been badly oversold, and Universal was faced with 
the prospect of losing a valued client. 
In retrospect, it is clear that Universal had grown too fast and with 
too little control over its subsidiaries. The multimillion-dollar Indus-
trial Leaf conglomerate had been underfinanced from the start, and its 
push in cigar leaf came at the time when cigars were rapidly losing 
ground to cigarettes. Within the Universal family, new bank accounts 
and increased borrowing had proliferated, and borrowing had become 
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increasingly expensive. Contributing to the problem to a lesser degree 
was the extravagance Universal lavished on its New York and Paris of-
fices as well as on its principal officers. 
James I. Miller also made unfortunate investments, though the situ-
ation is difficult to unravel. As president of both the Taylor Company 
and Southern States and as one of the principal organizers of Univer-
sal, Miller had amassed wealth and influence second only to Yuille's. 
When the presidency became available in mid-1923, it was offered to 
Miller, who declined, partly it appears because he opposed relocating 
to New York City. Perhaps he also let the opportunity pass because a 
story was already unfolding that would ultimately force him to leave. 
Miller's fall from power was set against the backdrop of his own 
severe medical problems. During a slow recovery, Miller made anum-
ber of unfortunate investments. His worst decision was pledging $1.5 
million for a huge tract of Georgia forest land that was no more than 
scrub timber. Miller had drawn heavily from his holdings in Universal 
stock for collateral and he needed cash from dividends to meet his in-
terest payments. The cessation of the quarterly dividends on the 
company's common and the depreciation of Universal's stock crushed 
him, but apparently not before he was able to manipulate some of the 
company's assets. 
Finally, on April 9, 1924, Miller's standing had become "intoler-
able," and he resigned as both officer and director to, he wrote, "go 
into business myself." Initially, he returned to Henderson where, with 
Universal financing, he founded the James I. Miller Company. In 1929 
he relocated to Wilson, North Carolina, where his remaining decades 
were spent as a successful businessman, active churchman, and civic 
leader. Meanwhile, Universal spent years attempting to salvage some-
thing from the Georgia forest land Miller had purchased. 
With Yuille's departure, the Universal presidency passed briefly to 
another of the senior founders, William A. Willingham, a Virginian 
who did not share Miller's distaste for living in New York City. Al-
though only an interim chief executive (1923-24), the courtly "Mr. Will," 
as he was affectionately known, wasted little time before addressing the 
company's most pressing problem. Stockholders learned that a new 
policy of "strict retrenchment" was under way and that borrowing by 
subsidiaries was henceforth to be controlled by Universal's Richmond 
office. 
Willingham further announced the curtailment of "endorsing notes 
of affiliated companies" and a goal of borrowing less and from fewer 
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banks. On all counts, Willingham could justifiably claim some success, 
but the real recovery came later under the leadership of his successor. 
Frederick Nash Harrison was only thirty-seven years old at the time 
of his elevation to the presidency on September 16, 1924. Although 
young and inexperienced in administrative matters, Fred Harrison 
brought to the office a number of assets, foremost of which were his 
family connections. Since their arrival in Virginia in the 1600s, the 
Harrisons had provided the colony, the state, and the nation with gen-
eration after generation of leaders. Fred Harrison's ancestors included 
a signer of the Declaration of Independence and two United States 
presidents. 
Of Fred's four brothers, one was a businessman in Richmond; an-
other a medical doctor in Danville; a third, James, headed the First 
National Bank of Maryland in Baltimore; and the fourth, Bob, had in 
1919 become the president of Export Leaf, the buying arm of the world 
giant, British American Tobacco. Fred had maternal ties to a host of 
other Virginia statesmen. The time seemed right for a distinguished 
Virginia family to be represented at the head of a major, albeit troubled, 
Virginia-based corporation. 
A second asset of the new president could be found in his own 
formative experiences, which not only shaped his character and values 
but made him an ideal transitional figure between the rough-and-tumble 
self-made tobacconists of the early twentieth century and the more so-
phisticated and better-educated leadership that was to follow. 
Fred Harrison was the tenth of thirteen children born to the Rever-
end John H. and Anna Carrington Harrison, then of Virginia's Amelia 
County. Fred's father had been educated at the University of Virginia, 
had ridden with a Powhatan County troop under Confederate General 
James Ewell Brown ("Jeb") Stuart, and had been shot, captured, and 
imprisoned by the Federals. After the war, John H. Harrison had be-
come an itinerant Baptist preacher serving five churches at a total sal-
ary of eighty-five dollars a year-plus an unspecified number of do-
nated hams and chickens. He had at one time owned a small farm, but 
it had been lost to foreclosure. Although Fred would later joke about it, 
times were difficult in his youth, and, like other Virginians of modest 
circumstances, he recalled eating lard for butter. 
When Fred was a child, his father died and the family was forced to 
move into sparse quarters in Danville where his mother, a strict and 
religious woman, became the principal influence in his life. While still 
a schoolboy in Danville, Fred entered the tobacco business; he would 
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rise before dawn and walk to a local tobacco warehouse for his chores 
as a floor sweep. With the assistance of an older brother, he worked his 
way through the University of Virginia and graduated as a civil engi-
neer in the class of 1911. After serving on the Panama Canal project 
and with engineering firms in California and Connecticut, he joined 
his brother Bob with the British American Tobacco Company. Bob's 
rapid rise caused Fred to fear talk of nepotism and to look for opportu-
nities elsewhere. 
In the meanwhile, Fred had caught the eye of the old American 
leaf czar, Thomas B. Yuille, who hired him to run Universal's W.H. 
Winstead branch in Owensboro, Kentucky, and also to work for Mr. 
Winstead during the Maryland season. Elected a Universal director in 
1919, he was paradoxically both an insider and an outsider when he 
was chosen president in 1924. 
Fred Harrison's third asset was his character and personality. On 
the occasion of his death in 1972, a close associate remarked: "I never 
heard anybody say an unkind or critical word about him, and I never 
heard him say an unkind or critical word about anybody." 
Fred Harrison genuinely liked people, paupers and plutocrats alike, 
and people reciprocated his interest and affection-and trusted him 
explicitly. Though he would later be knighted by the King of Sweden, 
he never, as one acquaintance remembered, "put on airs"-a personal 
accolade in the South-and he always enjoyed the company of tobacco 
folk. He never had a personal secretary. Harrison's integrity and per-
sonal warmth were widely admired as were his donations to numerous 
charities-large and small-which he almost always kept confidential. 
Modest and soft-spoken, "a gentleman and a gentle man," he became 
the ideal diplomat to mediate disputes among his fellow officers and 
among the leaders who headed Universal's partner companies. Harrison, 
who had a way with people and was known for his stable character, 
inherited officers who would remain throughout his long tenure as 
president. Continuity of leadership in key posts helps to explain the 
company's success during his decades as the company's leader. 
By 1924, to a remarkable degree, a new management team had 
been assembled at Universal. Of the founding officers, the chairman, 
the president, the secretary, the treasurer and most directors had re-
signed, retired, or reduced their responsibilities. Willingham contin-
ued to serve as chairman of the board from 1924 to 1945 and as a 
member of the finance committee. Remaining in New York City even 
following the closing of the office there and advancing in years, he 
28 Tobacco Merchant 
seems to have played an ever-decreasing role in company management. 
Pat Gorman, though valuable in several areas, especially with cigar leaf 
purchases, resigned in 1929. 
In this second, post-founding phase of Universal's management, 
the company officers were chairman of the board Willingham; presi-
dent Harrison; vice presidents K.R. Edwards, Patrick H. Gorman, O.C. 
Gregory,]. Pinckney Harrison, and Mr. Will's brother E.W. Willingham; 
secretary Curtis M. Dozier Sr.; and treasurer Joseph F. Henderson. 
The genial Dozier, whose Roman Catholic forebears had emigrated 
from France to the Virginia colony in 1683, was a mainstay in the state 
Republican party and also served as in-house legal counsel; however, 
he played a secondary role in management. But the other new faces-
K.R. Edwards, Pinckney Harrison, and Joe Henderson-were real deci-
sion-makers and catalysts in the company. They would remain so for 
decades to come. 
The oldest of the three, Kenneth Raynold Edwards, was born in 
Henderson, North Carolina, in 1891 and educated there and at nearby 
Trinity College (now Duke University). Starting in 1909 as a teenage 
foreman for the J.P. Taylor Company in his hometown, he was a vice 
president by 1914 and elected a vice president of Universal in 1921. As 
the older generation passed, Edwards became the preeminent leaf man 
in the company and remained so until his death in 1967. He influenced 
the purchasing and processing of millions of pounds of tobacco annu-
ally. To a large degree, the company's fortunes rode on his expertise. 
A no-nonsense personality and an indefatigable worker, the 
stout Edwards had a keen eye for the leaf and for a bargain purchase. 
On the direct and rough-hewn side, usually sporting a large black cigar 
and being chauffeured about in a luxury car and always carrying with 
him a detailed knowledge of the current market situation, K.R. Edwards 
became the prime model of a "leaf man." Ultimately he earned the 
sobriquet "the Dean of Tobacco." 
In sharp contrast to Edwards was the athletic and debonair James 
Pinckney Harrison, whose trademarks were sophistication, savoir-faire, 
and intellectualism. Although some associates took his increasingly dis-
cernible "broad A" accent and aristocratic manner to be signs of snob-
bery, none failed to acknowledge his brilliance. 
Fred Harrison's first cousin and confidant, Pinckney was born in 
1896, the son of a Danville, Virginia, lawyer who was an alumnus of the 
University of Virginia. Pinckney also attended Mr. Jefferson's Univer-
sity, as it was called by generations of Virginians, where he played both 
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baseball and tennis and was active in campus life. Family financial re-
versals caused him to leave the university in 1916 and to serve briefly in 
the U.S. Marine Corps, in which he rose to the rank of sergeant. He 
entered the tobacco business during the war, and by 1919 at the age of 
twenty-three, he had become a vice president and director of Interna-
tional Planters, an early Universal rival. He went to Universal shortly 
thereafter, where he was elected a director in 1922. 
Pinckney Harrison's lifelong strength was in sales, but his first major 
contribution to Universal was in the development of a significant profit 
center in China. There he replaced an agent with a company, then put 
in charge of it a tall raw-boned youngster who came from a family of 
nine off a hardscrabble farm near Reidsville, North Carolina. Pinckney's 
man was James E. Covington ("Covey"), who was destined to be one of 
the most colorful and important names in the Universal story. 
In the 1920s Pinckney Harrison, who died in 1968, also made peace 
with Nanyang Brothers of Shanghai and in addition toured Europe to 
reassess Universal's standing there. Along the way, he won the Rich-
mond city tennis championship for men's singles in 1926 and danced 
with his young wife, Nellie, almost literally around the world. 
While "the Kingfish" Edwards dominated the leaf scene and 
Pinckney Harrison realigned sales, Joseph F. Henderson sought tore-
establish the company's financial credibility. A Southerner who had 
migrated north, Henderson was part of a bank team that oversaw the 
liquidation of International Planters. Perhaps in that capacity he knew 
Pinckney Harrison or had come to know some of the Universal officers 
in New York. At any rate, he joined the company about that time and in 
September 1923 became its treasurer, thus ending the nearly annual 
turnover in that position. His accounting skill, conservative tempera-
ment, and strong ties with the banking community were welcome addi-
tions to the Universal system. Through the decades, Joe Henderson 
also served as one of the company's chief troubleshooters. He died in 
1964. 
Although youthful, Universal's new management team applied an 
old remedy to the company's financial ills: expenses were cut and new 
revenues aggressively sought. The formula was easier to state than to 
implement; however, results were positive, and by the fateful year of 
1929 Universal was in a strong position. It had overcome the problems 
of the early 1920s and would continue to prosper during the Great 
Depression. 
Retrenchment, which had begun during the Willingham interim, 
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was accelerated. The far-flung and costly empire of Industrial Leaf 
was liquidated under the hand of Pat Gorman, as were other suspect or 
unprofitable enterprises, most notably Tropical Leaf. Small savings were 
achieved when the Paris office was made less luxurious and the New 
York headquarters was reduced to a branch. Less borrowing from fewer 
banks also helped, as did a tightening of control over the financial deal-
ings of Universal's affiliates. Building on a 1923 resolution to "make 
straight loans to the subsidiaries instead of endorsing" their borrowing, 
the company established its authority over joint accounts with affiliates 
in 1925. 
Using Richmond as its corporate headquarters placed Universal in 
contact with the leaf departments of most major American manufac-
turers and with the American branches of many Europ.ean buyers. New 
offices in the Richmond Trust Building even inherited the Persian rugs! 
The company continued to buy up its own preferred stock and held 
the line for several years against paying dividends due on its common. 
The annual meeting of stockholders was changed from the third Tues-
day in September to the third Monday in October. While Universal cut 
back and streamlined, it also sought to generate additional revenues. 
Acquired from the residue of International Planters was the stable J. M. 
Edmunds Company of Danville, Virginia-the predecessor of today's 
Virginia Tobacco Company. Meanwhile, Eastern Leaf came into being 
to take advantage of market opportunities in Durham, North Carolina, 
and the W.H. Winstead Company entered the Pennsylvania market for 
cigar leaf. Across the board, Universal showed a more aggressive buy-
ing policy. 
More significantly, new profit centers abroad were established in 
the form of Universal Leaf Tobacco Company of China and Canadian 
Leaf Tobacco Company. The company salvaged what it could from 
Miller's Georgia land purchase and, under the leadership of treasurer 
Henderson, sought to generate revenue from its cash surpluses by in-
vesting in "the New York call money market." To stimulate the busi-
ness of its partners and subsidiaries, Universal accelerated its effort to 
help local managers buy into their own companies, and it invested heavily 
in plant improvements. 
A Universal chronology from 1924 to 1929 reveals the nature of 
the company's recovery. In 1925, net profits rose to over a million dol-
lars from fiscal year 1924's $179,365, and in November a Wall Street 
Journal headline trumpeted "UNIVERSAL LEAF MAKES A COME-
BACK." A 1926 government report listed Universal as "probably the 
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largest leaf dealer" in America, and the board voted a two-for-one split 
in Universal's common stock, although it changed from one hundred 
dollars per share to no par value. Further, for that year its gross sales 
rose 37 percent, and stockholders were told that "substantially all ac-
counts payable have been liquidated, leaving your company about free 
of debt and with bank balance of more than $1 million." 
In 1927 Universal posted an eleven-to-one ratio of current assets to 
liabilities, and the company was listed on theN ew York Stock Exchange 
"with no mortgages or funded indebtedness." In 1928 return from stocks 
in subsidiaries rose 44 percent. In 1929, gross sales totaled over $20 
million and the company had a cash balance of $1.2 million, unlimited 
lines of credit and no bank loans outstanding. With fixed assets of over 
$3 million and a surplus of over $5 million, at year's end, Universal's 
board declared a special 5 percent dividend "payable in common stock 
of the Company" and also took steps to allow employees to buy stock in 
an expeditious manner. 
Universal's recovery is all the more striking when viewed within 
the context provided by the fate of its rivals. International Planters was 
the largest of the dealers to fall in the early 1920s. From a World War I 
peak of 4,139, the number of independent dealers fell to 2,501; some 
consolidated and some went under while Universal sailed forward with 
a new generation at the helm. 
3 
The China Company 
Strikes Gold 
While Fred Harrison and the new management team set about to revi-
talize Universal in the mid-1920s, his cousin Pinckney was organizing a 
new and important subsidiary nearly half a globe away. Although its 
legal name would change more than once and although it would have 
more than one subsidiary itself, "the China Company," as it was called, 
proved immediately successful and contributed markedly to Universal's 
profits up to World War II and for a brief period afterward. It also 
provided some of the company's most colorful characters and dramatic 
moments. 
The story might be apocryphal but is nevertheless revealing, and it 
is certainly too good not to tell: according to one account, when Buck 
Duke first heard of the invention of the cigarette machine, he called 
for an atlas. He paged quickly through the book, not for the maps but 
rather for their demographic information. His eyes spotted "Popula-
tion: 430 million." Duke exclaimed: "That is where we are going to sell 
cigarettes." That, of course, was China. 
Tobacco had been grown and consumed in China for centuries 
before Buck Duke's day, but Duke's efforts made the Chinese people 
enthusiastic about cigarettes. First through the American Tobacco Com-
pany and then through the British American Tobacco Company (BAT), 
Duke introduced mass cigarette importation and marketing, then local 
mass production and cultivation in a combination that ultimately led to 
mass consumption and profits that few tobacconists thought possible 
anywhere. Starting in 1890 and relying on carefully selected talent and 
advertising, Duke raised his sales in China to 1.25 billion cigarettes by 
1902, to almost 10 billion in 1912, to 12 billion in 1916, and finally to 
31 billion in the early 1920s. 
Chinese cigarettes depended heavily on flue-cured blends, a need 
that was met by major imports from America. The peak was in 1931 
when 124,207,000 catties (a catty equals about one and a half pounds) 
were supplied. The BAT also pioneered the growth of indigenous flue-
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cured leaf, with the volume increasing from 2,640,000 catties in 1916, 
to a peak of 231 million in 1937. Although hundreds of Chinese manu-
facturers arose to challenge the BAT dominance, none did so success-
fully. Some, like the Nanyang Brothers, Hwa Ching, and Dah Tung 
Nan, all of Shanghai, developed substantial enterprises, and they too 
added to the demand for tobacco purchases. 
The focal point for much of China's tobacco trade was Shanghai, 
"The Pearl of the Orient." Strategically located on the coast of the East 
China Sea near the mouth of the Yangtze River and bays to the south, 
Shanghai was China's largest urban area and its most important com-
mercial center. On terms dictated by western powers in the nineteenth 
century, Shanghai became a "Treaty Port" and, as such, was "adminis-
tered mainly by foreigners." Within the city, large and specified areas 
known as "concessions" or "settlements," essentially "self-governing ... 
enclosures" were "set aside for foreign residents in which local admin-
istration (police, sanitation, roads, building regulations, and so forth) 
was in foreign hands and financed by local taxes levied by the foreign 
settlements." Foreign citizens-and goods alike-were subject to limited 
taxation by the Chinese. Even beyond the settlements, foreign influ-
ence prevailed over local authority. 
For many westerners prior to World War II, Shanghai was Shangri-
La, a place in which a small amount of foreign currency went a long 
way, and life's amenities and excesses were inexpensive. Villas, polo 
horses, tennis and golf, night clubs, gambling, fine food and drink, 
"the world's longest bar," cultural events, daily comforts administered 
by a half dozen or more servants-all were within easy reach of Ameri-
cans whose income by standards back home would be modest. 
Of the companies that combined to form Universal in 1918, some 
had already been involved in the China trade and would continue. 
Universal worked initially through an American, George Happer, in 
Shanghai, subsequently making him the company's agent for China, 
Korea, and Japan. By 1924 the operation had expanded to branch sta-
tus, but with disappointing results: with several million dollars at stake, 
a large contract with Nanyang had fallen apart. At this point, Pinckney 
Harrison came forward. 
Regarded by some of his contemporaries as a visionary, Pinckney 
had unorthodox ideas as well as sound ones. With keen intelligence 
and assurance, he often saw long-range possibilities; the judgment of 
time proved him correct on some occasions and wrong on others. With 
China, however, Pinckney's analysis was rewardingly on the mark. 
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Harrison's contributions in China went beyond only seeing 
Universal's potential there. He also sold the idea, organized a new com-
pany, replaced the former agent with Jim Covington, and, for years, 
served as Universal's liaison with China. In May 1924, Harrison won 
board support for organizing the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company of 
China "to carry on a general leaf tobacco business in the Orient with 
the principal office in Shanghai." Two months later he gained approval 
for the operations there to include a sales-and-profits protocol, a loan 
guarantee of up to six hundred thousand dollars, and the transfer of 
Universal's previous holdings and personnel to the new company. Al-
ready he had set about making peace with Nan yang Brothers. As if that 
were not enough, Harrison also benefited from an accident of timing. 
An intense Chinese nationalism welled up in 1925 with the BAT as its 
most logical target, thus inadvertently causing the BAT to be sympa-
thetic toward other western ventures. Native businessmen also opened 
the door to what had previously been a BAT -dominated local clientele. 
Finally, Pinckney had double good fortune in acquiring available 
office space. The company secured quarters on the second floor of the 
Asiatic Petroleum Company Building owned by Shell Oil. It was ideally 
located for business purposes in an attractive commercial area of town 
fronting the Whangpo River, which flowed into the Yangtze near its 
mouth on the China Sea. And, its address was Number One, The Bund-
with "Number One" carrying the coincidental benefit of meaning "most 
important" in the Chinese value system. 
Pinckney now realized he needed a director in Shanghai, and he 
found him, unemployed and walking down the street in Danville, Vir-
ginia. Whether Pinckney Harrison had known James E. Covington be-
fore that chance encounter is unknown, but a short conversation led to 
a longer one and ultimately to Covington's being sent to China. "Covey" 
went first in a general capacity, soon became vice president and man-
ager, and subsequently was named president of the China Company. 
Born into a large family on a small farm across the Virginia state 
line not far south of Danville, Covington had known hard times as a 
youngster. With only a limited education, he had done factory work in 
Durham, had retailed "Little Recruit" cigars in Pennsylvania, and had 
served a tour with the British American Tobacco Company in China 
before returning to a short-lived job, once again in tobacco, in Danville. 
Somewhere along the way he had developed ambition, drive, a forceful 
personality, and a salesman's ability to sell himself and his product. 
There would always be a raw-boned and rustic country boy inside 
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Covington-an unsophisticated presence that many people found at-
tractive and which he would use and at the same time try to overcome. 
Tall and angular, the red-haired Covington could exude unsophisti-
cated charm or, on occasion, he could behave true to stereotype and 
explode in anger. Some of his rough spots were smoothed by his gra-
cious and polished wife, Annie Stuart James, daughter of a prominent 
politician and publisher in Danville. China and Mrs. Covington com-
bined to advance considerably Covington's social skills. The process 
carried him, said one contemporary, from following the backside of a 
mule to being mounted in the saddle of a polo pony. 
Over the years, Covington made fifty-two trips to China and lived 
there more-or-less full time for over a decade. In the twenty-one years 
in which he had a responsibility for the China operation, profits were 
made in all but one-and attractive profits at that. Except indirectly, the 
China Company escaped America's economic despair and turmoil in 
the 1930s. "We didn't know about the Great Depression," noted one 
former China hand. "We didn't feel it." 
The nature of the business from the mid-1920s to Pearl Harbor 
was fourfold. First, UL T China imported American tobacco for sale in 
China. Second, it bought native leaf-from Chinese dealers and from 
local farmers-and sold it mainly to small Chinese manufacturers. Oc-
casionally native tobacco was also sold to combines like the Nanyang 
Brothers or even to the BAT when they ran short of certain grades or to 
manufacturers in Europe and Scandinavia. Third, Covington's men 
processed tobacco for Chinese companies. And, finally, and of least 
importance, the China Company traded in an opportunistic way in a 
variety of miscellaneous items ranging from sewing machines (sold to 
Nazi Germany) to products made by American Machine and Foundry 
(AMF), for which one of UL T China's salesmen served as an agent. 
The entrepreneurial spirit was so prevalent that Covington once cabled 
Richmond to send him a "boat full" of American automobiles, which 
could be sold at a nice profit in Shanghai, but the directive came back 
"to stick with tobacco." 
In its heyday in the 1930s, the China Company consisted of the 
corporate headquarters at Number One, The Bund, two redrying plants, 
two or three storage facilities, and three or more buying stations in the 
country's interior. In general, a handful of Americans, headed by 
Covington, supervised a multinational staff and a large body of Chi-
nese laborers. 
The laborers worked in groups and were supervised by a "Number 
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One" man in charge of the workforce. Tough and unsympathetic to 
physical weakness, the Number One, also Chinese, considered it rou-
tine for a one-hundred-pound man to shoulder and carry a two-hun-
dred-pound load of tobacco or for several of them to pull a loaded 
hogshead of some one thousand pounds half a mile by hand. 
Covington's management system was relatively simple. He made 
his expectations clear, delegated heavily, and kept a sharp eye in all 
directions. "He'd be the first to pat you on the back," remembered one 
coworker, "but also the first to raise hell if anything didn't work out." 
In his spacious office, Covington's desk was located so that he could 
see, if he chose, anyone entering the company's main door and also 
anyone getting off the elevator on the second floor itself. To an au-
thoritarian temperament he added the trappings of an executive-tai-
lor-made clothes, servants, and a seven-passenger Nash automobile. In 
short, there was never any mistaking who ran the business. 
Covington oversaw the company's entire operations, but his special 
strength was in making a deal. Indefatigable in sales, he was as shrewd 
as he was diligent. He particularly understood the importance of "face" 
(self-esteem) to his Chinese customers. "In China," recalled one Uni-
versal veteran, "everything was 'face.'" 
Unlike some rival dealers, Covington took the Chinese into his 
home-an ultimate compliment in the East-and entertained them roy-
ally there and elsewhere, always on guard to protect their sensibilities 
and to reassure them if a socially embarrassing situation arose. Covington 
knew how to put on a show for customers, even at the expense of his 
American staff. Once, for example, a guest accidentally put a foot 
through a lower pane in a French door leading to a terrace. Covington 
allowed no time for embarrassment to set in. "Oh, don't worry about 
that," he responded. "Watch this!" He kicked out another pane him-
self. 
In sales, at various times, were also J. Fuller Malone, a happy-go-
lucky North Carolinian who earlier had sold Buick automobiles in Shang-
hai and who could buy leaf as well as sell it; George Arbogast, a genial 
New Yorker and the AMF agent Pinckney Harrison had hired on a 
ship; Cliff Sutherland, a Virginian who had been sent from the main 
office in Richmond and who eventually would take charge of all sales 
of American leaf in China; and, to a lesser degree, George W. Macon 
and J.C. Waddell, two youngsters whose roles were more in leaf pro-
curement and processing than in sales and whose subsequent careers in 
the States made them two of America's best-known tobacconists. 
Backing the sales force was an office staff headed by A.l. McOwan, 
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a tough Scotsman with a background in accounting. McOwan had been 
born in 1898; as a teenager in the British navy during World War I, he 
had survived having two ships shot out from under him. He later joined 
the BAT in China (where an uncle had lately been a missionary). Though 
his native countrymen rightly called him "MacAw'n," he was destined 
to be "McOw'n" to his American coworkers after having been recruited 
by Covington in the mid-1 920s. Although these two strong-willed indi-
viduals clashed on more than one occasion, they also worked together 
to assure the successful day-to-day operations of the China Company. 
Mac had full responsibility-broadly defined-for company records. 
Inventory, prices, sales, factory reports, and other items often changed 
daily, and current, accurate numbers had to be at hand. Mac also handled 
such financial matters as paying taxes in China and to the United States, 
preparing monthly balance sheets and annual reports, overseeing the 
payroll, and supervising foreign exchanges as well as petty expendi-
tures. Chaotic conditions made China an unorthodox but genuine "tax 
haven," and payments were made largely "to keep the appearance of 
proper conduct." 
As office manager, McOwan supervised an administrative staff that 
at one time reflected in national origin nine different countries. Al-
most all of these people were on straight salary. Two key assistants were 
Randolph Suri, a multilingual Swiss-born bookkeeper, and Mary 
Kammerling Frisch, a German secretary whose loyalty to the company 
would stand severe tests during World War II. The bookkeeper pre-
ferred using an abacus to an adding machine, but Mac was tolerant 
because he perceived no loss of efficiency or accuracy. While Ameri-
cans came and went, McOwan was the closest thing to a permanent 
fixture in the China Company, serving it from the mid-1920s until af-
ter World War II, which included his incarceration by the Japanese 
from 1942 to 1945. He died in 1988. 
Universal's American staff was augmented by Chinese business-
men who worked on a commission basis and whose roles'as intermedi-
aries were absolutely critical. Foremost was L.T. Yuan, Universal's 
"comprador" (the native man who arranges things). The comprador 
system was widespread in China and made possible another business 
reality, namely "the squeeze." At all levels extra payment was required 
for the delivery of goods and services. Call it a tip, a kickback, a bribe, 
an unofficial tax, an informal service charge, or paying for favors-the 
squeeze was not only persuasive but obligatory and was accepted as 
such by Chinese and foreigners alike. 
"As prominent in Shanghai as a Chinese could be," the elderly Yuan 
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was a politician and businessman, and he knew well the needs of 
Universal's customers. He might see them separately or accompanied 
by, for example, Jim Covington, to effect a deal. Under Yuan was L.T. 
Tsao, his assistant; Mohan Zee, "the greatest salesman in the world" 
and a man whose association with Universal would span decades and 
pass into the generation of his two sons; George Su, who eventually 
sold both Chinese and American leaf; and O.K. Lee, a businessman 
and Yuan's successor as comprador. In leaf procurement and process-
ing, Universal's man was H.C. Chao, missionary-school educated, flu-
ent in English, able, and respected. 
American leaf was sold to the Chinese on a sample basis, with deliv-
ery taken from Universal's storage, usually after inspection. As in the 
United States, business was done on a handshake. Close contact with 
customers enabled Covington to cable anticipated and exact needs to 
the Richmond office, though on occasion he also went home for con-
sultation and to visit the markets where he made himself conspicuous 
by buying all the tobacco he could for resale in China. 
In the mid-1930s, fifteen or more American dealers had offices in 
Shanghai. Most operations, however, consisted of only a sales represen-
tative and his comprador. Universal had by far the largest operation in 
terms of personnel, volume, and scope of business; and few rivals could 
match Universal's range of sales, with customers from the BAT to Chi-
nese manufacturers of all sizes. 
Universal enjoyed several clear advantages over other American 
dealers in Shanghai. Covington's operation was larger and more versa-
tile, and he drew upon the resources of a parent company that could 
extend financial aid, guarantee loans, and provide American leaf in 
any amount and from any market. In addition, Universal Leaf Tobacco 
of China had a competitive edge because it also bought and processed 
native leaf, thus establishing multiple ties with Chinese manufacturers. 
Universal might process tobacco owned by a Chinese manufacturer, 
or it might sell him Chinese leaf owned and processed by UL T. Or a 
salesman might suggest the desirability of buying a combination of na-
tive and American leaf for a particular Chinese cigarette. Through its 
AMF connection, Universal also provided machinery and replacement 
parts. 
So substantial was the processing business that in 1935, in response 
to a report by Pinckney Harrison, Universal in Richmond established a 
new company, Lien Hwa Leaf, "for the primary purpose of rehandling 
native grown tobaccos in China for the Company-and others." Lien 
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Hwa ("feeding or nourishing" in Chinese) was also set up to allow im-
portant Chinese to buy into the Universal network. 
Universal's first processing plant in China dated from the 1920s 
and was located on Yulin Road within the International Settlement. Its 
season lasted six months, during which it ran two shifts of perhaps 130 
to 140 workers each. Chinese were hired by the Number One. Women 
were paid forty cents a day, and men earned eighty cents; family teams 
were common. The combined wage, by Shanghai standards, was not 
unattractive. Coopers, who also worked under the Number One, were 
better paid. Americans were amazed at the strength, agility, and energy 
of Chinese laborers, who could handle 250-pound bales all day long. 
The plant was small by American standards, and the process was 
simple. The ultimate purpose was to prepare newly purchased leaves 
for storage. The tobacco arrived tied in bundles, was checked for for-
eign matter, then cleaned by mass-steaming. Next it was hung on sticks, 
which were then placed on racks that were carried by moving chains 
through a shed for redrying. The leaf was heated, then cooled, then 
steamed again to bring the moisture content to the level required for 
storage-about 12 percent. Finally the tobacco was packed into hogs-
heads and taken elsewhere for storage. 
Although the labor was menial, the redrying process had to be done 
carefully or the tobacco would be ruined. Machinery was unsophisti-
cated-often consisting of J.P. Taylor Company discards-but knowl-
edge of it was necessary for preventive maintenance, repairs, and smooth 
runs. This expertise came from the United States in the form of young 
tobacconists hailing mainly from Virginia and North Carolina and bring-
ing with them experience they had gained working within the Univer-
sal system. 
Redrying skills and a knowledge of leaf were essentials, but so were 
the qualities of a tough foreman. The men who came to Shanghai were 
usually single and looked at their service there as a chance to advance 
within the company while seeing the world. Pay was higher, and an 
American dollar bought several times in Shanghai what it would in the 
States. An assignment was given in exchange for a four-year contract, 
with the promise of a paid three-month vacation at tour's end. 
Throughout most of the 1930s, the Yulin Road plant was managed 
by J.C. ("Ches") Waddell, a native Virginian who earlier had switched 
from pre-law studies to a floor sweeper's post with the Taylor Com-
pany in Richmond. Waddell had risen to a foreman's position when 
Pinckney Harrison sold him and especially his mother on the idea of 
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young Ches's going to China. He arrived in Shanghai in 1930 at age 
twenty-five just in time to arrange shipment home for his predecessor's 
body. 
Initially the Yulin Road plant consisted of Waddell and 130 Chi-
nese workers. With study, he soon picked up an elementary knowledge 
of the local dialect, or at least enough to get the job done and to recog-
nize that the melodic phrase he always heard on his arrival meant "old 
big nose is coming." Facing down a coopers' strike, he also learned that 
he "was the National Labor Board" and that a two-by-four plank could 
expedite negotiations. 
Waddell worked hard, played hard, and soon moved into other 
areas of the Chinese operation. In time he bought heavily for the com-
pany from the leaf transported to Shanghai by Chinese dealers. In a lot 
across from the factory, the Chinese leaf would be placed in rows of 
250-pound stacks, and Waddell would buy half a million pounds or 
more each day during a buying season of two or three months. 
Waddell had begun to move into sales when, in 1938, he decided 
that two tours were enough. Now the head of a young family, he also 
took seriously warnings from a japanese friend who told him bad times 
were ahead. Waddell's decision to leave China did not sit well with 
Covington, who apparently had been grooming Waddell to take over 
the China operation. Back in the States, however, Waddell later made 
his mark as a mainstay of Universal's buying staff. He finally did re-
turn to China, but only for a sentimental journey after his retirement. 
To his surprise, many of the old landmarks had survived World War II 
as well as the Chinese revolution. 
The Shanghai plant where Waddell worked was the first but not 
the largest of Universal's China properties; the second eventually had 
two redrying machines as well as a larger capacity and labor force than 
did the Yulin Road facility. Located up the China coast from Shanghai 
in the resort town and port city of Tsingtao in western Shantung Prov-
ince, it had been purchased by Covington and Harrison at a cocktail 
party in 1934. Chinese manufacturers had originally built the plant to 
circumvent Universal's processing dominance, but they had had diffi-
culty operating it and had damaged a whole year's tobacco crop. 
Universal's technical assistance was requested; then the Chinese sold 
out. Covington later said the price had been steep but the ultimate re-
ward substantial. 
First manager at Tsingtao was George Macon. A native of 
Henderson, North Carolina, and a J.P. Taylor employee since 1931 
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when he was only twenty-two, Macon first arrived in China in 1936 and 
ran the night shift for Waddell in Shanghai. As the business at Tsingtao 
increased, a second redrying machine was installed, and eventually other 
men were brought over to assist in the plant and with the buying. Join-
ing Macon were Charles Jackson, Henry Towler, and Rolf Gerber, the 
latter destined to die as a result of wartime incarceration by the Japa-
nese. Before his return to the States, Macon also figured in one of the 
most perilous moments in the history of the China Company. 
The Chinese had long grown tobacco, but their proficiency in Vir-
ginia types came only after the arrival of BAT experts who provided 
seed, technological assistance, and economic incentives. Chinese flue-
cured tobacco came largely from Shantung Province but also from 
Honan, where the leaf was similar to the American Old and Eastern 
Belts. 
Although inferior in many ways to American leaf, Chinese tobacco 
was in great demand within the country. Universal bought it regularly 
in Shanghai and eventually established three buying stations in Shantung 
Province, which included Tsingtao. The buying season lasted roughly 
from October 1 until just before Christmas. Purchases were on specula-
tion, and prices were set at a percentage of those on the current Ameri-
can market. 
Universal's three stations were on the main railroad line out of 
Tsingtao several hours into the interior; each consisted of a simple bam-
boo shed or two within or near a walled village close to the railroad 
line. Although China's "warlord era" had almost completely passed, 
militaristic activity and terrorism had not, and much of China still lacked 
any nationally recognized authority. One scholar estimates that in 1930 
in Shantung alone, "31 thousand unorganized troops and bandits, in 
addition to 192 thousand regular troops, were living off the country-
side." "Banditry flourished in all parts of the country," he continues, 
"and robbery and violence were commonplace." Kidnapping for ran-
som was widely practiced. That grim reality helps explain some other-
wise strange aspects of Universal's buying network. 
Arrangements in the buying provinces had been made in advance 
by Universal's highly respected leaf comprador, H.C. Chao. Universal's 
designated buyer lived in the walled village under the protection of the 
local Number One. A Chinese banker came in to handle the money, 
and likely a BAT contingent also would be there. Conditions were primi-
tive by western standards, although Americans usually brought their 
own supplies and servants. 
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Accompanied by up to fifty soldiers with fixed bayonets, the Uni-
versal buyer left the village and took up his position at a shed made of 
bamboo poles with a deep thatched roof, sawtooth style, its opening 
facing north to catch the true light for judging tobacco. Farmers brought 
their leaf in carts and wheelbarrows-sometimes using their wives as 
draw horses. The leaf was displayed in rows through which the buyer 
walked, preceded and followed by armed soldiers. Offers were made 
that farmers could decline by exclaiming pu mai ("no sale"). For deals 
struck, tickets were drawn that were redeemable locally in Chinese dol-
lars by the farmer. 
Aided by the Chinese labor force, the buyer combined the pur-
chased leaf into bales, put them into a packing machine, and stacked it 
all. When enough tobacco was accumulated, it was packed into a gon-
dola car at the nearby railroad; then, accompanied by guards, it was 
shipped to Tsingtao for processing or for shipment and processing in 
Shanghai. Waddell, Fuller Malone, M.R. Doggett, and other Ameri-
cans bought in Shantung, but by the late 1930s the buyers also included 
a Greek (Karas) and two Russians (Surin and Socolof). 
Success in Shantung led to the establishment in 1935 of a buyer 
station in Honan Province, where conditions were even more primitive 
and perilous. The BAT, which had been active there, welcomed Uni-
versal as a way of diffusing antimonopolistic antagonisms. The local 
Chinese dealers, however, were hostile to the idea of additional compe-
tition. Such was the scene faced by Universal's new man in Honan, 
George Macon, at the age of twenty-six. 
Not long after establishing himself at the buying station, Macon 
was invited to a conference in the local BAT compound. Accompanied 
by bodyguards, Macon arrived in good order, but outlaws struck. A 
shootout took place just five feet away from Macon, leaving the head 
BAT man and six Chinese dead. Had it not been for quick action by 
one of his bodyguards, Macon might have been one of the victims. Re-
newed buying led to other difficulties, and the Honan experiment was 
abandoned. 
Twice in the 1930s Universal's China operation was jeopardized by 
the outbreak of fighting between the expansionist Japanese and the 
tenacious but politically factionalized Chinese. In 1931 the Japanese 
invaded northern China, and the resulting war, though spasmodic and 
short-lived, reached Shanghai with tragic results. Macon, Waddell, and 
others in time became part of a volunteer militia force, a kind of instant 
home guard, called out to help the 4th U.S. Marines and other regulars 
protect the International Settlement from intrusion. Home guard sol-
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diers were issued arms, barriers were constructed, curfews enforced, 
and defensive positions established. In October Pinckney Harrison re-
ported "unsettled conditions" in China but predicted that business would 
not be hurt in the long run-and indeed the crisis passed. 
Much more serious was the outbreak of violence in 193 7. This time 
carnage and destruction entered even the foreign enclaves, and 
Universal's men saw war's horrors close at hand. Furthermore, in the 
aftermath, Universal had to deal with the mercurial Japanese-who came 
to control much of the Shanghai area-rather than with the essentially 
cooperative Chinese. 
With little warning, violent confrontations occurred again in Shang-
hai on August 13, 1937. Air raids, fire bombings, infantry attacks, and 
hand-to-hand combat followed one another in rapid succession. Over a 
thousand civilians died when a bomb landed in the center of a busy 
intersection not far from Universal's corporate headquarters in the Shell 
Building. 
Momentarily cut off in the confusion and destruction was Universal's 
storage facility on Dalny Road. The one American on duty there was 
Henry K. Towler, age twenty-seven, a native of Charlotte County, Vir-
ginia, and only recently arrived from the States. Towler got one tele-
phone call through-and was told to stay put. He had little choice, as 
street fighting soon engulfed and isolated the plant. Although terri-
fied, Towler did have the presence of mind to keep an American flag 
flying conspicuously above the building. When a truce was called and a 
rescue party appeared, Towler was holding on to the pole itself, the 
flag protectively-from a symbolic view at least-wrapped around him. 
Although Universal's people would be exposed to life-threatening 
situations in the future, no occasion would prove as bloody as that ter-
rible day in August. Towler, who tried unsuccessfully for years to blot 
the memories from his mind, still could not help remembering them in 
detail fifty years later. Trapped at the storage facility, he had watched 
in terrified horror as the fighting progressed door to door. 
"We made sure that we hung an American flag out," Towler re-
called. He telephoned Waddell and reported that he was trapped. "You 
could see them killing each other right and left in hand-to-hand com-
bat," he said. "[The Japanese] would bayonet the Chinese-and they 
weren't soldiers either-anything that came along that was Chinese. They 
would throw them up on a pile and get behind them ... using them for 
barricades. I got so scared ... I was afraid they were going to come and 
get me next." 
Later, Charles Jackson and Towler attempted to move their per-
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sonal effects during a temporary truce. While changing a flat tire caused 
by broken glass, a bomb hit nearby. Body parts rained down on the car. 
This would have been frightening by itself, but the men also knew that 
just a few miles away uncounted Chinese women had been raped and 
slaughtered. "I have tried to forget about that thing for so long, but ... " 
Towler said half a century later. 
After more fighting and another truce, Waddell and two other com-
pany employees went through the combat zone-with Japanese and 
Chinese soldiers poised on opposite sides of the street-to inspect the 
Liaoyang Road storage facility. The brick structure seemed at first to 
be in sound condition despite a few shell holes and occupation by the 
Japanese. "Thank goodness this hasn't been hit," Waddell said. He 
unlocked the front door and was shocked when he stepped into a roofless 
interior; an incendiary bomb had destroyed all but the four walls. Also 
destroyed was two hundred thousand dollars' worth of American to-
bacco. 
By November, the fighting had subsided, leaving the Japanese in 
control of much of Shanghai, including a large portion of the Interna-
tional Settlement and Universal's plant and main storage. As Universal 
sought to extricate its holdings in tobacco and the holdings of its Chi-
nese friends and customers, the squeeze system expanded to include 
the Japanese. For a time the company used tennis courts in the French 
Concession to conduct its business. 
Tsingtao also fell to the Japanese, and special arrangements had to 
be made to permit Universal's Chinese labor to work in the redrying 
plant there. Another difficulty came with a Japanese edict designating 
its own military paper, without value anywhere else, as the only official 
currency. One of Covington's last China maneuvers was designed to 
circumvent that policy. He learned that a large American naval vessel 
was lying at anchor in Tsingtao's bay and that American sailors were 
having to exchange their U.S. currency for Japanese paper for shore 
liberty; he struck a deal with the admiral in charge: under the eyes of 
the unsuspecting Japanese, Towler and others took suitcases full of the 
Japanese issue to the ship, where it was exchanged for checks from the 
National City Bank of New York. Covington had his American dollars, 
the sailors their Japanese script. 
Despite these and similar interruptions, business continued, and by 
1939 and 1940 it had returned to a profitable level. The company even 
introduced a new line dealing in Indian leaf, which was shipped for 
sale in Shanghai. By this time Covington had followed Waddell home, 
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and the China Company's nucleus had contracted considerably. Macon 
was still coming and going, but the China regulars were now Arbogast, 
Sutherland, Fuller Malone, Crawford Peace (a redrying man from North 
Carolina) and McOwan. For them the real drama came in 1941-and 
Malone, Peace, and McOwan did not get out in time. 
4 
A New Profit Center 
to the North 
As Pinckney Harrison and James Covington were developing Universal's 
China business, other company officials were pioneering in Canada 
and in various cigar-leaf districts of the United States. These three profit 
centers had much in common. In each case, a younger generation of 
entrepreneurs took over an enterprise of modest proportions and turned 
it into an impressive operation. Each company operated on a relatively 
autonomous basis, and each featured an essentially self-made man whose 
individual drive and acumen led him to a dominant position not only 
with a key subsidiary but within the geographic region. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, China and Canada represented Universal's foreign opera-
tions and, coupled with the cigar trade, discussed in the next chapter, 
they offered both a colorful and lucrative addition to the customary 
business in American cigarette leaf. 
In what today is the part of North America known as Canada, Indi-
ans grew tobacco long before the arrival of Europeans. East of the 
present-day Lake Huron and north of Lake Erie in the sand plains of 
southern Ontario, tribes cultivated the leaf and used it for trade, ritual 
ceremonies, and medicine, as well as for pleasure. Jesuit explorers com-
mented on its abundance and diverse uses, which included being smoked 
in pipes four or five feet long. Native tobacco was "strong flavored and 
sun cured," and its seed was collected and planted by early French set-
tlers. 
The nineteenth century witnessed significant commercial produc-
tion in Canada, largely in burley-type leaf, which was air cured. The 
first Canadian crop of flue-cured "Virginia" tobacco was grown in 1900 
in Leamington, Essex County, Ontario, by two brothers from North 
Carolina working for an affiliate of the American Tobacco Company. 
"Bright" tobacco caught hold, and newspapers in Virginia and North 
Carolina published notices of jobs for enterprising tobacco farmers who 
were willing to come north and ply their skills. 
Many who responded to these calls were youngsters right off the 
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farm, such as Red Parham, later an internationally known tobacconist, 
who arrived from North Carolina in 1921 and stayed several years. 
Parham and his coworkers "spent winter months in a tobacco process-
ing factory, teaching the workers how to grade and tie the tobacco, and 
during spring and summer, were buying or growing and curing the 
tobacco." 
Some of these American farm boys arrived with visions of polar 
bears and mountains of ice, only to be pleasantly surprised by the often 
temperate climate and picturesque farmscape in Ontario's "old belt" of 
Essex and Kent counties and later, to the west, in Norfolk, Oxford, and 
Elgin counties. The adjoining province of Quebec had long grown to-
bacco, mainly non-cigarette types, but flue-cured was not introduced 
there until 1930 and its production would never rival Ontario's. 
From its founding, Universal had dealt on a modest scale in Canada. 
Affiliates there included Gensior and Import Leaf of Montreal, and 
some business was also conducted with local manufacturers. But 
Universal's serious commitment came in 1925 with the founding of a 
new company with broad aspirations. 
From Universal's headquarters in New York City, William A. 
Willingham had monitored Canadian developments, and in June 1925 
he presented Pat Gorman and other directors with a tentative plan to 
organize a new company in Chatham, Ontario. In the short run, the 
step was taken to accommodate a Canadian customer, Tucketts Com-
pany of Hamilton, Ontario, but the long-range purpose was to make an 
early entrance into what promised to be a new source of marketable 
flue-cured leaf; although projected customers were Canadian, 
Willingham also saw export possibilities. 
Later that year the Canadian Leaf Tobacco Company (CL T) re-
ceived its charter and commenced operations to "buy, sell, handle, and 
deal" in Canadian tobacco. Of the two hundred thousand dollars' worth 
of stock authorized, Universal held about two-thirds, with a first option 
to buy the rest. But, as much as possible, the new enterprise was to have 
a predominantly British Commonwealth flavor-thus the name-with 
American influence being kept in the background. 
The first company officers consisted of prominent Universal offi-
cials-with Willingham as president, Dozier as secretary, and Henderson 
as treasurer-but the man responsible for on-site operations was a new-
comer to management. At CLT, Herbert WorthJacksonJr., then in his 
late twenties, found his first opportunity to demonstrate the qualities 
that in time would make him president of Universal itself. 
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Jackson came from a distinguished Tar heel family that dated from 
the seventeenth century and included governors, judges, president 
Andrew Jackson, and the notable editor-writer-cabinet officer Josephus 
Daniels. Born in Raleigh, Herbert moved as a child to Richmond where 
his father served as president of the Virginia Trust Company, as 
Herbert's brother would later. 
From Richmond's exclusive McGuire's University School, Jackson 
went on to the University of Virginia, where his college days overlapped 
those of Pinckney Harrison. Jackson, a mathematics major, completed 
his studies in three years, served as student body president, and main-
tained superlative grades. Bad eyesight threatened to keep him out of 
World War I, so he memorized the eye chart and joined the field artil-
lery as a private. Soon a second lieutenant, he years later recalled that 
he "saw no action," but he did admit to having been "kicked by two 
mules." 
Young Herbert forsook an opportunity in banking, not wanting "to 
sit on a stool all my life adding figures," and in January 1919 went to 
work for the J.P. Taylor Company in Richmond as a clerk. Obligatory 
service in the factories and on the markets came next, followed by his 
first test as a manager. He rose from vice president to president of 
Canadian Leaf by 1928. 
Much of CL T's initial personnel (including Jackson) came from 
the Universal organization in the States. The first plant in Chatham 
was in a building vacated by a lumber company; the task of transform-
ing it into a tobacco enterprise would be assigned to Ira C. Huff, a 
Taylor man from Henderson and for many years CL T's factory man-
ager. "All business" and "a man of few words," the efficient and hard-
working Huff believed "nothing was impossible." Eventually a senior 
vice president, he served Canadian Leaf until his retirement. 
Overseeing the coopershop was Wyatt Cheatham, a black 
Richmonder and a veteran of the Taylor Company. An expert hogs-
head maker, Cheatham taught the trade to others, including Russell 
French, a native Canadian Indian who worked at the plant until his 
retirement, as did Cheatham. The first redrying man was a Kentuckian 
from the Taylor Company. From Southwestern and the C.T.W. Argue 
Company came Robert C. Hodgin as accountant, office manager, and 
assistant secretary. Quiet and good natured, Hodgin served the Cana-
dian branch of Universal for thirty-five years. 
A key man in leaf was Clarence L. O'Brian, a North Carolinian 
formerly with the British American Tobacco Company. O'Brian had 
come to Canada in 1924 to grow flue-cured tobacco in Ontario, but the 
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next year he joined the new Canadian Leaf Tobacco Company as buyer 
and leaf inspector. He rose quickly to vice president and in 1931 be-
came general manager as the on-site executive representing Jackson, 
who by then had returned to the States. 
During his six years in Canada, Herbert Jackson not only estab-
lished a profitable company but also established himself within the 
Universal system. He impressed people with his sincerity and with a 
manner that was down-to-earth yet gentlemanly. He worked hard and 
expected others to do the same. He inspired people by placing trust in 
them, and he was both accessible and a good listener. 
Nothing if not systematic, Jackson was rarely caught unaware, and 
his ability with numbers and his mastery of detail were such that one 
employee suggested that "his head was a Burroughs adding machine." 
Frugality was a working principle with him; he even saved envelopes 
from incoming mail to recycle as note paper. A spittoon, to accommo-
date his chewing habit, always stood nearby. Surrounded by a young 
family and with the natural splendor providing endless opportunities 
for his outdoor interests, Jackson enjoyed perhaps the most contented 
days of his career. 
Herbert Jackson must also be credited with hiring his eventual suc-
cessor as CL T president and the man who would be in charge on-site 
from 1942 until his retirement in 1970-namely, E. D. ("Ed") Allen, one 
of Canada's most colorful and successful tobacconists. 
It might be said that a coin toss brought Allen to Canada while a 
fifty-dollar bill helped keep him there. The coin toss in a North Caro-
lina drug store determined which of three friends would respond to a 
Raleigh classified advertisement for two tobacco workers in Ontario; 
the fifty-dollar bill came from Ed's father with the injunction that he 
should be his own man and never fear having to walk home. 
Allen was born into an old-time tobacco family near Creedmoor, 
North Carolina. As far back as anyone could recall, his people had been 
"somehow or another in the tobacco business"-as large growers, ware-
house pioneers, and employees of various companies. His grandfather 
had been in the first wave of southerners coming to Leamington to 
work flue-cured tobacco, and Ed, a recent graduate of King's Business 
College in Raleigh, was favorably disposed to head north himself. He 
followed not only his grandfather's footsteps but also his advice to take 
plenty of long underwear. From 1927 to 1930 Ed Allen worked in south-
ern Ontario, helping to plant the first tobacco ever in some places and 
later growing his own. 
Allen heard of a possible job with Canadian Leaf, arranged an early 
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morning interview with Herbert Jackson, and by 10:30 A.M. found him-
self "in the grading room and working." His first impression of Jack-
son, destined to be his life-long friend and business colleague, was that 
he was "very dignified, high class, well educated ... the type of a man 
I would like to be associated with." In the 1930s Allen rose through the 
ranks as leaf tobacco inspector, buyer, sales representative, head buyer, 
assistant factory manager, and leaf superintendent. In 1942 he replaced 
the seriously ill O'Brian as general manager of CL T. All the while, 
Jackson, in Richmond, served as Universal's liaison with the Canadian 
arm and kept watch on operations there. 
Even as Canadian Leaf was being founded in 1925, the principal 
flue-cured belt was mov.ing westward-away from the pioneer area 
around Leamington and Chatham, along the north shore of Lake Erie 
toward such small towns as Tillsonburg, Delhi, and Simcoe. As the mi-
gration accelerated, so too did the pressure for Canadian Leaf Tobacco 
Company to accommodate it. In 1933, with C.L. O'Brian as the prime 
catalyst, it acquired, as a wholly owned subsidiary, the well-established 
firm of Norfolk Leaf in Tillsonburg. CLT got not only Norfolk's busi-
ness but, more important, its plant, which, although old, was expanded 
under leadership of factory manager Charles W. Thomas Jr. Another 
North Carolinian and an alumnus of its state University, Thomas had 
joined CL T in the late 1920s as a buyer and salesman. An extroverted 
person and a "good hand shaker," Thomas also "could figure more 
angles on most anything you can think about of any fellow you ever 
saw." Beginning in 1933 he served successively as vice president, direc-
tor, and manager of Norfolk Leaf. (His son C.W. Thomas III is cur-
rently president of Universal's major Canadian subsidiary, Simcoe Leaf.) 
Meanwhile, the Chatham plant continued to operate. The facility 
survived a fire in 1931 and, in 1937, a flood so bad a row boat was 
required to inspect the damage on the first floor. 
Canadian Leaf Tobacco's bread and butter account came to be 
Macdonald. Started by Jackson, increased by O'Brian, and firmly es-
tablished by Allen, this relationship was carefully nurtured so that as 
"their business grew, our business grew." An old-time manufacturer 
named for its eccentric but successful Scottish founder, Sir William 
Macdonald, the Montreal corporation scored heavily during World War 
I by giving free to soldiers its popular cigarette brands, Exports and 
British Consols. 
Macdonald, a private, family-run company, was headed by an 
equally private individual, Walter M. Stewart. A "man of few words" 
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but whose "words were his bond," Stewart distrusted high-powered sales-
men and complex situations alike. He easily formed a close bond with 
the direct and down-to-earth Ed Allen. Perhaps 80 percent of their busi-
ness was transacted by telephone, with payment by certified check. 
Stewart kept few records; he believed only two books counted: the check 
book-"you spend so much"-and the bank book-"you save so much." 
His wife, May, was an active partner in what was run-and run success-
fully-as a true "Mom and Pop" operation. 
Later the government insisted that Stewart keep more complete 
records and that he appoint a full slate of corporate officers. 
Unintimidated and wily, he named family members to every post, in-
cluding a son-in-law then incarcerated in Germany in a prisoner of war 
camp. When asked about the conspicuous omission of his own name 
from the list, he replied: "I'm just the owner." 
Canadian Leaf's final expansion of the 1930s took the company 
abroad when it established a branch in Southern Rhodesia in 1938. 
The move was made "mainly as a service to English customers who 
were interested in Rhodesian tobacco" but also with an eye toward ex-
port possibilities elsewhere. Again, Universal sought to maintain a Com-
monwealth flavor and to get in on the ground floor of a potentially 
active business. 
Sent to Rhodesia to begin operations was William H. Burroughs, a 
North Carolinian with a Duke University education who had been a 
buyer and leaf inspector for CL T since 1932. He established a base in 
Salisbury and worked closely with a local dealer, Kileff, which pro-
cessed, packed, and sometimes bought for CL T. Burroughs left, but 
returned in 1939 and again in 1940, accompani€d on the later stint by 
Mr. and Mrs. Ed Allen. Business broadened to the point that CL Twas 
buying on Rhodesia's three major markets-Salisbury to the south, Fort 
Jameson to the north, and Limbe in Nyasaland. Operations, however, 
were disrupted by Germany's submarine warfare and ceased for the 
duration of the war. 
No account of Universal's presence in Canada before World War 
II would be complete without at least a brief discussion of an unusual 
venture there. Although not directly related to Canadian Leaf Tobacco 
Company, it did involve Universal officials. 
In 1927 William A. Willingham, Patrick H. Gorman, and other 
tobacconists founded Club LaSalle on a section of scenic wilderness 
leased from the Canadian government. Essentially a fishing and hunt-
ing camp, Club LaSalle was located in Quebec Province about one hun-
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dred miles northeast of Montreal. Measuring perhaps sixty square miles 
and encompassing a dozen or more lakes and rivers, the tract was origi-
nally accessible only by air. A rustic lodge encouraged male compan-
ionship, and ample provisions (a major portion of which were of the 
alcoholic variety) and skilled Canadian guides kept life from being too 
spartan. Regulations were few and the organization informal, with 
Willingham and other Universal officials serving at various times as 
president. Membership evolved into one largely of UL T and Philip 
Morris officials; among the latter, Joseph F. Cullman III was especially 
active. 
At that time Wirt H. Hatcher Sr. of Philip Morris and J. Pinckney 
Harrison and Herbert Jackson of Universal were also quite active in the 
club. Later a number of top people at Philip Morris, namely George 
Weissman, who succeeded Joe Cullman as chief executive officer of 
the company, Ross Milhiser, Clifford Goldsmith, Hugh Cullman, George 
Macon, and Hugh West became members. From Universal the mem-
bership included Gordon Crenshaw, Thomas Towers, Howard Cone, 
Stuart Christian, and Reece Holloway. 
For years a number of Philip Morris and Universal top officials 
made frequent visits to this "remote and wonderful place," as Crenshaw 
remembered it. Although the group could not be characterized as ex-
pert outdoorsmen, the retreat was a source of enjoyment for all mem-
bers. Moreover, LaSalle played a major part in developing the friend-
ships between Philip Morris and Universal people. 
Thus by 1941, Canadian Leaf had firmly established itself as a reli-
able profit center for Universal. Its operations had expanded smoothly, 
and its on-site management and personnel were stable. The continuity 
of its workforce was strong as most employees remained with the com-
pany until death or retirement. One veteran recalled CL T as being "a 
homespun, family-type of a company." 
Two images of the American South. Above, tobacco grows at the base of the 
Robert E. Lee statue in Richmond, Virginia, around the turn of the century. 
Below, in typical fashion, this ox and mule driver has rolled his hogshead over 
the muddy roads of nineteenth-century Virginia to market in Richmond. The 
trumpeter at the right is signaling the start of the sale. Both photographs, 
courtesy of the Valentine Museum, Richmond, Virginia. 
Jaquelin P. Taylor, the major figure behind the founding of Universal Leaf 
Tobacco Company, at about age sixty-five. 
Top left. Frederick N. Harrison, Universal's president from 1924 to 1946 and 
chairman from 1946 to 1950. "Mr. Fred" was sometimes called "the peace-
maker" by company employees. Top right, Herbert W.JacksonJr.joined 
Universal at the bottom ranks. Known for his conservative stance on all 
business matters, he served as company president from 1946 to 1965 and 
chairman from 1965 to 1966. Photo by Dementi Studio. Under president 
and later chief executive officer Gordon Crenshaw (bottom left), Universal 
became a worldwide company. Crenshaw served in the company's top post 
from 1966 to 1988. Henry Harrell (bottom right), current Universal Corpora-
tion chief executive officer, joined the company in 1966 and today oversees a 
worldwide diversified company. Used by permission of Cliff Bruce Studio. 
Universal's China facilities at Tsingtao in the 1920s. The redrying plant at Tsingtao 
could turn out about 7,200 pounds of tobacco in ten hours. 
The J.P. Taylor plant in Goldsboro, North Carolina, as it looked in the mid-1950s. 
This was the site of Universal's first "super plant." Photo by Overbee Studio. 
Universal's headquarters at 201 South Third Street in Richmond, the nerve 
center of Universal from 1954 until1968. The Victorian structure at the far 
right housed the company laboratory, one of the first in the tobacco business. 
Photo by Photographic Services. 
A modern-day farmer stands beside 
his pile of flue-cured tobacco in a 
North Carolina warehouse. 
Shown here in the early 1970s, 
K.R. Edwards was a Universal 
vice president before he left to 
form his own company, which 
later became a leader in the 
tobacco business as a Universal 
partner. Photo by Reuben L. 
Johnson. 
R.A. "Bindy" Noakes (left), a native of Liverpool, England, a major figure 
in Universal's business in Africa, and Jan Laverge, the main force behind 
Universal's foreign operations, pictured in the early 1980s. 
The late John Leavell, a Universal buyer 
and company officer who covered all 
markets during his long career, points out 
the quality of a bundle of tobacco to a 
member of the Japanese Tobacco Corpo-
ration about 197 5. 
Billy "the Senator" Pritchard, 
seen here about 1980, was a 
legendary Universal tobacco 
buyer from the 1950s until his 
death in 1987. 
Gabriel "Gabby" Kremer poses with his daughter Nicola and son 
Dion in the mid-1970s in front of the airplane he used to evacuate 
Universal personnel from war-torn Angola during the revolution. 
Harry Hitchcock, the force behind 
Universal's cigar-leaf business in 
Pennsylvania, as a young man 
traveled the entire Eastern Seaboard 
in search of new customers. 
A.L. Hobgood, a nephew of K.R. Edwards, 
became the president and chief executive 
officer of Universal partner the K.R. 
Edwards company. Shown here in the late 
1970s, he ultimately became a director of 
Universal Corporation. 
The administrative section of the plant in Sintanjin, Korea in the 1970s. 
Korean tobacco is exported worldwide. 
James E. "Covey" Covington at 
left and George Macon pose 
with their families in front of 
the Great Buddha in Kama-
kura, Japan, in the late 1930s 
during a brief layover on their 
way back to China from the 
United States. Below, shown 
here in the early 1980s, Edwin 
W. Humphreys, nicknamed 
"the Rattler" by some subordi-
nates, is still known as the 
toughest taskmaster ever at 
Universal. His vision, how-
ever, paid off in the construc-
tion of the "super plants ." 
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Cigar Leaf Tobacco 
At the turn of the twentieth century, America's favorite tobacco prod-
uct was unquestionably the cigar, and consumers spent more money 
for cigars than for cigarettes, snuff, chewing and smoking leaf com-
bined. Cigars were made coast to coast, usually by small manufacturers 
who numbered in the tens of thousands, with strong concentrations 
in New York and Pennsylvania. Production hit four billion in 1890 
and rose to seven billion in 1906. Significantly, when the giant Ameri-
can Cigar came into being in 190 I, it controlled only one-sixth of the 
market. 
There were cigar brands for every pocketbook, and retail outlets 
often made their purchases directly from an army of tobacco's finest 
showmen, the cigar drummers. As described by Joseph C. Robert: "Some 
wore high silk hats and frock-tail coats. Most sported double-breasted 
vests, across which flashed lodge emblems on massive gold watch chains. 
The cigar drummer entered the dark little tobacco shop, grasped the 
hand of the dealer, slapped him on the back, and passed along the 
latest stories. The heavy accordion-type sample case was unstrapped, 
specimens redolent of vanilla and rum rolled under the nose, a couple 
cut open to prove the genuine long filler." "Then salesman and re-
tailer," Robert continues, "proceeded to the important part of the busi-
ness, the premiums that went along with the cigars: so many pictures of 
actresses and prize fighters as display cards, a wall lighter, cigar cutters, 
and matches, not to mention a mantel clock if the order were sizable." 
Leaf for American cigars came from both foreign and domestic 
sources. Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Dutch-controlled Sumatra provided 
the imports, while native leaf came largely from the Connecticut River 
Valley, which extended northward from Hartford into Massachusetts. 
Other regions that supplied cigar leaf included the Miami River Valley 
in Ohio; the region in and around Lancaster, Pennsylvania; and several 
areas in Wisconsin. In general, the Connecticut Valley was the oldest 
growing region, Wisconsin the newest, Pennsylvania the largest. 
Cigar leaf itself came in three types, initially categorized by use as 
filler, binder, and wrapper. Traditionally, filler provided the cigar bulk 
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or core and binder secured the filler in a cigar shape, wrapper being 
the outside cover. Cigar leaf was also used in such products as chewing 
tobacco. 
Although Universal was organized to deal in all types of tobacco, 
most of the founders had scant knowledge of cigar leaf. The exception 
was Pat Gorman, who was equally at home in cigarette or cigar leaf and 
whose experience included years in Puerto Rico and a stint with Ameri-
can Cigar. Gorman moved quickly to establish Universal in Wisconsin, 
where in 1919 he organized the Jefferson Leaf Tobacco Company, 
headed by former American official W.T. Jefferson. Gorman also 
helped set up the La Plata and La Regional Tobacco companies in Puerto 
Rico, and Dominion and Tropical in Santo Domingo. 
Closer to home, Universal also had a packing plant in Ohio and 
bought through dealers in Connecticut, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and 
on the Dutch markets in Amsterdam. The company also had close ties 
with the Cullmans of New York City and did some Pennsylvania busi-
ness through the W.H. Winstead Company, a founding Universal sub-
sidiary. 
Despite these initiatives in the 1920s, the company's cigar interests 
turned sour. Jefferson, La Plata, and Tropical were all merged into the 
ill-fated Industrial Leaf and failed when it did, although Industrial's 
liquidation took years to complete. Other losses were heavy, and by the 
late 1920s Universal's cigar-leaf business had shriveled to a negligible 
level, as Pat Gorman left the company to head American Cigar. Al-
though no one could have known it at the time, what appeared to be 
Universal's cigar nadir was in fact its real beginning. A story was about 
to unfold in the person of Harry Hitchcock, a bookkeeper turned cigar 
baron. Against strong odds, Hitchcock would in time build Lancaster 
Leaf into America's largest dealer in cigar tobacco. 
Harry Hitchcock was born in Baltimore in 1897. He was the son of 
a professional singer who had lost his eyesight. The Hitchcock family 
had a vaudeville show and also operated one of the city's first motion-
picture theaters-an unlikely heritage for a youngster who aspired to be 
a Methodist minister. His father's sudden affliction interrupted Harry's 
education and his career plans, but in time he made his way through 
night school and the YMCA School of Accounting. 
For a while Harry kept books, but he came to believe that he was 
"such a little cog in such a big wheel ... that nobody would know I was 
there unless lightning hit me." He decided to leave even if it meant a 
cut in pay, and looked for work where "you were noticed if you did 
something worthwhile." 
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In June 1919, coming off the Baltimore streets on the arm of his 
blind father, Harry Hitchcock entered the office of the W.H. Winstead 
Company on Redwood Street (formerly German Street until World War 
I, when anti-German sentiment forced the change). Henry Winstead 
hired Harry as a clerk. Working "forty hours a day," he established 
himself as "a good numbers man" and "as the man with the figures." 
His tax expertise attracted the attention of Gorman, whom Hitchcock 
described as "like a father to me," and other Universal officers in New 
York. 
Hitchcock later moved to the Richmond office, where he swallowed 
his Methodist pride in order to advance his career and became part of a 
Baptist Sunday School class taught by Universal's James I. Miller. He 
next was reassigned to New York City as one of the accountants for 
Industrial Leaf. Along the way his friendship with Gorman grew stron-
ger; Hitchcock prepared Gorman's income tax forms, a practice he con-
tinued until Gorman's death decades later. With the collapse of Indus-
trial, Hitchcock returned to the Winstead Company in Baltimore, where 
he received a startling proposition. 
By 1927 experts agreed there was no future for a young man in the 
cigar business. Cigarettes had passed cigars in popular taste, and, con-
sequently, in sales. Hundreds of dealers and manufacturers failed. 
Universal's poor showing was only part of a nationwide trend. The 
company's top management apparently had lost interest-or perhaps 
patience-with cigar leaf, but Henry Winstead thought one more low-
risk effort might be worthwhile. Winstead himself confessed neither 
knowledge nor personal interest, and his own experience in cigars had 
been limited and unsuccessful. Still, he had a vision and shared it with 
his peripatetic accountant. Simply put, Winstead proposed that Harry 
accept a reduction in pay, leave bookkeeping, and relocate to York 
County, Pennsylvania, for the purpose of developing a cigar-leaf busi-
ness there. 
At this point in his career Hitchcock knew nothing about cigar leaf 
and in fact had never "bought or sold a pound of tobacco" in his life. 
He might have added that he was a nonsmoker and a missionary Meth-
odist and that he would be attempting to enter an industry alien to him. 
"How do you start? What do you do?" he asked. But opportunity was 
knocking, and Hitchcock did not hesitate. Winstead's advice was straight-
forward: "The safest way to do it is to get options on tobacco without 
buying it, take samples and show them to prospective customers at a 
profit, and don't buy until you already have it sold." Winstead also 
supplied the name of a small dealer and acquaintance in York County, 
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which was the location of a number of cigar manufacturers and was 
within reach of others in Ohio to the west and in Lancaster, Pennsylva-
nia, to the east. 
With Universal's blessing, the new enterprise operated as the cigar-
leaf department of the Winstead Company. Harry became a Winstead 
vice president; his compensation was set at twenty-five dollars a week 
and 10 percent of the profits, which was a considerable cut from his 
yearly salary of six thousand dollars with Industrial Leaf. Pat Gorman 
was pessimistic but promised to help if he could. 
In York County, Winstead's reputation proved to be of assistance, 
but from the beginning, it was Harry's show. "I personally kept the 
books," he later recalled, "and I also had to buy and sell the tobacco. It 
was 'a one-man band.'" Initial results were promising, and he soon made 
the correct decision to relocate "across the Susquehanna" in adjoining 
Lancaster County, the center of Pennsylvania's cigar-leaf industry. There 
Harry rented a small processing plant at Mt. Joy. He hired Jake Bow-
man, "a little country packer," as manager of purchases. For his admin-
istrative headquarters Harry chose the office of a former soap factory 
at the corner of Prince and Seymour Streets in Lancaster. Joining him 
as bookkeeper was Stanley Altland, who would eventually become a 
vice president. A skeletal staff kept overhead at a modest level. 
Cigar leaf might be bought from a dealer or even a manufacturer, 
but more commonly it was purchased as a whole crop "in the barn" and 
from the farmer who sold it either as the quality "wrapper" long filler 
(80 percent) or the poorer farm filler (20 percent). In time, Harry's 
buying was done by one or two full-time, salaried supervisors who over-
saw the work of from sixty to seventy seasonal buyers, "most of whom 
were tobacco growing farmers who worked on a per pound basis," he 
recalled. 
Hitchcock's men bought not on order but "against indicated needs" 
of regular customers. The profit margin was often only a penny a pound, 
giving birth to the sobriquet, "Penny-a-Pound" Hitchcock. His goal was 
to get to the farmer "before anybody else with an offering price." 
Lancaster tobacco was "Pennsylvania Seedleaf" or cigar filler. The 
area's limestone-rich soil produced a "heavy-bodied, thick, dark-col-
ored gummy leaf" with good aromatic potential-that is, an ideal to-
bacco for the body or core of a cigar. In the region's diverse farming 
population were many Amish-hardy descendants of Swiss and Ger-
man immigrants and steadfast adherents to the pure and simple values. 
Because it was labor-intensive and non-technological, cigar leaf seemed 
an ideal crop for the Amish, whom Hitchcock came to regard highly. 
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The Amish did not consume tobacco and even preached against it, but 
they grew it well and, Hitchcock believed, kept it alive in the country. 
As it developed, Hitchcock's business was in "scrap," the least ex-
pensive type of cigar filler. Scrap might be breakage or residue after 
the stem or mid-rib had been removed to make the more expensive 
"long filler," or it might be simply a less costly grade or "farm filler." In 
either case, after curing by fermentation and storage the leaf would be 
shredded for blending with higher grades into the filler proper in an 
era when cheap cigars sold two for a nickel. In short, Hitchcock had 
opted for the Model T of the trade, not the Cadillac. 
Hitchcock's success or failure ultimately depended on his salesman-
ship, and he soon discovered talents of a high order. His approach was 
straightforward: "I took samples," he recalled, "and went out to see a 
Pittsburgh manufacturer who had small factories around the country." 
When the manufacturer asked why he should start buying from Uni-
versal, Hitchcock replied, "You and everybody else I call on are pres-
ently buying their tobacco from somebody else. If you have an open 
mind and will look at our samples, while I don't pretend to have had 
previous experience in this, I can assure you that you will get tobacco 
fully up to the sample and at that price. Now if our price is competitive 
and better tobacco at the same price, or is good tobacco at a lower price, 
I would think in your position you would want to buy what you can to 
the best advantage." 
To directness, Hitchcock added diligence. Tracking down "a couple 
of thousand small cigar factories" all over the east coast, he "drove a car 
fifty thousand miles a year, [and] averaged a thousand miles a week." 
He called on Hava-Tampa for twenty years "before I sold them the first 
pound of tobacco"-and then developed a substantial business there. 
Harry told a similar story about the giant Swisher, ultimately his largest 
customer. 
Along the way Hitchcock collapsed twice from exhaustion, but he 
also made friends-like Joe Cullman-who simply enjoyed his company 
and who occasionally passed some business to him even when they did 
not deal with him directly. And, of course, friendship, always a main-
stay in the tobacco world, could lead to business, as in the case of Gorman, 
who was as good as his word and placed a significant order from Ameri-
can Cigar. 
Harry was alert to all possibilities. If he could not sell a manufac-
turer any tobacco, he turned the tables and asked if the manufacturer 
had any tobacco to sell him, some undesirable tobacco "to get rid of." 
This type of deal often provided an entree and established a relation-
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ship in which Harry the buyer would later became Harry the seller. 
Of course the fundamentals never changed. "Not having name 
brands," recalled Hitchcock, "what we had to sell was service, and the 
basis of it was integrity, and trying to do for other companies some-
thing we could do better than they could do for themselves." And, we 
"always did what we said we were going to do." 
That last commitment was critical. Having been taken advantage of 
as a young salesman by customers who reneged on deals, Hitchcock 
was especially concerned about being "as good as his word." To en-
courage his customer to behave the same way, Hitchcock often pre-
pared written contracts. Nor did he hesitate to go to court over a broken 
agreement. 
He became outraged by what he called "parasitic dealers" who 
claimed an annual commission on any subsequent business that devel-
oped from a deal they had made. Under this system a dealer who sold 
some of Harry's tobacco to a manufacturer in, say 1931, would claim a 
percentage payment on any direct and later business Harry himself did 
with that client. Hitchcock and others fought this common practice, 
and today it is unknown. 
The former accountant also put a stop to what had been a long-
standing problem with Universal's cigar business. In the early 1920s 
"credit losses" were sustained on tobacco sold on long terms but not 
delivered for up to six months or even a year. Hitchcock's policy was to 
bill the purchaser monthly carrying charges "until the tobacco is deliv-
ered ... and then we want to be paid." Once customers agreed, and 
thus reduced Harry's costs, he then cut his prices and gained a further 
competitive edge. 
Hitchcock's operation prospered into the depression decade of the 
1930s. Branches were established in such cigar-leaf regions as Wiscon-
sin (Viroqua Leaf Tobacco Company, headed by the son of W.T. 
Jefferson; and others); in Versailles, Ohio; and in Windsor Locks, Con-
necticut. In the latter, Universal worked through a dealer, Howard 
Russell, who also bought on his own account. 
Each month, Hitchcock sent a strong balance sheet to Richmond, 
and, except for an occasional visit by the company treasurer, Joseph F. 
Henderson, Richmond allowed him to operate almost autonomously. 
This freedom lasted until 1941 when Henderson and others recom-
mended that Hitchcock's operation be reorganized into a company en-
tirely separate from W.H. Winstead, which was essentially a cigarette-
leaf venture. Part of the reason was obvious: the child had outgrown 
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the parent, and the cigar department had been making "more money 
than the Winstead Company in total." 
September 1941 saw the formation of the W.H. Winstead Com-
pany of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Legally it was a Virginia corporation 
authorized to do business in Pennsylvania and specifically "to handle 
cigar leaf tobacco, used principally in the grinding of scrap, but also to 
trade in cigarette tobacco of lower grades." The new company had a 
book value of two hundred thousand dollars. Hitchcock was named 
president and general manager. 
In keeping with the long-standing Universal policy of encouraging 
stock ownership-and thus a genuinely vested interest-by heads of af-
filiate companies, Harry Hitchcock had an option to buy up to 40 per-
cent (eighty thousand dollars' worth) of the stock issue. He amassed 
thirty-five thousand dollars by mortgaging his home and selling "the 
gold out of my teeth"; Universal loaned him the balance of forty-five 
thousand dollars to be repaid out of future dividends. Years later, in 
1967, when Universal bought him out, the company's book value had 
risen to $12 million, and Harry's percentage was then worth $3 million. 
It had been, Hitchcock said, "a fairy-tale development." 
6 
The Depression 
and the Great War Years 
Despite the excellent comeback from near disaster that Universal made 
during the 1920s, it was anyone's guess what fate lay ahead after the 
stock market crash on Black Friday, October 29, 1929. 
As mentioned earlier, the tobacco world was experiencing a de-
pression of its own as early as 1921. In that year the burley market 
almost collapsed, and Europe-Great Britain in particular-was also suf-
fering from a glut of bright tobacco. But what was unfolding in the 
winter of 1929-30 was different. Problems suffered earlier in the de-
cade were ones the tobacco industry could correct. But now the nation 
itself was in deep, nearly cataclysmic, trouble. By 1932, stock market 
prices had dropped to one-sixth of their 1929 worth, and American 
exports were roughly half of what they had been three years earlier. 
Worst of all, at the nadir of this collapse nearly 15 million people who 
wanted jobs were unable to find them. To many, it seemed as if America 
itself was about to crumble. 
Tobacco, however, has long been considered a depression-proof 
business (except at the grower's level), and so it proved to be during the 
early 1930s. To be sure, Universal was not unaffected by the Depres-
sion, as witnessed by President Harrison's report to stockholders in Sep-
tember 1930: "The general business depression throughout the world 
has to some extent affected the sales and profits of your company," he 
stated. "Mr. Fred" then noted that "a substantial reduction in operating 
expenses has been made during the last six months," indicating that 
Universal, like other businesses, had been forced to retrench. "How-
ever," Harrison optimistically continued, "we anticipate a satisfactory 
volume of business during the coming year." And despite the fact that 
dollar volume for the year ending June 30, 1930, was down from the 
previous year's, Harrison nevertheless proclaimed, "Your company is 
in sound condition." 
Indeed, such was the case. For example, during 1930 the board of 
directors put into operation a company stock-option plan for officers 
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and key employees. More than $329,000 worth of common stock was 
purchased and sold at "attractive prices." 
In addition to being financially sound in 1930, the company ex-
tended from Richmond to a sprawling complex of plants scattered about 
the East Coast and numerous foreign countries. It owned facilities in 
Richmond, Danville, and South Boston, Virginia; Goldsboro, 
Henderson, Wilson, Tabor, Kinston, Fairmont, and Lumberton, North 
Carolina; Mullins, South Carolina; Hughesville, Huntington, Carstow, 
and Chaptico, Maryland; Louisville, Lexington, Shelbyville, Cynthiana, 
and Owensboro, Kentucky; and Shanghai, China. The China facilities 
were functioning well. Other plants owned by Universal's subsidiary 
companies in the early Depression era were located in Greenville, Win-
ston-Salem, Farmville, and Oxford, North Carolina; Clarksville, Ten-
nessee; Hopkinsville and Henderson, Kentucky; Lynchburg and Pe-
tersburg, Virginia; Chatham, Ontario; and the Dominican Republic. 
The company also had agencies in cities in Europe, Asia, Africa, South 
America, Australia, and Canada. All these operations were overseen by 
a staff of thirty-five in the Richmond office. 
The company's consolidated balance sheet for 1931 reflects the 
extent of Universal's business, and it does not read as if the country 
were in a depression. Although total dollar volume was still down-
roughly equivalent to that of the previous year-the regular 8 percent 
dividend on the preferred stock and the regular dividends on common 
stock were paid. Universal also continued to acquire its own preferred 
stock, and $252,000 worth of it was purchased, leaving the total amount 
outstanding at $6,555,200. 
In 1932, the bright tobacco crop was unusually small, and for the 
first time in its history the company paid no bonuses. But the following 
year, when economic woes were lessening, Harrison reported: "Your 
company is in a splendid condition." In 1935, with the dollar volume 
up to $18,000,000, he used the same phrase, substituting the word "ex-
cellent" for "splendid." In 1936, Universal boasted six wholly owned 
subsidiaries, and for the second time in its history, gross revenues ex-
ceeded $20,000,000 reaching $20,972,515. It was never again to drop 
below the $20,000,000 mark. 
Business as usual was not the key for Universal in the 1930s, how-
ever. During and just after the Depression, new social programs were 
inaugurated with President Roosevelt's "New Deal," and the govern-
ment began grading and regulating tobacco. In addition, Universal hired 
several people who would ultimately bring a much broader and more 
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long-range vision to company leadership. Most important, although still 
firmly entrenched in the American South, Universal in the 1930s in-
creased its interest in foreign markets, an action that was to pay enor-
mous dividends following World War II. 
Because Universal has never offered products directly to the pub-
lic, it has always been a low-profile company, one unlikely to attract 
those seeking to regulate the tobacco industry. Nevertheless, the 
Roosevelt administration's interest in the tobacco business had an ob-
lique long-term effect on the company, ultimately paving the way for 
direct governmental involvement at the highest level by way of the 1964 
Surgeon General's report and the anti-tobacco laws of the seventies, 
eighties, and nineties. 
In the 1930s the New Deal moved the federal government deeper 
into the daily lives of working Americans, continuing a trend that had 
begun with the Food and Drug Act of 1906, the Draft Act of 1917, and 
World War I controls. During his campaign, Roosevelt had often spo-
ken of the "forgotten man," and by all accounts the tobacco farmer fit 
this stereotype. Auctioning off their leaf for an annual pittance, the 
nation's leaf growers were receptive to the ideas set forth in the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1933. The tobacco section of the AAA fo-
cused solely on the plight of the tobacco farmer. 
One important Depression-era law was the Tobacco Inspection Act, 
the purpose of which was to aid the farmer in pricing his product. Be-
cause farmers often had little or no contact with the world beyond their 
local towns, they were not in a position to know the prices tobacco would 
bring on various markets. According to the government's reasoning, 
they were therefore at the mercy of predatory middlemen who might 
defraud them by misrepresenting prices. Moreover, farmers were 
among those hit hardest by the Depression and therefore received a 
good deal of attention from the federal government. It was not until 
1941, for example, that farmers' incomes reached the level they had 
enjoyed on the eve of the stock market crash twelve years earlier. 
Becoming law on August 23, 1935, the Tobacco Inspection Act 
authorized the secretary of agriculture to impose an inspection system 
on any leaf market he designated, if he was able to gain approval from 
two-thirds of the growers using the market. Under the act, the secre-
tary was also required to assist the tobacco farmer by publishing and 
distributing information regarding supply, demand, and market prices 
of the leaf. Actual grading was based on a subdivision of leaf into seven 
classes and types. Although Universal's buyers were influenced more 
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by their own judgment than by the opinions of government inspectors, 
the precedent of government involvement in the tobacco business at 
the grassroots level had clearly been set. 
Labor unions, another outside force that impinged on the tobacco 
world in the 1930s, had little influence on Universal, and what influ-
ence they had was limited to the partner companies. The unions' most 
conspicuous successes during the decade centered on manufacturers 
rather than leaf dealers, who would, however, feel the effects of orga-
nized labor following World War II. 
Universal also had to deal with government directives such as the 
Social Security Act, which became law within two weeks of the Tobacco 
Inspection Act. Designed in part to establish a national and state spon-
sored system of unemployment insurance, the act immediately caused 
headaches in Universal's factories because government requested in-
formation did not exist and furthermore was impossible to obtain. But 
the government viewed it another way. 
One case in point centers on the experiences of Hugh West, who 
was with Universal for twenty-five years before he left to join the Philip 
Morris Company. Given the job of collecting biographical data on some 
fifteen hundred hand-stemmers in the Henderson plant, West soon 
discovered that few workers knew their own middle names, that their 
last names were often the same as their mothers', and that many did not 
know their father's name or even their own date of birth. West col-
lected the information as best he could and forwarded it to the govern-
ment, but within two weeks 75 percent of his forms were returned as 
incomplete. West was assured by the government that all blanks on the 
forms must be filled in, whereupon he approached the problem the 
only way he saw possible: he fabricated the data. He made up names 
and arbitrarily assigned birth dates. Known only to West, many people 
in the Henderson area officially shared West's birth date. 
Not only outside forces changed the tobacco world during the 1930s; 
inside ones played a role as well. Traditionally, American tobacconists 
were rough-and-tumble entrepreneurs with little formal education and 
a fierce adherence to the work ethic. In the 1930s, however, under 
Harrison's direction, those entering the Universal system brought with 
them different backgrounds. For the first time in its history, college-
educated young men were recruited into the company. 
Why Harrison chose the kinds of men he did is anyone's guess. 
Most likely, however, he saw in them something of his own image of 
what an up-and-coming young man of the 1930s should be both mor-
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ally and culturally. Mr. Fred was a committed Christian, a member of 
one of the oldest families in the Commonwealth, and a philanthropist 
who financially aided many friends in the difficult years of the Depres-
sion, during which his salary remained in the upper half of five fig-
ures. In addition, he paid the way for more than one needy youngster 
through college or seminary. 
Harrison apparently recruited new people with an eye to what they 
could become if properly nurtured. Among them was Pierre Warwick; 
a member of a socially prominent family who had to leave the Univer-
sity of Virginia without his degree because of a reversal in family cir-
cumstances. He later became one of Universal's master traders. An-
other was Edwin W. Humphreys, an unemployed metallurgical engi-
neer who had been raised under trying circumstances following the 
death of his father. He was later to become the father of the super 
plants, facilities that would change forever the way tobacco was pro-
cessed and would bring handsome rewards to the company. There was 
also Jan La verge, a native Hollander of Huguenot descent, who brought 
with him a mechanical engineering degree and the willingness to work 
his way up from the bottom in a foreign country. This he did, and he 
became the father of Universal's foreign operations and remained one 
of the major forces in the company for some six decades. 
These young men and others entered the Universal system under 
the tutelage of such crusty war horses as Lewis Gorin, at Southwestern; 
Frank Mills, of J.P. Taylor, at Henderson; Morgan Boyd, in the dark-
fired area; and K.R. Edwards, who was in charge of leaf purchasing 
during those years. Men such as these, who formed the backbone of the 
Universal world, expected absolute obedience from those who worked 
under them. They were no-nonsense types who did not care what their 
subordinates thought or wanted to do. Pete Walker, a Universal super-
visor from 1938 to 1966, explained his relationship with his subordi-
nates. "If you were hard to handle, I had to get tough," he said. About 
his colleagues, he noted that "they knew damned well that I knew my 
business and they knew damned well that I wouldn't take any crap. So 
we didn't have any trouble." 
Nor were these young men's entries into the tobacco business easy, 
or for that matter even civil by modern standards. John Leavell's initial 
encounter with the Universal family serves as a typical case in point. 
Over forty years later, Leavell, a college graduate, remembered there-
ception he received from R.L. ("Blackie") Kimbrough his first day on 
his first job at the Goldsboro plant during the Depression. "I reported 
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to him at 7 o'clock in the morning on the lOth of September 1932, and 
he took one look at me, got up from his desk and walked all the way 
around me just like I was a horse. And he said, 'I'll say one thing: you're 
the sorriest looking bastard I ever saw. Tell me one thing: why do those 
sons of bitches in Richmond send me everybody that don't know noth-
ing? Well, Goddamn it! I reckon we can use you."' 
In an atmosphere such as this, after the senior man had grudgingly 
accepted the junior he usually called him "son," while the younger al-
ways responded with "sir." The professional gap between the two was 
clearly defined and was never crossed for social occasions, those in 
charge considering themselves duty-bound to hold their charges in line 
and extract the utmost from them. Newcomers who played the game 
found their load lighter after the first few years. If good enough, they 
eventually became the company executives and in turn demanded the 
same from their subordinates. 
It would be unfair, however, to characterize these hard-liners as 
tyrants. Often without a subordinate knowing it, his boss would go to 
bat for him behind the scenes. A beginner-"young little boys," as the 
widow of one factory manager recalled them-might start as a floor 
sweeper, move to the prizery, then be placed in charge of drying or 
stemming. A few seasons later he might be found driving for one of 
the regular buyers and occasionally filling in during the sale. When 
many men reached the level of buyer they had fulfilled their ambi-
tions; others, however, with an eye toward further horizons and per-
haps with qualities that led them to be more carefully groomed by their 
superiors, came back to Richmond and went on into managerial posi-
tions and ultimately the executive ranks. 
In this rigid caste system superiors' decisions were unilateral and 
praise and announcement of promotion given privately. Walker, for 
example, recalled K.R. Edwards approaching him on one occasion with-
out warning and saying, "Come here, son." The older man took the 
younger one out of earshot of other employees, "where nobody on God's 
green earth could hear him talk, which was his point to begin with," 
Walker recalled. "He turned around and looked up in my face and 
said, 'Son, you ain't making enough money. I'm going to raise your 
salary a hundred dollars a month, retroactive the first of January.' [Then] 
he turned around and walked right on out." 
Even though it owned facilities in numerous locales, by contempo-
rary standards Universal was quite small during the Harrison years, 
when much of the buying was done by partner companies in the field. 
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Run by the last of the tobacco barons, these companies also served as 
training grounds for new Universal employees. At a later time, in the 
years following World War II, buying would shift in the direction of 
account servicing, but throughout the 1930s Universal's buyers, whether 
in the partner companies or working from the Richmond office, bought 
primarily on speculation. 
Buying on speculation was relatively simple: the tobacco was pur-
chased and stored, with no guaranteed sale in mind. It would be resold 
when a customer placed an order that could be filled from storage. 
Speculation buying had drawbacks as well as rewards, however. For 
one thing, space for storage translated directly into time and money. 
Moreover, such sales often took a great deal of time to consummate 
because Universal's customers were typically small and geographically 
dispersed; as a result, salesmen had to make numbers of trips, carrying 
samples to show prospective customers, then return home to see that 
the orders were shipped. During the time in question, twenty-five hogs-
heads was a sizable sale, contrasted with twenty-five hundred or so to-
day. And there was always the danger that tobacco bought on specula-
tion would have to be stored so long that profit would be lost. 
But Universal's sales in the 1930s were strong. For the fiscal year 
ending in june 1930 revenues from sales were $11,500,000. Remain-
ing fairly constant through the worst of the Depression, revenues climbed 
to almost $13,000,000 by the end of 1935. The following year they 
rose to $20,000,000. By the end of the decade they were at $21,676,000. 
Processing too was far different from what it would become within 
the next twenty years. Following its purchase at the auction, the tobacco 
came to the factory where each pile or basket was regraded and any 
necessary readjustments made. From there some would go to the hang-
ing room, where it was hung on stakes and put through the redrying 
machine to stabilize moisture content. The remainder would have the 
central stem removed from the leaf by a workforce of some three hun-
dred to seven hundred women, who accomplished this task by hand. 
Finally, it was packed in hogsheads ready for shipment. 
The workforce was almost entirely black; women performed the 
picking and stemming tasks and men operated the machines, manning 
the conveyor belts and dollies used to move the tobacco. The work day 
began at seven and ended at five, with thirty minutes for lunch. All 
workers brought their own lunches, which usually consisted of collard 
greens, fatback, and cornbread, or occasionally fish heads. Hourly wages 
varied from 7.5 to 15 cents, depending on one's duties. Employees had 
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ten minutes to answer calls of nature; one woman's sole job was to time 
each person's stay in the lavatory with a Big Ben alarm clock and then 
wind off a strip of toilet paper and deliver it to the stall. This practice 
was followed for years in order to prevent malingering and to keep 
employees from stealing the whole roll. 
Workers' days, and for that matter the life of the whole town, were 
regulated by a series of whistles emanating from the factory. The town, 
permeated with the odor of tobacco, rose to the 7 A.M. whistle, broke for 
lunch at the noon one, and finished its workday at the 5 P.M. shriek. 
Factories were not heated or air-conditioned; the only respite from the 
choking summer heat of the South was cold water from the melting 
blocks of ice the delivery man stacked in the communal wooden barrels 
each day. At the J.P. Taylor Company in Henderson (and perhaps 
elsewhere as well) factory manager Ralph Thompson allowed employ-
ees to sing for a half an hour or so each afternoon after the neighbor-
hood babies had finished their naps. In lyrics that restated dominant 
themes from three centuries of African-American life, hundreds of 
voices recalled the slavery era, praised Jesus, and told tales of unre-
quited love. Outside on the sidewalks, townspeople, white and black 
alike, gathered to hear the daily chorus. 
By today's standards working conditions were substandard and 
demeaning, but viewed in the context of the times they seem less de-
serving of censure. This was the era, for example, when farmers in 
Johnson County, North Carolina, staged a demonstration to protest 
national economic conditions; the parade featured "Hoover carts," which 
were the rear halves of automobiles drawn by a mules. Such events, 
one of which was formally staged in Smithfield on October 7, 1932, 
included a band and prizes for the most outlandish vehicle. A truck 
loaded with local unemployed people brought up the rear. These events 
were staged to send a message to Washington. 
This was also the time when complaining workers in businesses 
across the country were reminded by bosses, who sometimes took them 
to the factory window to view the line of job seekers below, that some-
one was waiting to take their place should they find their work too 
onerous. Often, between two and three hundred people would appear 
at Universal's factories each morning searching for employment. Lack 
of labor laws allowed for the practices that Jan La verge recalled at the 
Goldsboro plant, where two noted factory hands had worked twenty-
four hours a day. "They never quit," he remembered. "They took a 
nap on a pile of tobacco and kept on working." 
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As would be expected with such a large workforce, the factories 
were not without colorful characters and amusing incidents. One such 
person was Robert Blakely, known only as "Salty Dog" until Social Se-
curity laws forced his given name to be carried on company records. 
Blakely had abandoned the carnival life for one in a tobacco factory, 
and he got his name from his habit of continually singing the lyrics of 
a song he had performed on the carnival circuit: "let me be your salty 
dog 'til your sweet dog comes along." 
Buck McCoy, who wore a crudely fashioned artificial leg, was an-
other colorful character. While he was working in the third-floor pick-
ing room at the Goldsboro plant, a fire broke out and he found himself 
trapped by the blaze. His mother, who worked on a lower floor in the 
stemming room, escaped from the building before him. She spied her 
frantic son at a third-floor window. 
"I'm going to jump!" Buck shouted in desperation. 
"Say a prayer first," his mother called. 
"I don't know how to pray," he yelled back. 
"Say something with God's name in it," she screamed. 
McCoy thought for an instant before blurting out his plea for di-
vine protection: "Goddamn-Here I come!'' Then he took to the air. 
Witnesses reported that his artificial limb dug several inches into 
the ground, but McCoy, his dubious prayer perhaps answered, escaped 
with no broken bones. 
Unlike many businesses, Universal weathered the times because it 
had a low overhead operation, because of the constant demand for to-
bacco, and because of its successes abroad. During much of the 1930s, 
Universal operated from its modest suite of offices in the Richmond 
Trust Building at Seventh and Main Streets. There, from a sample room, 
one other large room and four smaller ones, it oversaw the operations 
of six wholly owned subsidiaries-the J.P. Taylor Company, Southwest-
ern Tobacco Company, W:H. Winstead Company, State Warehouse 
Company, Southern States Tobacco Company, and the Universal Leaf 
Tobacco Company of China. In addition, it was involved in the opera-
tions of the Canadian Leaf Tobacco Company, the Norfolk Leaf To-
bacco Company, the Kinston Tobacco Company, and seventeen other 
affiliated companies. 
President and director Fred Harrison was often absent from the 
office and allowed his cousin Pinckney Harrison to care for routine 
matters. Rounding out the top three executives was Kenneth R. Edwards, 
the head leaf man. Twelve others made up the managerial force, the 
total staff numbering about fifty by the end of the decade. As was cus-
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tomary, there were no written contracts. Consequently, most duties 
revolved around paying for and routing tobacco to customers. Louise 
Hankins, who went to work for the company in 1927 and left eleven 
years later to follow K.R. Edwards into his own venture, remembered 
that a great deal of the business was conducted on the golf course, with 
cryptic notes being conveyed to her and other secretaries following a 
game. Often the men were away on the markets, leaving those behind 
to construct their own routines in their 8:45 to 4:45 work day. Much of 
the business was conducted by telephone, and few or no written records 
were kept. 
Although it appeared to be a sharp blow at the time, Universal was 
ultimately to gain when on july 1, 1938, Edwards left the company and 
opened his own business in Smithfield, North Carolina. Beginning ten-
tatively as a domestic tobacco dealer, he expanded and diversified and 
ultimately became one of the most important Universal partners. 
The Edwards company was later to take on international aspects 
after the 1953 installation of its new leader A.L. Hobgood. Currently it 
operates in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Argentina, and Colombia, 
selling its product to almost all the world's cigarette makers. It remains 
a key player in the Universal arena. 
One of the most important figures in the company during these 
early days was treasurer Joseph F. Henderson, who joined Universal in 
the 1920s and soon had all company financial matters under his con-
trol. Henderson was neurotically exacting, eccentric, and highly opin-
ionated (He once told Dutch native Jan Laverge never to trust a for-
eigner: "they're all crooks!") Moreover, he had no interest in anything 
but money, and he oversaw Universal's finances with conservatism and 
rectitude. What could have spelled disaster for the company was nar-
rowly averted in 1946 when Henderson failed in a bid as a compromise 
candidate for the company presidency. He eventually suffered a men-
tal breakdown and lived out his days in a nursing home conducting 
imaginary transactions with play-money. A childless widower and a 
millionaire, he accepted the $100 sent to him monthly by a niece who 
thought him impoverished. 
Universal weathered the Depression decade at home and also broad-
ened its horizons by tentative entries into foreign markets. The new 
business was the result of exploratory trips by Laverge and Warwick to 
the Mediterranean, Northern Europe, and Central and South America. 
These jaunts culminated in small gains for the company; more impor-
tant, they promised greater rewards to come. 
In the 1930s Laverge and Warwick could have been described as 
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"floating" employees in Universal's sales department. Both were young 
and new to the company and both found themselves in a business con-
trolled by firmly entrenched vice presidents who handled the bulk of 
the sales and regular accounts. Owing to their junior status, the two 
men were often hard pressed to find new leads and potential accounts 
to cultivate; as a result, they went after those customers their superiors 
thought marginal or not worth pursuing. Their accomplishments were 
significant for the future. For example, in Holland, before the war 
Laverge sold some four to five hundred hogsheads per year. In 1946, 
the first full year following the war, the Dutch pipe tobacco industry 
commission placed orders with Universal for somewhere in the neigh-
borhood of twenty-five to thirty thousand hogsheads. Had it not been 
for the company's entree there in the thirties, such business may not 
have been forthcoming. As it was, it foreshadowed the success Univer-
sal was to have on the world tobacco market. 
The two main foreign arms of the Universal body in the years im-
mediately prior to World War II were Canada and China, the former 
being the smaller of the two. 
The Canadian operation in the 1930s saw sales fluctuating from 
year to year and customers, most buying limited supplies of tobacco, 
varying on an annual basis. About half of the business in Canada was 
with domestic accounts; Macdonald Tobacco Company was the largest. 
The other half was spread throughout a number of countries. A sizable 
business, however, was being done with England and Germany. 
Overshadowing the Canadian operations in the 1930s, however, 
was the one in China. In many ways, its success offset the Depression in 
America for Universal. The Chinese operation was a staple in the com-
pany until the Japanese invasion of China and the ensuing World War 
II halted operations there. 
When Japan's Admiral Nagumo followed his orders and sent his 
carrier-based planes to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the 
great global war was immediately in full swing. The United States, 
and along with it Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, was about to 
change. 
For Universal, the most drastic effect of the war revolved around 
the loss of the China company. The Japanese invasion of China was, of 
course, more than a military venture. On the heels of the army came 
Japanese businessmen, who confiscated foreign interests held in China, 
including those of Universal. When A.I. McOwan, the last remaining 
staff member, was incarcerated, the China branch was written off as a 
complete loss. Moreover, with the Japanese military entrenched in the 
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Pacific from New Guinea to Okinawa, it was pointless to entertain any 
notion of expansion in the Far East or Southeast Asia. 
The company also had its woes in Europe. The first European prob-
lem to surface centered on Spain, which during the mid-l930s erupted 
in civil war. Suddenly the company found that it was unable to convert 
pesetas into dollars. Common today, it was virtually unheard of for 
governments not to allow such conversions at that time. Roughly a half-
million dollars of company funds, representing profit and outlay for 
tobacco, was frozen in a bank in Barcelona. 
Laverge made a trip to Barcelona in an attempt to free the funds, 
but to no avail. Exhausted from fruitless attempts and terrified follow-
ing all night anti-aircraft fire from the roof of his hotel, he left the 
country. His life was probably saved by a change of plans. At the last 
minute he took an Air France plane; the train on which he had origi-
nally booked passage was bombed and many of the passengers were 
killed. 
Negotiations with Spain continued, but they ended in frustration. 
At one point the company even considered bizarre schemes to free its 
frozen pesetas. For example, it arranged a test case whereby the com-
pany was to buy $4,000 worth of Spanish anchovies, which would be 
contracted to a New York importer at a cost of approximately I 0 per-
cent of the pesetas involved. Spanish approval seemed forthcoming, 
but on second thought Universal's Finance Committee decided to pur-
sue more conventional channels. Only later did a market in blocked 
pesetas evolve, but Universal suffered a substantial loss when it finally 
got its money, a process that dragged on until 1944. The final settle-
ment was for $315,000. 
Problems in China and Spain were dwarfed, however, by those 
brought on by the war itself. When Hitler's forces invaded Poland, al-
most all Universal's dealings in Europe ground to a halt. Throughout 
1939, the company continued to do business in neutral Belgium, Hol-
land, and Denmark, but those nations fell to the Nazis in the spring of 
1940. This was the final blow. Universal would sell no tobacco on the 
continent until the war was over, except for minor amounts in neutral 
countries and also under the provisions of President Roosevelt's lend-
lease program. The company did, however, continue business in Great 
Britain through the auspices of the American government, which funded 
British tobacco purchases. Formerly supplied almost exclusively by the 
Imperial Tobacco Company, Great Britain now got its tobacco from 
several companies, one of which was Universal. 
Another boost for Universal's sales, and one that partly offset the 
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loss of the European market, occurred in the form of the lend-lease 
program, which was aimed at aiding America's allies. Lend-lease came 
into effect in March 1941 and lasted until August 1945, when it was 
terminated on the heels of the surrenders of Germany and Japan. Under 
its provisions, the president had a free hand in providing U.S. allies 
with war materiel, under whose broad umbrella tobacco was included. 
This put Universal in the position of supplying tobacco to countries it 
might otherwise have lost during the war. The volume was far below 
that of prewar years, however. 
An observer of Universal's foreign losses during the war years might 
have come to the conclusion that the company was in for hard times or 
worse. Nothing could have been further from the truth, however, as 
the annual figures for the years 1942 through 1945 clearly show. For 
the fiscal year ending june 1942, the last before the beginning of a total 
war economy, gross revenues totaled $33,688,239.91. The next year 
it was up to $55,854,263.44. Dollar volume for 1944 reached 
$57,527,523.31, and for 1945 the figure was a stunning $88,138,514.15. 
And this with the loss of the China company and European business. 
The war years were also good for Universal because of the complex 
interaction between tobacco consumption and the psychological needs 
and stresses of the consumers. In times of crisis people tend to smoke 
more, and during the time in question, the whole nation was involved 
in the conflict. Some thirteen million people were in the armed forces, 
and during those times tobacco consumption carried neither social stigma 
nor health caveats. Combat forces customarily received a package of 
five cigarettes in their K Rations, and cigarettes came tax free-often 
entirely free-to military personnel. Tobacco products were supplied 
by American manufacturers under the auspices of a government eager 
to aid the troops in any way it could. "You had a home market for every 
pound you could buy, no matter what it was," Laverge remembered. 
"You were in a real seller's market." 
Like most American businesses, Universal underwent change dur-
ing the war, but not as much as many companies. La verge and Pinckney 
Harrison were the only two members of the company's managerial staff 
to see military service; the others were too old. The company's factory 
staffs were severely depleted, however, as young men and women 
donned uniforms and heeded the call of the bugle. And, incidentally, 
those leaving Universal for the military had life financially better than 
many of their fellow volunteers or draftees in the ranks. In a patriotic 
gesture to aid both the individual and the country, Universal followed 
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a practice during World War II of awarding the difference between 
military pay and company pay while an employee was in the service. 
R.W. "Will" Tuggle, for example, while in the Army periodically and 
candidly notified the company of his advance from private to commis-
sioned officer, knowing that he would receive less money from Rich-
mond. At each point his check reflected his new military status. Mean-
while, in the home office wall posters asked employees to buy bonds, 
which many did. 
Of the Universal personnel who served in the military, Laverge 
had the most interesting tour of duty. He and his wife became Ameri-
can citizens in 1942, and barely twelve months later Laverge was in 
uniform and a member of the elite Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
Eventually assigned to its Secret Intelligence (SI) division, he was in-
volved in intelligence in England and eventually on the Continent. 
Pinckney Harrison also served in Army Intelligence. He was sta-
tioned in Washington, D. C., for much of the war and rose to the rank 
of colonel. 
A little known sidelight to the larger history of Universal, and of 
World War II in general for that matter, involves the use of prisoners 
of war in the American tobacco factories. During the height of the con-
flict rumors abounded among the rural residents of Virginia and North 
Carolina that German spies were infiltrating the U.S. mainland. In-
deed, a handful did manage to penetrate North Carolina's sparsely 
populated coast; but the Axis powers were represented in a more nu-
merous, yet less threatening, way by being leased as prisoners of war to 
private companies. Their presence set rural countrysides buzzing. More 
than one farmer employed his mule and plow to cut furrows around 
the family home in hopes of stopping any forest fire started by German 
saboteurs. The fires never came, but the Germans (and a few Italians) 
did, truckloads of them, working under guard in the tobacco factories. 
Because tobacco, although important, was not considered a war in-
dustry, its workforce was soon depleted by the draft as well as by those 
who volunteered for the military. About the time the problem became 
serious, company officials learned that they were eligible to acquire 
prisoners of war to replace personnel in uniform. Arrangements were 
made by Universal's Richmond office, and soon the company's plants 
were operated primarily by prisoners, who were trucked from area pris-
oner of war camps-a notable one being North Carolina's Camp 
Buckner-to the factories. 
Arriving in groups of fifty or sixty each morning, the prisoners 
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worked a twelve-hour day and were supplied food by the military, 
brought each noon by trucks. Universal had to pay the government for 
each prisoner. Recollections of the prisoners' effectiveness vary; but 
Laverge recalled that the company would not have been able to stay 
afloat without them. He remembers hearing them described as "good 
workers." Pete Walker, a highly respected supervisor, concurs, adding 
only that they required close scrutiny. Some worked as far afield in the 
company system as the Maryland and Kentucky plants. 
Although most welcomed the opportunity to get away from their 
compounds, the incarcerated Germans were not always model employ-
ees. Sometimes fights erupted and work stopped until they were quelled. 
Also, as prisoners of war, they were subject to the military code-they 
were honor-bound to look for ways to escape and to cause as many 
problems for their captors as possible. Thus they had to be closely 
monitored, with armed soldiers acting as guards. Problems of sabotage 
occasionally arose. At Winston Leaf Tobacco Company, Universal's 
partner in Winston-Salem, prisoners employed nuisance sabotage tech-
niques. W.A. Goodson Jr. recalls that prisoners there somehow acquired 
small explosive devices about the size of pens. They would place them 
in boxcars loaded with tobacco, where they would explode, necessitat-
ing assistance from fire-fighting crews. In all, however, Goodson re-
members the prisoners as an integral part of the company's operations 
during the early 1940s: "without these people we would have had to 
shut down part of the plant for lack of labor." 
Although in 1946 few if any people in the company could have 
foreseen it, Universal was on the eve of major expansion, which would 
be brought about primarily, but not entirely, by the war. On the home 
front, tobacco tastes were changing, evidenced both literally and sym-
bolically by a 1945 court decision to remove cuspidors from the country's 
federal buildings. Clearly the cigarette had become the tobacco of 
choice. Moreover, as Universal was soon to discover, Europe was in 
need of tobacco. 
Fresh from war experiences, Laverge undertook in 1946 a trip of 
exploration throughout much of western Europe. Specifically, he wanted 
to learn the conditions of the tobacco markets in various countries and 
hoped to reestablish Universal's presence on the Continent. He visited 
some seven countries and learned that a significant market existed and 
that tobacco stocks were almost entirely depleted. Prior to the 1946 crop, 
Universal had sold little more than a hundred hogsheads to any Euro-
pean company; in 1946 it began to sell by the thousands. Laverge's 
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trip, which would lead to even greater sales, reestablished the basis of 
Universal's trade with western Europe. Moreover, the U.S. government 
stood ready to help in the form of the Marshall Plan, which was de-
signed to get Europe back on its feet. 
Because of its 1930s ventures into overseas markets, Universal was 
in 1946 positioned to garner a huge share of this new market. In turn, 
the company used the experience and contacts gained in post-World 
War II Europe to begin global explorations that would lead it to enor-
mous success in the closing decades of the century. Moreover, the com-
pany was entering a new phase because of the appearance of techno-
logical advances within its vast factory system, as well as within the busi-
ness community at large. Soon the world would be smaller and easier to 
cover. Finally, the company was changing directions because a new gen-
eration of people was moving into managerial ranks, and the current 
president was about to retire. 
Mr. Fred gave no inkling to stockholders or colleagues before ten-
dering his resignation on May 31, 1946. The previous year, W.A. 
Willingham, chairman of the board and a company founder, had died, 
and now Mr. Fred's departure (although he would remain active in 
company affairs for another twenty years) paved the way for new lead-
ership from Herbert Jackson. 
The change of command following Harrison's resignation was not 
a particularly smooth one, however. There were several contenders for 
the position of president, and one influential person in particular-
Covington-was opposed to Jackson's bid. Covington's faction wanted 
Pinckney Harrison in the position but Jackson argued that he had been 
in the military so long that he was out of touch with the day-to-day 
operations of the company. The real reason was more likely that 
Pinckney and Jackson had apparently previously rubbed each other the 
wrong way, most likely during the period when the former often called 
the shots. When Covington brought the matter of what role Pinckney 
should play in the Jackson administration to a head, Jackson flatly re-
fused to be forced. In a late-night telephone conversation with Mr. Fred, 
who still backed Pinckney's cause, Jackson said crisply, "If you press 
me any further, I'll resign." The proud Pinckney Harrison subsequently 
refused the position of vice president. Personalities aside, however, the 
stage was set for the emergence of a new chapter in Universal's history. 
Fred Harrison was born in 1887, and after his death on June 18, 
1972, he was eulogized in the lead editorial of the Richmond Times-
Dispatch in effusive terms. This tribute was written by Virginius Dabney, 
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himself a preeminent figure in the twentieth-century history of the 
Commonwealth. Dabney hailed Harrison's philanthropy and his per-
sonal generosity and also noted his knighthood, about which Harrison 
never spoke, by the King of Sweden. Dabney called his subject "a great 
human being," and ended by writing, "There are few like him in any 
generation." 
The eulogy, of course, reflected the public Mr. Fred, but it was the 
private one who held the helm at Universal. It was probably Fred 
Harrison more than anyone else who defined-both by actions and atti-
tude-the kind of business Universal would become and remain to the 
present day. He saw Universal certainly as a business, but he also saw it 
as a family whose members had the same moral and ethical obligations 
to each other as they had to their private families. Patriotic in his lead-
ership at the company during the war years and solicitous of his em-
ployees who were in the military, he was quiet, unassuming, and known 
by the nickname "the Peacemaker." He was content to work from be-
hind the scenes, overseeing and approving the company's moves while 
leaving much of the day-to-day management chores to the more flam-
boyant Pinckney Harrison. By the standards of the 1990s Fred Harrison 
might be considered a quaint and reticent Victorian gentleman, but the 
values he espoused and attempted to instill in those who worked for 
him continue to shape operations at Universal. 
7 
Postwar Growth at Home 
When Herbert W. Jackson Jr. assumed the presidency of Universal Leaf 
Tobacco Company in 1946, the country was moving from war to the 
uncertainties of demobilization. Having conquered the combined forces 
of Germany and Japan, the United States emerged from combat with 
strong feelings of solidarity and pride. Demand for tobacco soared to 
record heights, and Jackson, who always considered tobacco to be one 
of life's harmless but pleasant diversions, was to have a major influence 
in helping meet this unprecedented demand. 
A heavy-set man with a ruddy complexion, Jackson drove to work 
each morning in his Cadillac, which he called "the hearse," through a 
Richmond undergoing change similar to that of the rest of the nation 
in the late 1940s. Its West End neighborhood was rapidly being devel-
oped as a major suburban area, and new roads and subdivisions were 
being built. New businesses were also coming to the city on the James 
River that had been host to English colonists, the Revolutionary and 
Civil wars, and Reconstruction. 
Jackson had been first attracted to tobacco warehouse work because 
of its physical demands. The idea of jockeying hogsheads about, just as 
had been done in the business since the seventeenth century, doubtless 
appealed to him as a twenty-two-year-old man recently out of the army 
just after World War I. Thus, on New Year's Day 1919, he began work-
ing for Richmond's J.P. Taylor Tobacco Company, a Universal subsid-
iary. Rising rapidly through the ranks, Jackson did a seven-year stint in 
Chatham, Ontario, where he set up operations for the new Canadian 
Leaf Tobacco Company. Following his return to Richmond in 1934, he 
was made a vice president. Twelve years later he became president. 
By nature Herbert Jackson was a mild-mannered, self-effacing per-
son who shunned the public eye-he said he had "a passion for ano-
nymity"-as ardently as he sought perfection in spoken and written 
English. His memos, reports, and letters were often stylistic gems, re-
flecting his admiration for the prose of Winston Churchill. So careful 
was Jackson in his use of words that he often openly admonished oth-
ers for misusing them. Once during an automobile trip from the 
78 Tobacco Merchant 
Chatham, Ontario, plant to the one at Tillsonburg, a distance of about 
a hundred miles, he was engaged in conversation with Ed Allen, who 
eventually headed up Universal's Canadian company. Toward the end 
of the trip, Jackson said, "Ed, it's been a very interesting chat. Do you 
realize how many times you've cursed since we left Chatham?" 
"No, sir, I don't," was the abashed reply. 
"Fifty-nine times," said Jackson. 
"I'll be damned!" came the spontaneous but immediately embar-
rassing rejoinder. 
"Sixty," saidJackson. 
In college, Jackson picked up the nickname "Stony." Doubtless, the 
person who bestowed it on him had in mind an oblique reference to the 
famous Confederate general Thomas Jonathan ("Stonewall") Jackson. 
The name stuck with Jackson for the rest of his life, but was never after 
college used to his face. Like his namesake, to whom he bore no rela-
tion, Herbert Jackson was a committed son of the South, a devout Pres-
byterian, and an ardent taskmaster. He reflected well the work ethic 
and individualism of the era in which he was born and raised. 
As a leader of Universal, for which he sought the same anonymity 
that he did for himself, Jackson was known for his conservative stance 
on all issues. His philosophy was simple: the company's money should 
be invested only in tobacco because that alone brought the financial 
return that all connected with the business expected. "Bricks and mor-
tar," a term he often used to describe Universal's physical facilities, 
were in his view like a carpenter's hammer, merely a tool. Tools gave 
their user no return; only what they produced could do that. Many 
Universal people approached Herbert Jackson's desk, which was flanked 
by twin cuspidors that he regularly used, with ideas that were never 
implemented because to do so would have cost money. And rare is the 
Universal employee of long standing who has not heard and repeated 
the story of Jackson's eliminating one foot from the proposed new cor-
porate headquarters in an attempt to deal with an impending cost over-
run. Some fifteen years following Jackson's unexpected death of a heart 
attack in 1966, a former colleague reflected that "he was the most con-
servative man I ever knew." 
Although Jackson's conservatism may at times have bordered on 
parsimony, there is no doubt that he was an important force behind the 
Universal Corporation of today. He was capable of holding disparate 
groups within the Universal family together by allowing them freedom 
to pursue their jobs as they thought best, a method of leadership upon 
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which the company still prides itself. This was particularly important 
where the partners were concerned. 
Since its founding, Universal had brought a number of partners 
under its umbrella. Chief among them was the K.R. Edwards Com-
pany. Others included Kinston Tobacco Company, R.P. Watson, W.B. 
Lea, W.H. Winstead, Winston Leaf, Virginia Tobacco, W.A. Adams, 
W.L. Robinson, and other smaller ones. Wholly owned companies ex-
isted in the form of the J.P. Taylor Company and Southwestern To-
bacco Company. 
Jackson's theory of governing the partners was basically one of 
laissez faire, concluding that they would produce best if they enjoyed 
autonomy. He knew the characters of the men who ran these opera-
tions, men often called "popes" or "barons" because of their autocratic 
managerial styles. Universal always owned 51 percent of these compa-
nies but gave them a free hand regarding routine operating matters. 
Sometimes personnel would be transferred briefly between the Rich-
mond office and one of the partner companies, either in this country or 
abroad. When an employee went for a stint to a partner company he 
would answer to management there. 
In addition to retaining a good working relationship with the part-
ners, social interactions made the partners feel part of the Universal 
family. The Lancaster Leaf operation in Pennsylvania provides a case 
in point. Largely omitted from Universal's main flow, it functioned in 
isolation until the mid-1950s, when Wallace Chandler arranged to have 
the annual company golf tournament held at nearby Hershey. The event 
drew Lancaster Leaf closer to the company. With the advent of super 
plants, discussed below, and the parallel decline in the partner system, 
such interactions with the partners changed, however. 
Jackson's heyday was during the era of the partner system, and his 
skills made it work. Often these companies had been formed by the 
fathers, sometimes grandfathers, of the men currently running them, 
men who were not accustomed to having their word challenged or even 
questioned. Only a diplomat as skilled as Jackson could soothe egos on 
the one hand without compromising good business sense on the other. 
Although some in the organization thought some partners took advan-
tage of their autonomy, Jackson was able to placate the personalities 
that made up Universal Leaf Tobacco Company. 
Jackson's success with the partners reflected also his ability to com-
municate with people. "Tremendously capable man, a very affable man," 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Gordon L. Crenshaw recalled 
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from the vantage point of the early 1980s, "the kind of fellow that made 
you feel you were the greatest thing he had seen that day." 
Despite Jackson's leadership, it was four years into his presidency 
before gross sales volume reached what it had been for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1945. In that year, revenues were more than $82 mil-
lion. For 1946, the first full year of world peace, they dropped to $76.9 
million. The year 194 7 saw a further decrease to $73.6 million, while 
1948 saw a four-year low of $58.2 million. Higher tobacco prices helped 
push gross revenue to $79.6 million for 1949, but it was slightly off-to 
$75 million-for 1950. In 1951, however, for the first time in company 
history, dollar volume exceeded $100 million, rising to $108,910,396.65. 
In his first report to stockholders on September 5, 1946, Jackson 
observed that several Universal plants were involved in union negotia-
tions and that one of the affiliates had been closed by a strike at the 
outset of the flue-cured season-the worst possible time. Simultaneously, 
other affiliates were being pressured to negotiate with the unions, who 
in the 1940s were making an effort to organize the South. Jackson fur-
ther noted that a worldwide shortage of dollar exchange made it diffi-
cult for foreign countries to obtain the dollars necessary to procure 
American goods. Also, he later reported unusually high building costs 
for physical facilities and expressed a fear of what would take place on 
the termination of the U.S.-financed Marshall Plan. 
As Jackson's tenure continued, sales began to grow; although the 
end of 1952 proved disappointing. The physical volume of tobacco 
handled was the same as the previous year, but sales revenues slipped 
to a disappointing $78 million. For 1953, they were back at a healthy 
$96 million. A milestone was reached in 1956 when dollar volume in-
creased to just over $119 million, never again to fall below the $100 
million mark. By the end of the decade the gross revenues were up to 
$143 million, the largest in the firm's history. For 1965, the last full 
year of Jackson's presidency, Universal's gross dollar volume stood at 
$309,924,507. Painful though it was to many, Jackson's conservative 
approach brought rewards, although there are still those at Universal 
who argue that the company could have done even better with a more 
aggressive approach. 
Further indications of Universal's growth during the Jackson years 
are also evidenced from the annual stockholders' reports. Collectively 
the reports show important trends over time. In 194 7, the first year that 
Jackson delivered his own report, almost a quarter of a million dollars 
was earmarked for special construction, while a stock dividend of 300 
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percent was proposed. The next year, additional money was set aside to 
build two new packing plants and to update others. In 1949 a small 
packing plant was opened in Nyasaland, in East Africa. In 1953, East-
ern Leaf Tobacco Company and Universal Leaf Tobacco Company of 
China became wholly owned subsidiaries, while the following year an 
additional two hundred thousand was budgeted for plant renovation. 
In 1961 experiments that would lead to the inauguration of the super 
plants were being conducted in Goldsboro. The super plants were huge 
processing facilities, the size and efficiency of which to that time had 
not been seen in the tobacco business. Automated and highly organized, 
they brought processing into the modern technological world. The fol-
lowing year saw another new plant in service, while in 1964 Universal 
ventured into Greece and reported that an enlargement of the home 
office in Richmond was also needed. 
With the inauguration of the super plants, the early 1960s saw such 
growth that in 1965, the last year Jackson delivered the annual report, 
net earnings (after providing for dividends on the preferred stock) were 
$6,721,458-a marked increase from the $1,492,414 he had reported 
in 1946 at the start of his tenure. 
An important event during the Jackson era was the construction of 
a new corporate headquarters. For a number of years the company had 
operated from offices at the Richmond Trust Building, but by the early 
1950s it was apparent that additional space was needed. 
During this time, the face of downtown Richmond was being dras-
tically altered. On street after street the wrecker's ball was in action, 
clearing away the old to make room for the new. One of the spots that 
was razed for business use was the once-fashionable Gamble's Hill area. 
Situated on a promontory that originally had enjoyed a commanding 
view of downtown Richmond to the east and the winding James River 
and Manchester (once a town in its own right) to the south, the area had 
escaped the ravages of the evacuation fire that destroyed much of the 
city when the Union forces entered it in April1865. But by the end of 
World War II, the stately antebellum houses were run-down. Most were 
rooming houses, while others were being converted to commercial uses. 
In at least one, prostitutes did a thriving business. It was to this area, at 
201 South Third Street, that Universal moved in 1954. 
For the first time in its history, the company had the opportunity to 
construct a state-of-the-art home office, but such was not to be the case. 
Before the emergence of a strong executive committee, all major deci-
sions at Universal were made by the president, who may or may not 
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have asked for advice from associates. Accordingly, Jackson asked an 
architect friend at the well-known local Baskervill firm to draw plans 
for a building on company property at Third and Canal Streets. Fig-
ures for the structure came in at approximately four hundred thousand 
dollars-fifty thousand dollars more than Jackson was willing to pay. 
He decided to keep the plans but to decrease the size of the facilities by 
one foot. "As a result, it was a beehive instead of an office building," 
Jan Laverge recalled. "It was awful." In his 1954 annual report, Jack-
son noted that the facility, into which the company had moved in April 
of that year, had cost "approximately $350 thousand." Not until an ad-
ditional wing was added several years later, however, did the building 
become completely functional. . 
The new headquarters were barely occupied when problems be-
gan, one of the first centering on J. Pinckney Harrison, the strong con-
tender for the presidency when Jackson had prevailed in 1946. Harrison, 
upset because his quarters were so spartan, installed himself in the board 
room; he acquiesced, however, to having the board room table carried 
in and out for meetings. James E. Covington, citing claustrophobia, 
insisted that the wall between two offices be taken out so that he could 
have more space, the result being that his quarters were the same size as 
Harrison's and Jackson's. 
To make matters worse, about the time that the move was com-
pleted someone discovered that a brothel was in operation nearby, so 
close in fact that the women there had watched with interest as the new 
Universal building was being built. Former president Fred N. Harrison, 
no longer active on a day-to-day basis in company matters but neverthe-
less concerned about its image, heard of the illegal operation. Rather 
than file a complaint with the police or consult anyone at Universal, he 
took unilateral action: he personally bought the house and shut down 
the business. He remains Universal's sole recorded negotiator for such 
an establishment. 
During the two decades that Jackson directed Universal, the com-
pany was governed by a strong president who was advised by a board 
constituted solely of insiders. This system worked adequately until the 
post-World War II era, when growth and expansion into foreign mar-
kets made apparent the need for an executive committee (as well as for 
other committees to aid management and to function below the board 
level). As early as the beginning of the 1950s, La verge, Humphreys, 
and Warwick had begun pushing for the establishment of an informal 
executive committee; each noted that Jackson alone was making the 
major decisions. 
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In time the board would become a diverse and dynamic force. Made 
up of people with disparate business backgrounds, it now gives advice 
to top management; however, in the Jackson era it was quite different. 
During his day it was comprised of men who had shared lifetimes of 
intimate collegiality, a situation that fostered a relaxed and informal 
approach to matters. With rare exceptions, board members were part-
ners and top officers in the company, thus making their collective vi-
sion somewhat parochial because it lacked the broader view of the busi-
ness world outside tobacco. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the board 
was also sometimes marred by members who, although effective in their 
prime, were no longer as energetic as they once had been. 
When the Executive Committee first came into being it met only 
sporadically. Jackson still preferred to call in a few trusted people and 
informally ask their advice. The stock purchase plan, according to some 
the most important development pertaining to personnel during the 
Jackson years, was created in the late 1950s when Jackson worked out a 
pension system for Universal with the Life Insurance Company of Vir-
ginia. Based on a percentage of the employee's pay, the plan had a 
maximum benefit of six thousand dollars per year. Several years later, 
rather than increase the maximum, Universal's leaders hit upon the 
idea of a stock purchase plan whereby each employee was permitted to 
have 5 percent of his total compensation deducted from his pay and 
put into the plan, at which point the company would match the funds. 
Although Jackson had misgivings about matching the contributions 
dollar-for-dollar, he approved the plan-but with one stipulation: em-
ployees could not take out monies they had put in until the fifth year; 
he believed that such regulation would bind the employee to the 
company. 
Although other lower level committees also evolved, since its in-
ception the company has preferred as few bureaucratic encumbrances 
as possible. Thomas R. Towers, retired president and vice chairman, 
explained it this way: "rather than having layers of committees, we want 
it so that when a decision has to be made, then the people who can 
make a contribution to that can quickly come together. In our business, 
if you don't act immediately, you could well lose the opportunity." 
Apart from its corporate structure, the uniqueness of the tobacco 
business becomes readily apparent in leaf purchasing. Despite modern 
laboratory techniques, the only method of learning tobacco is by work-
ing on the markets and in a factory. Jackson once noted that it took a 
person about seven years to learn tobacco. By that time a buyer should 
be able to walk on the auction floor with orders for several hundred 
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grades of tobacco, recognize them (see Appendix 3), and be ready to 
bid in a split second. He would have learned from years of experience 
what grade would be right for which customer. It is easy therefore to 
understand that grading tobacco is a subjective process, fundamentally 
unaltered by science, technology, or automation. 
The buyers are perhaps the most glamorous people in the tobacco 
business, men who play for high-dollar stakes in instantaneous deals 
and who cherish the freedom to pursue their jobs-which have changed 
little over the decades-in a less structured, less supervised way than 
many others in the company. Jackson knew this and prudently did not 
seek to implement constricting rules upon them or, for that matter, on 
the company's officer-salesmen. These men, known as account execu-
tives, sell the tobacco that the buyers acquire. 
No activity in the tobacco business is more interesting and colorful 
than the auction sale, the focal point of buyers' day-to-day activities. 
Held in a multitude of Southern towns-from northern Florida to Vir-
ginia for the flue-cured crop; in Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee for 
the burley and dark-fired tobaccos; and in Maryland for "Maryland 
tobacco"-these sales dramatize what to the public's mind is the tobacco 
business. 
When the crop is ready for market it is brought by the farmer to a 
warehouse in one of the many towns in tobacco-growing areas and turned 
over to the warehouse. Prior to that, the farmer has separated his crop 
into rough grades. Unscrupulous farmers sometimes are not averse to 
hiding inferior tobacco inside piles of tobacco of a higher grade. This 
practice, called "nesting," might also be done by warehouse people. No 
matter which, scores of unsuspecting buyers, especially beginners, have 
been victimized by buying inferior goods. So the buyers always tried to 
inspect as much of the tobacco as possible before the sale. "It was noth-
ing to go on the floor," said William (who bore the double nicknames 
of "Billy" and "The Senator") Pritchard, one of Universal's legendary 
buyers, "and have 250 to 300 grades. You expected to use them all." 
Attending each sale are people from various companies. Usually 
the group consists of from eight to ten buyers, an auctioneer, a ticket 
marker, and the warehouse operators. The buyers are usually assigned 
to an individual market. The markets start as soon as enough tobacco 
has been harvested in a sale area to keep the sale going. Their openings 
follow typical weather patterns. Consequently, Georgia and Florida start 
first and northern North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland, respectively, 
open last. 
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Buyers, understandably, are under pressure. As far back as fifty 
years ago they would spend as much as a quarter of a million dollars of 
the company's money in one day; for some, the pressure was unbear-
able. Pritchard reported that he and colleague Charles ("Charlie") Mar-
tin bought 13 million pounds in one season in Henderson, North Caro-
lina; and in Lexington, Kentucky, he and a fellow buyer bought more 
than five hundred thousand pounds in one day. 
In addition to the pressures that go with handling large sums of the 
company's money, living conditions for these members of the business 
were often at best provincial, although they have changed markedly 
over the years-especially since the advent of air conditioning and the 
rise in popularity of motels. Early recollections in the business abound 
with tales of dirty rooming houses, bad food, and inadequate facilities. 
Veteran Universal officer John Leavell, recounting the days when he 
first started buying, tells the story of being sent on short notice to 
Carthage, Tennessee, "to follow sale," as is the term in the business. 
Arriving late at night at a shabby hotel, he was informed by the woman 
in charge that all rooms had a bath. While looking over his prospective 
quarters, however, he was unable to locate his. The woman then led 
him to a back window through which she pointed to the Cumberland 
River. She informed him that it served every room in the house! 
Coupled with the pressure of buying was the pressure of having to 
work under the scrutiny of supervisors who were taskmasters of the 
first order. Supervisors would routinely pull buyers from the line for 
an on-the-spot consultation, and public admonitions were not unusual. 
Thomas R. Towers recalled, for example, standing with his fellow buy-
ers and being handed a sample of tobacco he had bought. He was then 
told by his supervisor Ches Waddell, "Take that tobacco back to your 
motel; every night when you say your prayers say 'Oh Lord, please don't 
let me buy anything as heavy as this again!"' Occasionally customers 
showed up at the markets and were given the red carpet treatment, 
making the activities more tense for the buyers. Work days, which usu-
ally began at 7 A.M., were for the buyers more often than not followed 
by evenings back at the warehouse regrading what had been purchased 
during the day. In the flue-cured market warehouses in Georgia, sum-
mertime temperatures would sometimes reach 130 degrees Fahrenheit. 
Twenty-one below zero has been reported during a sale on the burley 
market in Lexington, Kentucky. 
When work was over for the day, or if the day was Sunday, buyers 
would often attend impromptu parties at which they would talk tobacco 
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until the early hours of the morning. Towers nostalgically recalled these 
get-togethers as reminiscent of his military time, when men of like minds 
and duties shared each other's company following the work of the day. 
Recreation often consisted of the a motion picture or a night of 
drinking. The use of alcohol, alone or with the group, has long been a 
problem for tobacco men. The story still circulates about the buyer who 
appeared late one night stark naked in the lobby of his hotel, thus end-
ing several days of sobriety that he had vowed to maintain during that 
year's season. 
Then there were women. Local females who were willing to trade 
sex for a few days of what they considered the good life of new cars, 
good food, and some fancy clothes could be found. Professional prosti-
tutes would also follow the tobacco sales, offering their services to the 
tobacco men, or to the farmers, who were separated from wives and 
families and were largely anonymous in the late summer in the dusty 
towns across the South. 
To the uninitiated, the auction is begun and concluded so quickly 
that one is not aware of what has taken place. As buyers and auctioneers 
walk the aisles of tobacco, they communicate with the auctioneer by a 
series of actions and gestures known to them alone. Some buyers prefer 
to stand behind the tobacco, others in front of it. Some face their com-
petitors, and others turn their backs to them. Sometimes a wink, a nod, 
a movement of the lips, or a subtle forefinger salute indicates that a bid 
is being offered. John Leavell reported that he once stood close enough 
to the auctioneer to be able to bid by briefly tapping the auctioneer's 
hand without attracting the attention of any of the other buyers, who 
must have wondered how the sale was moving. Another buyer remem-
bered working with an auctioneer who used the prearranged signal of 
picking his nose to convey information to a favored buyer. 
Auctioneers offered their wares in a singsong monologue unintel-
ligible to outsiders. A typical offer would sound something like "Sixty-
fie, oh, sevn, sevn, eight an' nine, ten, an' ten, lookin' ten, fa' 'leven, 
lemme see twelve, twelve. Gone!" The foregoing transaction would take 
place in as few as six or seven seconds, with as many as eight or so 
buyers having made bids! 
Sometimes tempers would flare if bids were missed or ignored, or 
if the auctioneer seemed to favor one buyer. Occasionally a brief scuffle 
would break out. Leavell reported that once in the 1940s he saw a buyer 
in Goldsboro knock an auctioneer over two rows of tobacco. On an-
other occasion, in Louisville, an irate farmer pulled a shotgun on a 
group of buyers. Seeking higher prices for his crop, the farmer backed 
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down when the warehouse man stuck a pistol in his back and shouted, 
"You get your ass out of here!" Neither guns nor fights are part of the 
auction scene today, but rumors of farmers bringing guns to sales ex-
isted into the late 1970s. 
Before the mid-twentieth century, tobacco was handled almost en-
tirely by hand. Brought by the farmers to the auction centers, it was 
purchased, tagged, and taken from the floor by the purchaser, who 
transported it to his processing plants by either railroad or truck. When 
received at the factory, tobacco was taken from its transporter by "duck-
bills," hand-operated two-wheel dollies that lifted and carried a small 
amount, which the operator took to the scales. There it was weighed, 
regraded, and arranged in rows by the new grade, following which 
each grade would be hauled manually to the stemming room on four-
wheel dollies, called 'jacks." Laborers pulled the jacks with metal hooks. 
Next, the tobacco would pass through the "ordering machine," which 
infused it with roughly a 30 percent moisture content, then it would be 
moved to the stemming room. 
Before the advent of the 409 stemming machine-the first really 
revolutionary piece of equipment in the business-all stemming was 
done by hand. The tobacco would proceed from the ordering machine 
on a conveyor belt, its destination a large room in which from two hun-
dred to six hundred people, mostly black women, performed the stem-
ming duties. Varying in numbers according to the factory, the women 
were paid by the amount of stems they removed, pay being ten cents 
per pound. Each woman kept the stems in a small canvas bag. Often the 
women would pour water in the bag to increase weight. With the intro-
duction of the stemming machine, however, hand stemmers were put 
out of work. This machine, one of the earliest to go into regular service 
in the factories, had grippers that picked up the tobacco and knocked it 
free from the stem. 
Following the stemming process, the tobacco went to the redrying 
machines, where its moisture content was reduced to about 12 percent, 
10 if it was going to England. Next it would go into a hogshead, which 
was made on the premises, for the transport. The tobacco was then 
pressed ("prized") as compactly as possible and the lid ("head") nailed 
in place. Each hogshead was then stenciled and either stored or shipped. 
The hogsheads, each weighing about a thousand pounds and measur-
ing about four by four feet in size, were rolled by hand. But the advent 
of the super plants, whose introduction to the tobacco business was just 
around the corner at mid-century, changed all that. 
Another change took place in 1958 with the introduction of a labo-
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ratory, at which time Universal became one of the first companies in 
the American tobacco business to submit tobacco to scientific analysis. 
Bernard S. ("Skip") Holt Jr., formerly in the research department of 
the American Tobacco Company, was hired to organize and direct the 
lab. Located in Richmond in what was once a mid-Victorian house, the 
lab was difficult to work in because its facilities were spread out over 
several floors. Although inconvenient, the lab was so well installed in 
the Pulliam house, as the structure was known, that it received an award 
from the Association for the Preservation of Viriginia Antiquities for 
the conversion of a historic building. 
The era of the super plants was getting under way during this time. 
Long a dominant figure in leaf procurement and processing, Edwin 
W. Humphreys became the father of them. With a reputation for an-
gering some, alienating many, and bullying those who would take it, he 
revolutionized Universal. 
A native Kentuckian, Humphreys, who was born in 1910, gradu-
ated from the University of Kentucky with a degree in metallurgical 
engineering at the height of the Great Depression. He never worked at 
the profession for which he was trained, however. He entered the to-
bacco business in 1934 as a foreman for the R.P. Watson Company in 
Wilson, North Carolina, and soon returned to Kentucky, where he 
worked for Southwestern, a member-firm of the Universal family. Dur-
ing World War II he was a buyer for Southwestern, where he became a 
vice president in 1946. Ultimately he became the leading leaf man at 
Universal, supervising purchasing and processing. 
To the present day, stories at Universal are legion about 
Humphreys's public tongue-lashings of high-ranking subordinates. "He 
had a certain tolerance for you," one former Humphreys subordinate 
recalled. "He would listen to a certain extent and then you could see his 
face begin to tighten, and he would look at you with those steely blue 
eyes. His jaw would begin to quiver, and you knew at that time he had 
heard enough and you'd better back off." One colleague remembers 
Humphreys as "a man that made up his mind, right or wrong, and 
would stick with it through hell and high water, and never vary from it; 
and even after he found out he was wrong, he would think of ways to 
justify that he wasn't really wrong." But on the other hand, there were 
those who liked him. John Leavell, a lifelong friend and associate of 
Humphreys, recalled that "Ed Humphreys was one of the finest men 
I've ever known. In every respect, he was a great businessman and he 
was tough, and he got the nickname 'rattler' because everybody said he 
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was just like a rattlesnake, he'd bite you before you knew it. But Ed 
could be one of the nicest people there was." 
Nevertheless, the fear that Humphreys instilled in his subordinates 
was legendary; the best example was perhaps what happened following 
an altercation between Humphreys and one of his people in the Lex-
ington, Kentucky, office. Following the exchange, the employee would 
come to work in the mornings, climb a flight of stairs, go through the 
accounting department, and descend again to the first floor on the other 
side of the building in order to get to his office. Circuitous though the 
path may have been, it afforded him the security of knowing that he 
was avoiding a potential encounter by not walking past Humphreys' 
office door. 
That Humphreys must have enjoyed his reputation is evident by 
the fact that his personal automobile license plate bore the numbers 
"007." To a generation of Americans this signified the code name for 
the fictional spy James Bond, made popular by novelist Ian Fleming. 
In a group of novels and motion pictures made when Humphreys was 
at his height, Fleming's "007" was wily and calculating, tenacious and 
lethal ... and his enemies never knew where he would strike next. 
All in all, however, Humphreys was the right man at the right time 
for Universal. Countering Jackson's conservatism, he saw the potential 
offered by the modern, state-of-the-art, super plant. Because of his po-
sition of power, he was able to implement his wishes, and he often 
deliberately underestimated the cost of an idea in order to sell it. He 
knew that he had a chance of getting a low figure by Jackson and the 
committees and concluded-dangerous though such thinking might have 
been-that he would find the necessary money when the time arose; he 
was always able to do so. Prior to World War II, and for most of the 
1950s, Universal's tobacco processing had been carried on in antiquated 
plants constructed decades earlier. As customers' needs changed, the 
company realized that its factories must also change. 
Although Universal never manufactured its own processing ma-
chines, early on it began installing and experimenting with those made 
by other companies that specialized in servicing the tobacco industry. 
Some of this machinery, although viewed with skepticism by Jackson, 
looked as if it might produce favorable results, but its implementation 
caused problems at first. Buildings in which the new drying, stemming, 
and threshing machines were installed and tested had been constructed 
originally to handle tobacco by hand and were thus not suited to a mod-
ern, production-line operation. 
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Following a study of costs, future usefulness, and financial return, 
the decision was made, largely at the urging of Humphreys, to turn the 
Goldsboro plant into a large-scale experiment that ultimately led to the 
super plants. A.W. ("Pete") Walker, the plant manager at Goldsboro, 
and his staff installed the new machinery with the assistance of the 
company that made the machines. Assistance also came from Richmond 
in the persons of engineers C.H. Hinnant Jr. and M. Deane Cheatham 
Jr. The experiments, which centered on the way the tobacco was 
threshed, showed immediate promise. Prior to this Goldsboro venture, 
a typical factory could turn out about 360 hogsheads of tobacco per 
day; afterward the average was one thousand. 
The millions of dollars expended on the super plants that grew 
from the Goldsboro experiment were counterbalanced by reductions 
in labor costs. Under the old system, it took four hundred to six hun-
dred employees to operate a plant; under the new, fewer than one hun-
dred. The increased capacity, coupled with reduced labor requirements, 
gave Universal a competitive edge. Following the 1960 experiments at 
Goldsboro, the first super plant was put into operation at Henderson, 
North Carolina, in 1961, the next one at the K.R. Edwards Company at 
Smithfield, North Carolina, in 1962, followed in the same year by Ca-
nadian Leaf Tobacco Company in Tillsonburg, Ontario. Other super 
plants soon in operation included Tobacco Processors in Wilson, North 
Carolina, and Southern Processors in Danville, Virginia. Gigantic and 
highly automated, they changed forever the way tobacco was processed. 
Goldsboro may have been chosen as the experimental plant because 
of the leadership there. Long recognized as a weak link in the Univer-
sal chain, it had been placed under the direction of Pete Walker, a crusty 
hard-swearing tobacco veteran, and one of the few men who had the 
temerity to take on Humphreys. "I never had any trouble with Ed," 
Walker recalled following his retirement, "because he knew that I wasn't 
going to stand for anything out of line whatever. If he blasted me, I 
blasted right back at him." Walker remembered the Goldsboro plant as 
"raggedy-assed ... no discipline, no order, no nothing. I got all the 
people together and I said, 'Look, this place has a bad name. The only 
way we can change that is that we're going to do a hell of a job here . 
. . . I'm going to work and every one of you are going to work, and 
you're going to tend to your own business .... I'm the hub of the wheel 
and the rest of you are the spokes. Now let's get going!"' Obviously, 
Humphreys and Walker were men of similar mind, and Humphreys 
probably turned to Goldsboro because it was being run as he would 
have run it had he been in Walker's shoes. 
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Not only the factory system, but the sales system was changing dur-
ing this time. Over the twenty years that comprise the Jackson era, 
Universal's sales grew tremendously. As has always been the system at 
Universal, the most promising people in the immediately lower ech-
elons were promoted into sales, "bringing them along," as the saying is 
in the company. Another feature of Universal's business is that, although 
a salesman may move into the executive ranks of the company, he still 
retains the sales accounts with which he had previously been working. 
Therefore, Universal's top-level executives continue to retain and ser-
vice accounts. Put another way, top Universal officers are nearly all 
active salesmen. 
During the Jackson years the sales department underwent a transi-
tion in personnel. Senior officers-Jackson, Pinckney, and Fred 
Harrison-remained stewards of long-standing accounts, while Jim 
Covington, back for good from China, developed new clients, espe-
cially R.J. Reynolds and Benson and Hedges. But the cadres of a newly 
emerging sales force were already present in the persons of Jan La verge 
and Pierre Warwick. In time these men would be supported by a cast of 
rising people: Gordon Crenshaw, James H. Abernathy, Walter 
Robertson, Thomas Towers, Cliff Sutherland, and John Leavell. 
Laverge and Warwick had worked together in foreign sales since 
the 1930s, but with the taste in tobacco after World War II evolving to 
favor American leaf, they ushered in a new era for the company. Part 
of the reason for the success enjoyed by the two men probably lay in the 
fact that they had markedly different personalities and thus comple-
mented each other; another is that they shared the goal of garnering as 
much foreign business as possible. A colleague used a hunting image to 
describe the cooperation between the two: "the two of them were just 
like two bird dogs in a field, working together beautifully." 
A native of Amsterdam, Laverge, born in 1909, was a member of a 
Huguenot family that had fled France for Holland in 1681. For many 
generations the La verge men had been Protestant ministers in Holland, 
but La verge's grandfather had abandoned the ministry in the late nine-
teenth century in favor of the tobacco business. 
Laverge graduated from college during the depths of the Depres-
sion with a degree in mechanical engineering and, with jobs scarce, 
joined his father in the tobacco business. He came to Universal in 1934 
following his father's death. Despite his prior knowledge of tobacco, 
like everyone else Laverge paid his dues in the hot and dusty factories 
in North Carolina, and for a beginning salary of $100 per month. He 
was soon moved to the Richmond office, where his ascendancy began. 
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Because of his background, Laverge brought a new enthusiasm to 
Universal's international sales efforts. He was fluent in English, Ger-
man, and French, which made him a natural choice as the company's 
chief European representative. Careful, deliberate, and demanding of 
his subordinates, he came to conclusions methodically and with logical 
preCisiOn. 
Warwick, on the other hand, was more of a dreamer, albeit one 
whose dreams often produced results. A native of Norfolk, Virginia, 
and a product of schools there, he attended the University of Virginia 
for three years. He left Charlottesville in 1927 without a degree after 
his family suffered financial reverses in the lumber business in Florida. 
Warwick was injured accidentally by a self-inflicted shotgun wound 
when he was a teenager, and during his interview at Universal he was 
called on to prove that the absence of three fingers represented no real 
debility. He won the job, and the contest, when he challenged his inter-
viewer to a race at tying shoelaces. Taking the usual route of a new-
comer to the business-four years on the markets from North Carolina 
to Kentucky-he was assigned to the sales department. 
What made Warwick temperamentally suited to represent Univer-
sal in the Mediterranean and South and Central America was his love 
of complex, even chaotic, bargaining. He enjoyed the dickering, the 
subterfuge, the contrived delays, and the feigned outrage at inconse-
quential obstacles that often accompany business transactions in those 
areas. Once, for example, during negotiations in a Middle Eastern coun-
try, he and Towers, at that time his assistant, were rebuffed for anum-
ber of days before the prospective customer announced that he would 
not buy at all because Universal's prices were too high. Next came a 
week of negotiations, which seemed fruitless to the young Towers, who 
favored returning home. "Patience is the most important thing of all," 
Warwick counseled. "If we have to, we're going to stay here for a month." 
After two more weeks of negotiations they concluded a sale that the 
customer thought he had manipulated to his advantage, and Warwick 
and Towers headed home with a comfortable profit. 
When Covington returned permanently from China, there was some 
question of what to do with him. Not waiting for an answer, however, 
Covey went to work developing new business and soon made himself 
indispensable as a member of the sales force. Energetic, self-motivated, 
and possessing an ability to win difficult clients, he became one of 
Universal's top salesmen. He was known for his punctuality, meticu-
lousness of dress, and devotion to a personal code that demanded as 
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much of others as of himself. "If someone welshed on a dollar bet on 
golf, the devil with them, he just wrote them off," his son James Jr. 
recalled. "He didn't care about playing golf with them, didn't care about 
doing business with them, or anything else." Given to occasional out-
bursts of temper that humiliated more than one waiter, sometimes even 
marred a dinner party, he was nevertheless a trusting and loyal friend 
who kept his close allies for life. So close were his friendships that some 
were kept alive by his children twenty years after their father stopped 
doing business. In his later years, but before his retirement to Florida, 
he owned imported horses and enjoyed fox hunting at Virginia's Deep 
Run Hunt Club where he rode to the hounds. Covington had long be-
fore learned the pleasures of country club amenities and had devel-
oped a lifelong love of giving lavish parties, the expenses of which still 
cause eyes to roll for those who remember them. "There used to be a 
joke around the office," colleaegue M. Norton Howe remembered, "that 
Covington had an unlimited expense account and he exceeded even 
that!" Over time, Covington's customers included some of the most 
important to the company. 
In the late 1920s one of the most important relationships between 
Universal and one of its major customers began. In those years, 
Richmond's Continental Tobacco Company was a cigarette and pipe 
tobacco manufacturer, with a plant on Twentieth Street between Main 
and Cary Streets. One of this small company's directors was Wirt 
Hatcher, one of whose duties was tobacco purchasing. Hatcher and 
Universal's Pinckney Harrison were close friends; both of them were 
avid outdoorsmen and hunters, passionate bridge players, and, above 
all, businessmen. Although Continental's leaf tobacco needs were small, 
whenever possible Harrison was given the first opportunity to supply 
them. Thus began the Universal-Philip Morris connection, which was 
to become significant to both companies. 
In 1929 a small New York business calling itself Philip Morris and 
Company purchased Continental Tobacco. Although maintaining a New 
York office headed by sales and advertising director O.H. Chalkley, 
the company's business activity was centered in Richmond at the Twen-
tieth Street plant, which was run by Hatcher, Edward Dinwiddie, and 
Clark Ames. In the mid-thirties they were joined by Jehu Arch bell, who 
for many years had been president of the American Tobacco Company 
of the Orient (headquartered in Turkey). These four men shared two 
small offices in the concrete factory building on Twentieth Street. 
Of the four, Hatcher, the driving force, was mainly responsible for 
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the early success of the fledgling company. Looking for ways to in-
crease business during the Depression, he blended and marketed in 
1933 what was to be called the "Philip Morris English blend." In addi-
tion to supplying Philip Morris's leaf tobacco, Universal also financed 
its tobacco purchases. Although the company may not have been 
underfinanced at the time, Philip Morris was expanding so rapidly that 
it needed all the credit it could muster. When it bought Continental in 
1929 it manufactured 24 million cigarettes for the year. Ten years later 
it was manufacturing over 12 billion. 
Another change in the relationship between Universal and Philip 
Morris had its origin in a cigarette company called Benson and Hedges. 
Like Philip Morris, it was located in New York. This small firm, which 
produced a limited amount of specialty cigarettes, (including Parlia-
ment, America's first filtered brand), came under control of the 
Cullmans during World War II. In earlier years, Joseph F. Cullman Sr. 
had been a member of Universal's board. Joseph Jr., the second gen-
eration of this famous tobacco family, was president of the holding 
company, Tobacco and Allied Stocks, which had acquired the control-
ling interest in Benson and Hedges. 
Expanding slowly following World War II, Benson and Hedges 
relied on Universal as its leaf supplier. In time, Jim Covington and 
Cullman became close friends, and the two of them became a familiar 
sight on the tobacco markets. 
Tobacco and Allied sold its interest in Benson and Hedges to Philip 
Morris in 1954, Philip Morris thus acquiring Parliament at the time 
when the demand for filter cigarettes began to rise. Although he died 
within a year, Joe Cullman Jr. became chairman of Philip Morris's Ex-
ecutive Committee. Many credit him with the unbelievable success the 
Philip Morris Company enjoys today. From modest beginnings, it de-
veloped into a diversified international conglomerate and the largest 
cigarette manufacturer in the United States. Universal continues to func-
tion as its principal tobacco supplier. 
Initiated through the mutual confidence between Philip Morris and 
Universal at a time when the former did not think it could afford its 
own leaf department, the relationship continues as one of the most 
unusual in the tobacco business. As recently as 1990 Joe Cullman III 
observed, "I think [the relationship is a reflection] of the quality of the 
leadership ... of Universal." 
Universal's sales organization during this period consisted of Presi-
dent Jackson, who was centrally involved with the Gallaher and the 
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American Tobacco Company accounts and Pinckney Harrison, who was 
primarily responsible for Philip Morris, on which he was succeeded by 
Humphreys. Covington managed the accounts for Reynolds Tobacco 
Company and for Benson and Hedges. On the foreign scene, Warwick 
had Central and South America and most of the Mediterranean coun-
tries. Laverge had Europe, except England and the Iberian Peninsula. 
These senior figures were assisted by Crenshaw, Abernathy, Leavell, 
Christian, Robertson, Towers, and Sutherland, who was responsible 
for the Far East. 
In the early postwar years most nations in western Europe were 
devoid of any tobacco inventory. Attempting to deal with this shortage, 
European countries where monopolies did not control the tobacco busi-
ness, most notably Denmark and the Netherlands, created government 
buying agencies. In 1946, the year of the first major postwar crop, rep-
resentatives of these agencies went to various tobacco-producing coun-
tries, especially the United States. Enormous quantities of tobacco of 
almost any usable type were ordered. To illustrate the size of this busi-
ness, Theodorus Niemeyer, who headed the buying committee for the 
Dutch tobacco interests, arrived in the United States in November of 
1946 to advise Universal that his company wished to increase its order 
for the 1946 crop by 16 million pounds. The order was successfully 
filled. The Danish order was placed mainly with British American To-
bacco Company's leaf buying organization, Export Leaf. 
In the later 1940s Japan, Germany, and Austria also sent represen-
tatives to the U.S. in an attempt to secure leaf. The Austrian monopoly's 
delegation consisted of Ludwig von Hurter and Hans Dorrek, who vis-
ited Universal first because of its strength in the dealer business. The 
Austrian monopoly had no dollars available but asked for a limited 
supply of leaf tobacco on credit. Following extended discussion, Trea-
surer Henderson agreed to a credit of twenty-five thousand dollars. 
From Richmond, the Austrians proceeded to visit other firms, the next 
being K.R. Edwards Company, one of Universal's partners, who 
promptly offered the monopoly a credit of fifty thousand dollars, obvi-
ously without consulting Henderson. As a result, Edwards has had the 
major part of the Austrian business ever since. 
After a year or two, the practice of "order sales" began to emerge. 
Prior to the war, and indeed for some time afterward, Universal bought 
tobacco, packed it, and offered it for sale to manufacturers on the basis 
of samples, sales being often assisted by local agents. Although this 
system still exists in isolated places, it became more and more usual and 
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acceptable for a foreign manufacturer to discuss prospective needs with 
the Universal executive and to develop a buying program that would be 
executed when the tobacco became available. This type of buying obvi-
ously demanded great confidence by the manufacturer in the Univer-
sal organization. Furthermore, postwar improvements in transporta-
tion and communications permitted customers to come to the U.S. to 
see their orders executed and to have close contact not only with 
Universal's buyers but with the support personnel connected with the 
transactions. 
Among the first foreign companies to entrust this type of business 
to Universal were Gallaher in England, Scandinavian Tobacco Com-
pany in Denmark, and Reemtsma in Germany, as well as a number of 
the monopolies in japan, Sweden, Austria, France, and other nations. 
The exception was the Italian monopoly, who, although they became 
important customers, nevertheless continued to buy on the old system 
of samples and offers. 
One of the most important events in the history of Universal's sales 
occurred in 1954 with the unannounced appearance one Friday after-
noon of a South African tobacconist, at that time unknown to anyone at 
Universal. Dr. Anton Rupert, who had formerly been in the wine busi-
ness and had recently entered cigarette manufacturing in South Africa 
in a modest way, came calling to announce that he had just acquired the 
Rothman company, a small family-owned tobacco manufacturer in 
London. "He said that he intended to grow his company into a much 
larger one," Crenshaw recalled, "and to go into many other countries, 
and he would like to give us all his business. Mr. Jackson and I looked 
at each other and we thought that it was likely that we were being of-
fered 100 percent of virtually nothing." 
As it developed, both jackson and Crenshaw were wrong. No one 
could have foreseen the growth and success of Rupert's company or the 
future importance of this business to Universal. Beginning both cau-
tiously and tentatively, Universal began financing Rupert's needs as he 
bought the English firm of Carreras. Next came successful ventures in 
Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya, to be followed by Canada, Bel-
gium, Germany and other European countries. Today, Rupert heads 
not only one of the world's largest cigarette manufacturing companies 
but a network of disparate businesses that stretches around the globe. A 
man with a keen sense of loyalty to those who aided him along the way, 
he still gives public recognition to Universal (for whom he remains a 
key customer) for being willing to listen and then make a commitment 
to him on that Friday afternoon in 1954. 
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Like so many American businesses, tobacco came of age following 
World War II. At Universal, Jackson guided the company to heights 
that its original founders would not have been able to foresee. Machin-
ery, automation, laboratories, and super plants in the United States all 
played vital roles as the company began moving into larger areas of 
activity. 
For a time after the demise of its China company as a consequence 
of the Communist takeover in 1949, Universal's sole foreign subsidiary 
was its long established company in Canada. Under Jackson, the initial 
postwar move abroad was made with the expansion of operations in 
Rhodesia. The company's forays into countries throughout the world 
and its growth into an international organization were still to come. 
After Jackson's untimely death, they were brought to fruition under 
his successor, Gordon L. Crenshaw. 
8 
Postwar Growth Abroad 
From its inception in 1918, Universal Leaf Tobacco Company had as 
one of its goals the development of a worldwide operation, an aspira-
tion that first began bearing fruit in the Chinese and Canadian ven-
tures. The Canadian one, the smaller of the two, grew smoothly from 
the beginning, but the one in China was fraught with problems brought 
on by World War II and the Japanese occupation of China. Further 
difficulties came with the 1949 Communist takeover. Halfway around 
the world, the war also brought a halt to operations in Rhodesia. 
The Japanese surrender on board the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay 
in 1945 ushered in a new, if short-lived, era of prosperity for Universal's 
China operations. During the war, Universal's A.l. McOwan had been 
interned by the Japanese. McOwan (along with other American and 
British subjects) was transported across the Whangpoo River and incar-
cerated in a British American Tobacco Company cigarette factory at 
Pootung. Underfed, the group whiled away time growing a vegetable 
garden and listening to news of the war on a radio they kept hidden. 
When liberated in August 1945, the emaciated McOwan, clothed in 
filthy rags and wearing rubber strips for shoes, walked a great distance 
until he reached the old company headquarters at the famous Shang-
hai address of Number One, The Bund. Forcing his way into the of-
fice, he found in a crisis meeting no doubt the same Japanese business-
men who had taken the company from him in early 1942. 
McOwan's language and message were direct: he had come to take 
over in the name of Universal Leaf, and he wanted a full accounting of 
all property and inventory, in triplicate and in English, within seventy-
two hours. If the Japanese cooperated, he continued, he would try to 
see that they were treated better than they had treated him. McOwan 
recovered at least $1 million in tobacco, reestablished Universal in China, 
and held on until relief arrived in early 1946. Veteran China tobacco-
nist George Macon characterized McOwan's actions succinctly: "Mac 
was a tough number." 
Shortly after the war, Covington, still the liaison between Richmond 
and China, asked George Macon to assume the presidency there. Also, 
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George Arbogast, who had been the number one man in China until 
the Japanese seizure, returned. 
The job facing Universal's China people was not an easy one be-
cause the company's physical facilities had been damaged by the japa-
nese during the war. Eventually, however, most of the equipment was 
recovered and repaired and the China arm of Universal was soon func-
tioning-but not the way it had before the war. The difficulties arose 
from changes in the way Chinese tobacco was handled. 
The changes in the China operation were twofold. First, all new 
sales of American leaf were to the Chinese manufacturers, roughly the 
same as in the prewar era, but the buying, processing, and selling of 
Chinese leaf had come to a virtual standstill because of the civil war 
that was unfolding. None of the Chinese leaf was being exported, and 
Universal was unable to sell it abroad, as it had done prior to the war. 
Second, Universal's operations in China following the war declined 
because of inflation. Before the war, the exchange rate was about five 
to one. In the postwar era, however, it soared to 20 million to one, 
making Chinese currency virtually worthless. George Macon recalled 
that in the late summer of 1949, just before the Communist takeover, 
his wife and her friends would go shopping one day, return home to 
get money from the bank, and pick up the goods the following day. 
Macon remembered that he would write his personal check, then have 
his servant go to the bank and pick up the cash. "He would go to the 
bank, come back with the rickshaw piled sky-high with money, and my 
wife would get in over the money, get back in the rickshaw and go to 
these shops. As they drove from shop to shop, she would call out and 
say, 'Look, I need 10 million,' or whatever the exact amount. The money 
was bundled up in bundles with say, 10 million, 5 million." 
When conditions in China deteriorated to the point that collapse of 
the government was inevitable, American authorities advised all women, 
children, and unnecessary people to get out. Macon remained until 
February 1950. After briefly visiting the United States, he returned to 
the Orient, this time to Hong Kong, where he resumed control-albeit 
at a distance-of Universal Leaf Tobacco Company of China. Business 
was confined, however, to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
India. As they had been prior to World War II, Universal's properties 
in China were once again written off as a loss. 
Although China figured prominently in a government suit brought 
against Universal, it was, as far as the company was concerned, little 
more than a large area on the world map between 1949 and 1972. In 
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that year, following President Richard M. Nixon's tour of China, Norton 
Howe made a tentative visit that was to lead to Universal's reestablish-
ing ties with the tobacco interests on the Chinese mainland. 
A country not beset by the vicissitudes of political and military upheaval 
that have affected so much of the rest of the world, Canada has long 
been the site of one of Universal's most stable bases of operations. When 
Jackson assumed control of Universal in 1946, the Canadian Leaf To-
bacco Company was in good shape, as it had been since he himself had 
headed it decades earlier, and the Canadian tobacco industry had not 
changed much. Under the existing buying system, each buyer (who had 
a territory consisting of 100 to 150 farms) called on each grower. Buy-
ers recorded the varieties of tobaccos being planted and the number of 
acres under cultivation, thus garnering knowledge of the year's pro-
spective crop volume. As the tobacco grew, the buyers-almost always 
knowledgeable in all aspects of growing, curing, processing, and final 
product preparation-would give advice to the farmers. Following cur-
ing, the tobacco was graded and brought to market. After the sale, the 
farmer was responsible for getting the tobacco to the factories. 
This system changed in 1957, however, with the introduction of 
the Dutch clock auction, which had originated at the flower auctions in 
Holland. Unlike other tobacco auctions (where prices are bid up and 
the highest bidder wins), under this system the beginning price is high 
and the clock runs backwards. The tobacco is brought to auction on 
flats of from one to twelve bales, then is graded and priced by the buy-
ers, who in turn pass the lists of the prices to their colleagues in the 
"clock room." As the clock runs back toward the price evaluated by the 
buyer, a button is pushed and the clock stops; the tobacco is sold to the 
bidder who has stopped the clock. At first Universal did not favor the 
new system, but as time passed, it was accepted as an efficient way to 
market crops. 
An important development in the Canadian operation took place 
in 1959, when the leading company in Anton Rupert's group, Carreras 
Ltd. in England, abandoned its leaf-buying and processing operations 
in both Canada and Rhodesia. These two operations, Leamington Sales 
in Canada and the Lytton Tobacco Company in Rhodesia, were of-
fered to Universal as a package and were subsequently purchased. In 
Rhodesia, Lytton was integrated into Rhodesian Leaf Tobacco Com-
pany as a second processing facility, but in Canada a separate unit, 
Simcoe Leaf Tobacco Company, which would operate independently 
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of Canadian Leaf, was formed. Promoted mainly by Warwick, this 
move proved to be a wise one. From 1959 on, Universal operated two 
separate companies in Canada. 
A further development involving the Canadian operation during 
the Jackson years came about as a result of the 1960 purchase of thirty 
acres of land in Tillsonburg, which over the next two years saw the 
construction of Canada's first tobacco super plant. Based on a group 
decision of E.D. Allen, Ira Huff, C.W. ("Charlie") Thomas Jr., William 
("Bill") Burroughs, and Herbert Jackson, the new plant was modeled 
on the one just completed in Henderson, North Carolina. The new 
facility further changed Universal's competitive position and was fi-
nanced I 00 percent by the Canadian branch of Universal. As soon as 
the new plant was operative, the old one at Chatham was phased out. At 
the same time, Allen became president of the Canadian Leaf Tobacco 
Company, a position he had held de facto for many years but whose 
title, untill962, officially referred to Herbert Jackson. 
Despite the abilities that Warwick and La verge brought to the fledg-
ling foreign sales force, the moves that Universal made beyond China 
and Canada into other countries were not always smooth ones. The 
first obstacle centered on the necessity of convincing the ever-cautious 
Jackson of the financial reward of any new venture. 
As Jackson was working into his position of company leader in the 
late 1940s he was reluctant to become further involved in the African 
arena, but he was finally willing to do so minimally if the expansion 
could be handled through Universal's Canadian operation. Jackson sent 
George Cheatham and Ed Allen from Canada to Rhodesia, where they 
began laying groundwork for what was to become the Canadian Leaf 
Tobacco Company of Rhodesia. In the beginning they operated as to-
bacco brokers only, and from shabby offices in a blighted neighbor-
hood. The initial venture was no more than a minimal one. 
To assess the business more closely, a number of Universal's people 
traveled to Rhodesia. Warwick went in 1951 and was followed the next 
year by leaf expert William "Bill" Saunders and Howard Woodson, a 
top accountant. Warwick strengthened the organization there with the 
hiring of Jack Last for sales and Charles Kemp as the chief accountant. 
What little amount of tobacco that was bought was packed through a 
small dealer, the Kileff Company. A further decision was made to send 
two Universal buyers to Salisbury. In Aprill953, Stuart Christian, who 
chose Thomas Towers to accompany him as assistant, went out. This 
trip, one of many from the 1960s through the 1980s, began Christian's 
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long association with Africa as Richmond's liaison officer. He had joined 
Universal in the late 1930s as a temporary summer employee only, but 
by this time had found himself responsible for coordinating the 
company's entire African interests. 
In 1953 another important step was made for the African opera-
tion when Jackson himself made a trip there, followed later the same 
year by Laverge. Immediately realizing the potential that lay in the 
African market (as did Harrison, Warwick, Humphreys, Christian and-
by that time-Jackson), Laverge argued that Universal should either get 
in deeply or abandon the venture. When asked by Laverge if Rhode-
sian tobacco had a future in the world market, Christian replied, "You 
couldn't miss with a missing machine." Laverge advocated that the 
Rhodesian company be completely severed from the Canadian one and 
placed under the direct control of Richmond. Thus was the Rhodesian 
Leaf Tobacco Company formed, absorbing the Canadian company's 
personnel with the exception of manager George Cheatham, who left 
Universal to establish his own operation in Salisbury. In 1954 a new 
manager, Enoch Haley, was sent from the United States. 
A South Boston, Virginia, native, Haley did well in a market previ-
ously dominated by long-established English firms. His major contri-
bution to Rhodesian Leaf's eventual success was his suggestion to com-
bine with a small company, R.W. Noakes, owned and directed by R.A. 
("Bindy") Noakes, who had emigrated to Rhodesia with Donald "Don" 
Bell and George Hinds in 1948. This trio had a small and simple pro-
cessing facility that had developed some excellent customers. In the 
mid-1950s Laverge returned to Rhodesia and organized the purchase 
of the Noakes company by Rhodesian Leaf, an action that proved to be 
decisive in Universal's success in Rhodesia. Haley then returned to the 
U.S., while Noakes became managing director. 
A native of Liverpool, Noakes, along with other family members, 
had been in the leaf tobacco business in England for a number of years 
when his father made a trip to Northern Rhodesia in 1935 in an at-
tempt to collect on bad debts. In the course of the trip Noakes' mother 
was killed when the car her husband was driving was involved in an 
accident. Noakes' father never returned to England; instead he remained 
in the tobacco business in Northern Rhodesia. 
Following a brief stint in the Army during World War II, the 
younger Noakes migrated to Salisbury, Rhodesia, where he opened an 
arm of the family business in 1945 and another in Nyasaland two years 
later. At first he sold heavy-bodied tobacco, especially favored by the 
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Imperial Tobacco company at the time. With the advent of an intensi-
fied research project in the business, many types of tobaccos soon be-
came available that were more attractive or suitable to the export 
market. 
Noakes had met Herbert Jackson before the war when he had pur-
chased Canadian tobacco from Canadian Leaf. Later, in the mid-1950s, 
he began making small purchases for Universal, during which he met 
Laverge and other Universal representatives. Following these explora-
tions, Noakes sold the company to Universal. He remained with the 
company until his retirement. 
At the time, the optimistic forecast was that Rhodesian Leaf To-
bacco Company would be able to buy and sell 30 million pounds-ap-
proximately 10 percent-of the colony's tobacco crop within four years. 
The forecast, however, actually turned out to be conservative: in 1964 
Rhodesian Leaf bought and sold 100 million pounds, one-third of the 
crop. In 1960, the company built a new processing factory, including 
an office complex. All went well until 1965 when the Rhodesian gov-
ernment renounced allegiance to the British crown and declared the 
African country independent. This step was the result of fears on the 
part of Rhodesia's ruling white minority that British authorities planned 
to give control to the colony's black population. 
Following a series of acrimonious confrontations, the United Na-
tions, at the behest of Great Britain, entered the fray, and imposed 
economic sanctions in 1966. Among the Rhodesian exports proscribed 
by the international embargo was tobacco. At the time sanctions were 
imposed, Europe and the United Kingdom were the largest consumers 
of Rhodesian tobacco. According to veteran African tobacco man Wil-
liam ("Billy") Hunt, sales were cut almost by half, at which point the 
Rhodesian government entered the picture and formed the Tobacco 
Corporation, whose representatives traveled the world, especially Asia, 
attempting to find new markets. 
Further exacerbating matters, Rhodesia soon found itself embroiled 
in civil disturbances in the form of black nationalist guerrilla incur-
sions from the north. These forays ceased with the advent of black 
majority rule in 1979, but tobacco farmers had to be protected by the 
system called "bright-lighting," whereby circuit-riding guards protected 
farms and farm families at night. 
Problematical also was the fact that Universal's assets, including 
ongoing earnings, were frozen in Rhodesia, leaving diversification the 
most practical way of dealing with the problem. The company soon 
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invested in apartment buildings, company-owned farms, and a busi-
ness that made hogsheads, cases, and other items used in tobacco trans-
port. Headed by Derek Edwards, who was in charge of Rhodesian 
diversification, the new ventures worked as a stop-gap measure until 
sanctions were lifted and business operations could resume. 
Potentially devastating though the short-term loss of Rhodesian 
business could have been, it did have its positive side. Because Univer-
sal was temporarily out of the tobacco business in southern Africa, 
searches for other growths of tobacco seemed the likely way to deal 
with the problem. Such activities, however, still left a number of to-
bacco people idle. The time was obviously ripe to focus attention on 
other geographical locales. Under the direction primarily of Towers, 
the African tobacconists took their expertise to Southeast Asia-the Phil-
ippines and especially Korea. This operation proved enormously suc-
cessful when Korean tobacco was found to be of an excellent quality. 
Universal soon began looking to other markets on the African conti-
nent, one of the most important being the revitalization of an older 
business that had earlier failed. 
When George Cheatham arrived to begin the African branch of 
the Canadian Leaf Tobacco Company, one of his first tasks had been to 
form an operation in Nyasa (now called Malawi) that specialized in 
dark-fired tobacco. Plagued by mismanagement from the beginning-
one of the indigenous managers thought he was successful if he simply 
moved the tobacco by selling it at cost!- the operation was soon aban-
doned. Nevertheless, Rhodesian Leaf continued to keep buyers on the 
Malawi markets, and their purchases were packed by Imperial Tobacco 
Company in Limbe. By this time, Malawi had begun to produce both 
flue-cured and burley, which soon found acceptance on the world 
markets. 
The implementation of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia gave a boost 
to the demand for Malawi tobacco and vastly stimulated that country's 
production and sales. In addition, Malawi produced another small crop, 
an Oriental-type tobacco, which the newly formed Limbe Leaf Tobacco 
Company contracted to buy and sell. To accommodate this business the 
company erected a small packing shed in Lilongwe, prospective capital 
city of the soon-to-be independent Malawi. Also in the 1960s Universal 
purchased a small firm owned by Jack Stevens, who soon became the 
managing director of Limbe Leaf. 
In the mid-1970s the Malawi government asked Universal to allot 
them an equity interest of 40 percent in Limbe Leaf, a request that was 
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reluctantly agreed to but one that later paid large dividends. By the late 
1970s a substantial expansion of packing facilities became necessary 
and a plant, similar to Universal's super plants in the U.S., was de-
signed and built in Lilongwe. 
Following its tribulations in Rhodesia and its success in Malawi, 
Universal began expanding into other African countries. Buyers from 
Malawi made contact with the Ugandan government and initiated a 
small trading business, but they soon were hampered by officials work-
ing under the too-close scrutiny of dictator Idi Am in. Uganda sold 
dark-fired tobacco to Malawi. This tobacco ultimately went to English 
customers. A different situation existed in regard to Tanzania, how-
ever. 
Bordering on Malawi to the south and Kenya to the north, Tanza-
nia is a long country running up the east coast of Africa on the shores 
of the Indian Ocean. The country chose a socialist form of government 
in 1961 and has been a one-party state since 1965, with the Tanganyika 
African National Union dominating the political scene. Tanzania pro-
duces two tobacco crops, flue-cured and dark-fired. Although the quan-
tities are small, the quality is good and Universal has done a lucrative 
business in both types. 
Zambia, the former Northern Rhodesia, until recently an autocratic 
regime dominated by Kenneth Kaunda, also produced good quality 
tobacco, some of the best flue-cured in Africa. Following independence, 
tobacco auctions were begun in the capital of Lusaka, where a modern 
processing plant was built with foreign aid. Universal operated for some 
time in Lusaka using personnel from Malawi, but both quality and quan-
tity of the crop decreased and the operation was abandoned. 
The problems associated with Universal's functioning in African 
countries can perhaps best be illustrated by looking ahead to what hap-
pened in Angola. Like many African countries seeking to shed vestiges 
of European colonialism, Angola received its independence, in this case 
from Portugal, in 1966, only to suffer the pangs of revolution and even-
tual Marxist rule. While under Portuguese control, its tobacco interests 
with Universal fell under the care first of Warwick, then of his succes-
sor, Towers. Ultimately the Angola tobacco operation was a complete 
failure because the revolution forced suspension of Universal business 
there. 
Following the highly successful undertaking in Rhodesia and lesser 
ones in other African countries, Universal looked to other latitudes to 
further its interests. The next venture centered on Greece, where in 
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1964 Laverge was able to gain a toehold for the company in a some-
what circuitous way. 
During the mid-1960s the Dutch company of Deli-Maatschappij 
was, like Universal, seeking to expand. For many years involved only in 
the growing of cigar-wrapper tobacco in Sumatra, Deli began experi-
encing difficulties following World War II. After Indonesia became 
independent and expelled the Dutch, the directors of Deli-Maatschappij 
recognized the need to diversify. Establishing offices in New York, 
they invested in a number of nontobacco businesses, some eventually 
highly profitable. 
Through friends, Laverge discovered that Deli-Maatschappij was 
looking for a partner to put together a tobacco deal in Greece. He, and 
later Crenshaw, met with the two leading Deli officials and learned that 
the venture was to be modest and would require a Universal investment 
of approximately $250,000. At a board meeting in Richmond, Jackson 
and others endorsed the undertaking. Jackson, who believed in hedg-
ing his bets, always preferred to start new ventures as partnerships. 
That way, if anything went wrong, the company lost only 50 percent of 
the total investment. As it turned out, the business prospered, if only in 
a limited way. 
Greece has been a major producer of Oriental tobacco for hun-
dreds of years, but the purpose of the new partnership (Gretoba SA) 
was the purchase, packing, and sale of burley, the production of which 
had just begun in the Salonica area. A small processing facility was 
built in Salonica headed by an experienced Greek tobacconist named 
Ioannides. Sales were handled by Ludwig von Hurter, who was retired 
from the Austrian Tobacco Monopoly and was now an employee of 
Deli-Maatschappij in charge of its off-shore tobacco operations, mainly 
in Italy and Greece. A modest but successful operation followed when, 
owing to von Hurter's efforts and backed by Universal's worldwide 
connections, orders were secured from such important customers as 
the Japanese Tobacco Monopoly, Philip Morris, Reemtsma, and oth-
ers. One mistake, however, was the decision to engage also in buying 
and packing Greek Oriental tobacco, for which a warehouse in Kavala 
was equipped. The idea behind this move was that, after the burley 
crop was bought and packed, the packing of Oriental could follow. 
Difficulties soon arose in several forms, and the venture was abandoned 
the following year. 
Following a trip to Greece in 1965 by Humphreys and Laverge, the 
decision was made to expand the Salonica factory by adding a second 
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redrying machine and some threshing equipment. Then, in the 1970s, 
Ioannides was replaced as general manager by George Darmi. Follow-
ing Darmi's premature death, the Greek operation came under the joint 
leadership of leaf manager Raul Manas and the company's chief ac-
countant, Vafeas. Although small, the Greek operation remains an im-
portant part of Universal. It has about a half dozen accounts servicing 
European manufacturers, the Japanese Monopoly, and Philip Morris. 
More important, perhaps, Greece served as the stepping stone to other 
European ventures for Universal. Laverge, because of his relationship 
with the Deli Maatschappij, nursed this company for many years. He 
was followed by Lucius Cary and, after Cary's death, by Henry Harrell. 
While Universal was searching in the post-World War II years for 
ways to increase its foreign enterprises, it also happened upon an inno-
vation that revolutionized the cigar industry. Called the "Microflake" 
process, it originated with Jan Laverge and the Dutch connections he 
had maintained since his youth. 
When the young Laverge lost his job with the American Tobacco 
Company and accepted an offer to come to work for Universal in 1934, 
he turned down a similar offer extended in his native Holland by Koch 
and Company, a cigar tobacco dealer started by Laverge's grandfather. 
Run in the 1930s by Laverge's uncles and cousins, the company later 
merged with Scheltema to form Koch Scheltema, of which Laverge's 
younger brother August Theodoor ("Chris") was director. This com-
pany was ultimately purchased by Deli-Maatschappij; August subse-
quently became president of the combined corporation. 
Born in 1920, Chris was trained as a lawyer before he entered the 
tobacco business following World War II. During the war he had served 
in the Dutch forces and had been assigned to the Eighty-second Air-
borne Division of the U.S. Army. Severely wounded in a glider crash 
that killed his three American companions during the invasion of the 
Netherlands in September 1944, he later served as one of two Dutch 
prosecutors at the war crimes trials in Japan. He was involved in the 
case that culminated in the hanging of Japan's wartime prime minister 
General Hideki Tojo. While in Japan, August married an American. 
When he returned to his homeland in 1948, he reentered the tobacco 
business following a training period on the American markets in the 
Universal system. 
Meanwhile, the American Machine and Foundry Company (AMF) 
was having trouble marketing their new machine designed to make ci-
gar binder. As noted previously, cigars are made of three principal parts: 
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filler, binder, and wrapper; wrapper and binder are made of the full 
tobacco leaf. One leaf usually could be made into wrapper or binder 
for only two cigars, and the rest was wasted. AMF's machine would 
take the cigar leaf scrap, grind it into a fine dust, and convert it into 
sheets. At substantial savings, the sheet could then be used as binder. 
Virtually all binder today is made this way. 
As early as I 957 Laverge and his brother had discussed the possi-
bility of combining resources to make sheet tobacco. They became seri-
ously interested in the venture about the time AMF began searching in 
Europe for possible investors. AMF was unable to raise sufficient funds, 
and the Laverges began meeting once a month in New York to lay 
groundwork for producing sheet tobacco using technology purchased 
fromAMF. 
August located a German cigar leaf dealer who was interested in 
joining the enterprise, sufficient stockholders were identified, and the 
sheet operation became a reality. The Microflake factory in Schifferstadt, 
Germany was formed; Universal and Koch Scheltema were the princi-
pal stockholders. The business was exceedingly profitable at first, de-
claring roughly IOO percent of capital dividends. Ultimately, however, 
the worldwide energy crisis of the I 970s and the advent of rival tech-
niques for producing sheet helped bring about the liquidation of 
Microflake. More important to its demise, however, was the changing 
public taste for tobacco. At the time that Microflake was liquidated, 
cigar consumption was dropping at an annual rate of about I 0 percent. 
"It was a sad thing to see," Laverge noted, but keeping the factory 
would have resulted in over-production of cigar sheet. 
An interested observer looking at Universal Leaf Tobacco Com-
pany during the twenty-year period encompassing the Jackson era finds 
a company guided by dynamic and complex people and forces. Jack-
son-elder statesman, primary leader, and final authority-managed the 
entire Universal system. He held together the partners-numbered at 
roughly fifteen in Virginia and North Carolina alone-and governed a 
diverse and intricate business. Perhaps because of his strong religious 
beliefs and his logical and systematic world view, he applied easy but 
steady force to Universal between I 946 and I 966. Calm, compassion-
ate, and able to cope with a host of personal problems that continually 
haunted him, he, like Mr. Fred before him, saw himself as the father of 
the modern Universal family. Will Tuggle noted years later that, dur-
ing Jackson's term, "the company got a reputation as absolutely solid, 
dependable, financially strong. It was a period of growth, solid growth." 
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During Jackson's era the company was also greatly influenced by 
trends in the tobacco industry at large. The first was the rising demand 
abroad for American leaf, the second a consolidation of manufacturers 
as scores of old firms disappeared or were incorporated into larger 
ones. Consolidation also led to greater sophistication of buying on or-
der. In this time of change, Universal showed again one of its primary 
qualities, one that would give it a competitive edge and would guaran-
tee a hold on the future. 
Most businesses, especially those that are publicly incorporated, feel 
intense pressure to generate maximum earnings for each annual state-
ment and are not inclined to spend large sums for distant gains. In 
many ways, however, Universal defied this conventional wisdom by its 
willingness to invest in science and technology and by its willingness to 
develop accounts that competitors considered inconsequential. 
In addition to its financial strength, Universal was known during 
the Jackson years as a company for which accuracy was a consuming 
passion. Doubtless Jackson, with his mathematical training and logical 
approach to problems, instilled in all the company's employees the need 
for precision and exact performance. After all, millions of dollars were 
at stake. "I think we did better than a lot of people. I really do," Will 
Tuggle said. "I would not accept any mistake as being inevitable. I 
remember when IBM told me, 'This system is going to be 99 percent 
accurate.' I said, 'That's not acceptable.' It wasn't acceptable really. We 
didn't accept mistakes." This was another Jackson legacy. 
Yet Tuggle and others in the company would agree that Universal 
had been too conservative in the two decades following World War II. 
But if Jackson had been overly cautious, this trait was offset by the 
more aggressive satellite figures who played a part in shaping the com-
pany during the time. 
Humphreys's role in the growth of the company is almost as impor-
tant as Jackson's. He oversaw all purchasing and processing of the leaf, 
and he was the chief mover behind the super plants. A man less certain 
of himself might have been reluctant to gamble with millions of the 
corporation's dollars, especially in the presence of a company presi-
dent known to be indifferent to "bricks and mortar." Humphreys-
along with Laverge and Warwick-was one of the people who recog-
nized that the partner system, although once a necessity, was beginning 
to outlive its usefulness. Irascible, at times even demeaning, Humphreys 
knew exactly what he wanted, and as it happened what he wanted was 
good for Universal. 
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Then there were Laverge and Warwick. Traditionally, men of the 
American tobacco business have been Southerners, people wedded to a 
region and a way of life somewhat divergent from the rest of the na-
tion. European born and bred but acclimating quickly and well to the 
social and business climate of the South, La verge was an indispensable 
player in Universal's expansion. A man not only of financial vision but 
one with managerial ability, he was the right man at the right time to 
bring European and African markets into Universal's network. 
Warwick's talents were also unique. By both temperament and inclina-
tion he enjoyed the rough-and-tumble Middle Eastern and South Ameri-
can bargaining, at which he was successful. The creative collaboration 
of these individuals with such experienced hands as Covington, J.P. 
Harrison, and others in the home office made Universal unique in the 
leaf tobacco business in the 1940s, 1950s, and into the 1960s. 
By 1965 Gordon Crenshaw had spent nineteen of his forty-three 
years in the employment of Universal. For a number of months prior 
to the spring of that year he had been given additional duties andre-
sponsibilities, although he did not suppose that he was being singled 
out in any way. In May, he received a summons from jackson, who was 
in Sweden attending to the Swedish tobacco monopoly account. The 
request asked only that Crenshaw come to Sweden as soon as possible. 
Upon the younger man's arrival, Jackson invited him to dinner. Dur-
ing the course of the conversation he said simply, "We want you to 
become president." 
In retrospect, Crenshaw, who was junior to several others who might 
have been candidates for the post, was able to recognize that such an 
offer had been in the making. Nevertheless, it was a heady experience, 
especially with such older men as Covington, Laverge, Harrison, 
Warwick, and Humphreys still on stage. Acting with the advice of other 
senior members of the organization, Jackson instituted a system whereby 
he would become Universal's chairman of the board and chief execu-
tive officer when Crenshaw was installed as president in October. That 
way,Jackson could supply the needed advice and guidance as Crenshaw 
worked his way forward as heir apparent. 
During the winter of 1965-66 Jackson often met informally with 
Crenshaw and offered advice about routine as well as philosophical 
matters. Such help was useful because the new president now had un-
der him several people for whom he had worked during the entire time 
he had been with the company. The older man, however, never fin-
ished counseling his protege. On March 26, 1966, Jackson died sud-
Postwar Growth Abroad Ill 
denly of a heart attack at his six-acre estate in Richmond's Chatham 
Hills. His wife, the former Josephine Mann Rose, had died six years 
earlier. 
"It was an absolute shock," Crenshaw recalled. Barely four months 
following his promotion, Crenshaw found himself in charge of a cor-
poration with a permanent staff of seven hundred and a seasonal 
workforce that approximated ten thousand. In addition to its person-
nel, Universal at the time of Jackson's death was listed as having twenty-
two affiliated companies with plants in six foreign countries. It was on 
record as having done $300 million worth of business the previous year. 
Although the transition had proved to be a smooth one to date, Crenshaw 
suddenly realized that he indeed had his work cut out for him. "My 
reaction," he said, "was that I've got a hell of a job on my hands." Not 
only had he not had sufficient time to learn all the older man had to 
teach, but he was soon to take on additional duties of a much larger 
scale. 
Because Jackson's death left a void at the top that needed to be 
filled immediately, Crenshaw would become the new chief executive 
officer. Barely had he learned the rudiments of one job before he was 
cast by circumstance into the next higher one. Although Jackson had 
not divulged it to anyone, he doubtless had conceived at least some sort 
of a scenario for easing Crenshaw into the chief executive officer's chair, 
a plan that would have been executed over the time period he thought 
appropriate. Such, however, was not to be the case. 
9 
A Worldwide Company 
Under the leadership of Gordon L. Crenshaw, Universal became a 
worldwide organization. Expansions were made into all parts of the 
globe, most notably in South America, the Far East, and Southeast Asia. 
To see the growth of the company during Crenshaw's tenure, one need 
only look at yearly revenues. In 1966, for example, Crenshaw's first 
year as company leader, annual revenues were $348 million. Two de-
cades later, in 1987, it had reached the $2 billion mark. Figures re-
flected in the company's annual reports are not startlingly large for any 
particular fiscal year; rather, they reflect solid growth: in 1966, $348 
million; in 1968, $396 million; in 1971, $463 million; in 197 4, $626 
million; in 1978, $839 million; in 1981, $1 billion; in 1986, nearly $1.5 
billion; and so on. 
From the beginning of his tenure, Crenshaw brought a different 
perspective to top-level management. Although in many ways Crenshaw 
was cut from the same social and educational cloth as many other Uni-
versal officers, a marked difference existed between his business phi-
losophy and that of his predecessors. 
A native Richmonder and a graduate of the city's John Marshall 
High School, where he had been an excellent student, Crenshaw had 
gone on scholarship to the University of Virginia, where he majored in 
economics. In both high school and college he had been a leader, first 
as co-editor of John Marshall's student newspaper, later as editor of the 
one at the university, where he was also elected to the Raven Society 
and the leadership fraternity, Omicron Delta Kappa. 
Crenshaw, who graduated in 1943, was offered an opportunity re-
served for a few military inductees of his generation who showed ex-
ceptional promise. Having already committed himself to the Navy, in 
which he was ultimately commissioned, he was selected by the govern-
ment to attend Harvard University for further study. Though he was 
sent there to take military courses, he ended up in what was essentially 
a graduate business curriculum. After completing his studies, he served 
on board ship in both the Atlantic and Pacific before returning to Rich-
mond. He briefly taught economics at the University of Richmond be-
fore accepting an entry-level job at Universal. 
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Crenshaw ascended Universal's corporate ladder in the normal way, 
although he chafed somewhat at having to sweep floors in the South 
Boston factory after having been a Navy officer. Mter coming through 
the sales department under the tutelage of Warwick and La verge, how-
ever, he was thoroughly knowledgeable about the tobacco business and 
was ready to assume the company's top post. Even so, there were ob-
stacles to overcome and potential problems with which to deal. 
For one thing, there was much potential for discord in Universal's 
upper ranks. Warwick, Laverge, and Humphreys were all senior by a 
decade or more to Crenshaw, who had had barely four months in the 
presidency and was now, because of Jackson's death, headed for the 
position of chief executive officer as well. Any one of these senior 
people was a logical contender for higher office in the company. In 
addition, the board of directors, at this time still comprised of tobacco 
people, had to be satisfied that this new and youthful leader could handle 
the job. Although Crenshaw was aware that Jackson, Covington, and 
Pinckney Harrison had been instrumental in his rise to the presidency, 
he knew also that no one could have foreseen the situation brought on 
by Jackson's death. 
Preparing for the first board meeting in his new job, Crenshaw 
recognized that he confronted problems of both protocol and policy, 
ones that if not handled carefully might jeopardize his effectiveness: 
how could he acknowledge and reward the long-time contributions of 
the most important people in the Universal system, powerful men who 
one day were his seniors and the next his subordinates? Crenshaw el-
evated Warwick, Laverge, and Humphreys to newly created positions 
as senior vice presidents, in effect extending to them the only recogni-
tion and promotion at his disposal. At the same meeting, Towers be-
came a member of the board, partly as a result of the evolutionary pro-
cess but also at Crenshaw's behest. 
Support for Crenshaw, who functioned both as president and chief 
executive officer until Towers was elevated to the presidency in 1982, 
came by degrees, but the important thing was it came. The senior offi-
cials did not break ranks; continuity was maintained. Universal was still 
on a firm foundation. 
At the time Towers was elevated he was the obvious choice for presi-
dent. He had been with the company thirty-four years, had been in-
volved with tobacco operations on four continents, and was an affable, 
easygoing, and highly competent manager. He had come up through 
the ranks the usual way, following graduation from Richmond's St. 
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Christopher's school and the University of Virginia. He had also seen 
U.S. Navy service as a destroyer navigator in the South Pacific during 
World War II. A lifelong history buff who had spent countless hours 
under the informal tutelage of the great historian of the Confederacy 
Douglas Southall Freeman, Towers brought to the position of presi-
dent a humanist's view of the world. His tenure was brief, however; 
medical problems forced his resignation barely two years into his new 
position. In retirement he continues to take an active part in Universal. 
Having consolidated his position, Crenshaw began to make his mark 
in terms of executive style. Although at the time no one-probably not 
even Crenshaw himself-knew it, Universal was on the brink of impor-
tant changes in spring of 1966; a new team with new ideas was about to 
take over. 
In the past, the man at the top had essentially done as he wished. 
Crenshaw, however, chose to govern more by consensus, asking for 
and acting on advice from others. In addition, the Universal board, 
long top-heavy with insiders, under Crenshaw became more diverse as 
the opportunities arose to bring a broader business perspective to bear 
on issues. New programs and benefits, some of which were initiated 
under Jackson, were updated and enhanced for Universal's rank-and-
file personnel, while others were introduced. Jackson's informal agenda 
for the company was neither canned nor shelved at the start of the 
Crenshaw years; it was expanded, modified, modernized, and used to 
set the stage for Crensha~'s own initiatives. 
The push toward implementation of new technology at Universal 
had begun in a systematic way when Herbert Jackson was president. 
Under Crenshaw, however, the most significant advances began, par-
ticularly in the area of processing. Although the super plant era began 
five years before Jackson's death, under Crenshaw the super plants came 
to full fruition; facilities were updated every few years. For example, 
the Henderson, North Carolina, super plant, fully operational in 1961, 
by 1982 was outmoded. That year the old threshing and separating 
systems were replaced. This $6 million expenditure is representative 
of the periodic updating required to keep the super plants in state-of-
the-art effectiveness. 
In 1977 Universal's first extrusion plant was put into operation in 
Lumberton, North Carolina. On the green tobacco markets the com-
pany had traditionally packed tobacco in hogsheads. Under this sys-
tem, called "green prizing," the tobacco was taken from the auction 
floor to a power pressing machine, run up a conveyor and pressed into 
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barrels, then taken by truck to the factories. With the more efficient 
extrusion method, the tobacco was blown through a tube, compacted 
into cubes, and baled. Following success at Lumberton, other extru-
sion plants were constructed at Rocky Mount, North Carolina; Danville, 
Virginia; Greenville, Tennessee; and Lexington, Kentucky. 
In 1979, a further advance was made when electronic program-
mers were first introduced at the Simcoe plant in Ontario, Canada. 
Electro-mechanical devices were replaced with purely electrical ones. 
Smaller and more reliable, they could be programmed to almost any 
degree of sophistication. The simplest are no more than sequencing 
apparatuses, but the more sophisticated have a memory and the capa-
bility to analyze data, ultimately making decisions and controlling ma-
chinery. At first viewed with skepticism, they were soon accepted by 
employees. The company moved fully into the electronic age in the 
1970s. 
Other innovations also came about during these crucial years. Busi-
ness volume had grown to the point that something had to be done 
about the antiquated billing system. The process was automated. An-
other problem that surfaced was that of coordinating the movement of 
tobacco to and from the factories. Charles ("Charlie") Beard was ap-
pointed clearinghouse coordinator and given an office in Wilson, North 
Carolina. His job was to keep track of newly purchased tobacco by tele-
phone and to route it to the factories. To do this efficiently, he took 
advantage of technology. 
By the mid-1970s Universal was handling so much tobacco that a 
better way of controlling it had to be implemented. At that point the 
"congestion report" was devised. The report, based on data that for-
merly came to the Richmond office, was soon computerized and is now 
issued each morning. It lists the status of all tobaccos in the entire 
Universal domestic system. 
Another procedural innovation introduced during these years was 
a statement of quality control guidelines. Comprised of some of the 
first written instructions given to factory superintendents, they included 
requirements for scrap removal, tipping lengths, packaging instructions, 
and so on. 
As the worldwide need for better information about nicotine and 
tar content of tobacco arose, Universal resurrected an industry system 
to provide the information. In 1980, the company introduced blending 
silos. These were enclosed metal bins about forty feet long, ten feet 
wide, and ten feet high. At one end was a mechanism that looked like 
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a series of egg beaters. Each silo held about thirty thousand pounds of 
tobacco, which would be mixed for about half an hour in order to blend 
it evenly-after which a reading of its mean content and average con-
stituents could be obtained. New to Universal but not to the tobacco 
industry, blending silos came into being because of requests from cus-
tomers legally required to post nicotine and tar data on cigarette pack-
ages. Silo blending ensured that everything from one load would have 
identical numbers regarding content. Three of the silos were in use in 
Danville, Virginia, and three more in Smithfield, North Carolina. 
Within months, six additional ones were installed in Henderson and in 
Wilson (both in North Carolina), continuing a trend that has spread to 
other factories. 
Universal in the 1 970s also continued experimentation in its thresh-
ing system in an attempt to make larger pieces of tobacco while keeping 
stem content within an acceptable size. To do this, machinery had to be 
continuously upgraded and replaced. The Richmond office also sup-
plied help-technological and otherwise-to many of its foreign affili-
ates in the 1 970s. Among them were Italy, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, 
Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malawi. 
As volume increased and the operation became more detailed and 
scientific, the need for more sophisticated communications became 
obvious. Prior to Crenshaw's rise to the top post, Holt had been reas-
signed by Jackson from the laboratory to R.W. ("Will") Tuggle's de-
partment. Tuggle, whose primary duties centered on traffic, shipping, 
and storage, was feeling the pressures from the increase in the volume 
the company was handling. He was also becoming more involved with 
liaison work between Universal and the government. 
A new system, called Customer Services and Product Coordination, 
evolved under Tuggle that reduced the day-to-day operations in the 
factories to a set of information sheets, which at a glance would tell the 
status of any order in the Universal system. Holt prepared instructions 
that were circulated to the domestic factories. At first the instructions 
were rejected, but it soon became obvious that having all information 
about orders together in one place was necessary. 
Today, instructions involve what tobaccos are being processed, how 
they are being blended, percentages and restrictions regarding blends, 
the quantity and yield to be derived, how the tobaccos are marked and 
packaged, and what is to appear on the package. Additional informa-
tion includes what weight and moisture the package must contain, and 
how by-products that have been generated are to be handled. Further, 
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there are instructions as to how tobacco is to be handled following pro-
cessing: where is it to be stored, what its destination is, how is it to be 
sampled, how it is to be inspected, and whether it is to be chemically 
analyzed. Other required information centers on the salesman and the 
customer, with Holt's staff gathering data to help identify the particu-
lar order. Questions on the form also solicit data concerning which 
factory will process the order, the daily volume produced by that fac-
tory, the changes in status, how much has been received and processed, 
and how much has already been bought. Collected daily and forwarded 
to Richmond by computer, these reports provide the base information 
for weekly meetings in Richmond. 
The partner system, which served Universal from the 1920s through 
the 1950s, was starting to present problems well before the end of 
Herbert Jackson's tenure. Humphreys was primary among the critics 
of the system; he (along with others) argued that liquidation of these 
smaller entities in favor of consolidation into super plants was more 
cost-effective. As Crenshaw became more comfortable in his job he 
began examining the partner system and eventually he oversaw its de-
mise. 
During the late 1960s and the 1970s the tobacco industry world-
wide saw a consolidation of manufacturers and major purchasers that-
because of changes in technology-wanted to buy tobacco from one cen-
tral source rather than from a group of dealers, even though those deal-
ers might be associated with a large parent organization such as Univer-
sal. For example, the Carreras group in Great Britain normally pur-
chased tobacco from about ten U.S. suppliers. Once the firm was com-
bined with Rothmans, however, the parent company wanted to deal 
with only one supplier. 
The partner system was also causing problems in other ways. As 
time passed it became more and more difficult to control these affili-
ates because many partners had accumulated sufficient wealth to last 
them for life and it mattered little to them whether their factories were 
state-of -the-art facilities. 
Another consideration of those who argued for dismantling the 
system centered on freight costs. It was less expensive to send tobacco 
to a single super plant than to operate several small factories because 
such factories were located in major markets. Finally, there was the 
generational factor. In many cases when the older men who controlled 
the partner factories retired or died, there was no one to take their 
places. 
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Thus the partner system was phased out. Longtime employees were 
reassigned or cared for as companies such as Person-Garrett, R.P. 
Watson, W.B. Lea, and L.B. Jenkins disappeared. With them disap-
peared the cumbersome system of funding each partner roughly $1 
million to finance each annual tobacco crop (or an occasional three 
hundred thousand dollars or so for new stemming equipment or the 
like). As the partners' facilities were abandoned, they became storage 
locations or packing points. Such were the final dispositions of proper-
ties owned by J.P. Taylor and Southwestern, and the K.R. Edwards 
Company. Occasionally the properties were sold, in one case given to a 
local church. It was apparent that the partner system, although once 
workable, had become an anachronism. (However, a few strong virtu-
ally wholly owned affiliates remained, such as Lancaster Leaf and the 
K.R. Edwards Company.) 
Construction and updating the super plants plus the dismantling 
of the partner system had two immediate effects. First, by making the 
commitment to super plants, the company placed itself ahead of the 
competition. Consequently, unlike so much of American industry in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Universal began the fourth quarter of the twenti-
eth century in fiscal good health. In addition, because the partner sys-
tem had been dissolved, corporate energies could be devoted to seeking 
other tobacco markets and also eventually to moving toward diversifi-
cation. Spurred by Crenshaw's urging, Universal began exploring the 
entire world market and extending its interests around the globe. China, 
Canada, and Rhodesia had long been satellites in Universal's sphere, 
but now a new thrust, pushed by the rising cost of U.S. tobacco, began 
to extend further. 
Roughly one month after Crenshaw's rise to the presidency, Rho-
desia, at that time the site of the company's most significant overseas 
affiliate, was drastically affected by the imposition of U.N. sanctions. 
As explained previously, the loss to Universal was substantial, and new 
foreign initiatives became imperative. 
Changes also manifested themselves in a new relationship with the 
government. In a way, Universal and the federal government may be 
said to have grown up together. When the company began operating in 
1918, the government was rarely involved in the day-to-day affairs of 
American businesses. That condition changed, however, especially for 
companies that were involved in worldwide commerce. 
Following World War II, Universal's contact with the government 
revolved around supplying tobacco to Europe under the Marshall Plan, 
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which, after its technical expiration in 1952, was continued under Pub-
lic Law 480. At the time the Marshall Plan was implemented in 1948, 
the government also determined a need to regulate tobacco prices, a 
precedent it had set in 1933 when, under the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act, tobacco farmers were encouraged to take money for allowing fields 
to lie fallow. 
The program, which is still functioning in the mid-nineties, limits 
tobacco production to stabilize farm income. Quotas are placed on the 
quantity of tobacco that can be marketed. An average price is calculated 
annually by the Department of Agriculture according to a congression-
ally mandated formula. Tobacco that fails to bring the support price is 
purchased by stabilizing cooperatives called pools. The pools are actu-
ally farmer cooperatives and are funded by and operated under con-
tract with the Commodity Credit Corporation. Funds borrowed by the 
pools must be repaid with interest from the sale of pool inventories. 
Over time, Universal's Jim Abernathy and others became experts in 
this part of the business and acquired a good deal of pool tobacco for 
resale by the company. 
Universal also dealt with the government on "barter deals." Begun 
in the late 1940s as a method of providing economic aid, primarily to 
Third World countries, the barter deals were trades of strategic materi-
als for commodities. High profits could be made in such materials, but 
they could not be brought into the United States unless the importer 
could find an American exporter willing to supply a needed commod-
ity, such as tobacco, to the country in question. Inevitably, there was 
risk, especially when third and sometimes fourth parties became in-
volved. Sometimes these deals, handled by Tuggle, would require the 
commitment of as much as $10 million of company money. Stressful 
though such dealings were, they often paid well. For example, profits, 
which came in the form of discounts that Universal shared with cus-
tomers involved in the deals, amounted to $650,000 for the first year. 
Tuggle estimated that he handled more than one hundred such deals 
while the barter system was in place. 
Tuggle was further involved in federal government activities on 
Universal's behalf with his work in the European Common Market, 
with its system of internal free trade coupled with common tariffs on 
imports from countries outside the community. For some time 
Universal's leaders had thought the tariff against American tobacco 
was too high. Finally it became Tuggle's job to do something about it. 
He began by making personal contacts in Washington, particularly in 
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the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and State. As a conse-
quence, he and representatives from other tobacco interests were ap-
pointed to government advisory committees. The end result was that 
the tariff was lowered to a more acceptable level. 
During the Crenshaw years the government also imposed more and 
more duties and controls on American businesses. One of the most 
difficult regulations for the company to deal with in recent times has 
been the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Implemented in 1977 prima-
rily for the purpose of eliminating under-the-table deals, the act brought 
under scrutiny companies such as Universal that did a large volume of 
international business. Because the company conducts annual audits, it 
was easy to perform an immediate check to determine if foreign busi-
ness was being transacted in accordance with the new law. The audits 
confirmed that it was; nevertheless, company officials still complain 
that the law is too severe. They have also found it useful to prepare a 
pamphlet on business ethics, which is distributed through the company's 
worldwide system. 
One aspect of government relations that played a large part in U.S. 
businesses with worldwide connections for many years centered on the 
Central Intelligence Agency. It was common practice for Universal per-
sonnel returning from abroad to be contacted by representatives of the 
CIA to get their impressions of countries they had recently visited. As 
it did for the Internal Revenue Service, Universal supplied facilities for 
the CIA interviewers. In recent years, popular sentiment has turned 
against such information gathering techniques, and the practice has 
been discontinued. 
Another important event during these years was the company's move 
to a new corporate headquarters. By the late 1960s Richmond was in 
need of an expressway system to carry commuters from its West End 
suburbs to the downtown area of the city. In the mid-1960s planning 
was begun for the construction of what came to be known locally as the 
Downtown Expressway. As plans neared the final phase, engineers 
decided to run the roadway so close to the Universal building that its 
addition, originally constructed to alleviate crowding, would have to be 
removed. The company was forced to relocate not only by space con-
straints but by the increase in worldwide business and the rise in regu-
lar visits from foreign partners and clients, many of whom needed tem-
porary office space. 
Following inspections of available buildings in the downtown area, 
none of which was suitable, the company purchased a lot adjacent to 
the Virginia War Memorial on Belvidere Street on which it planned to 
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build. In the meantime, however, an existing building came on the 
market. One visit to the building, located at the corner of Hamilton and 
Broad Streets, convinced Universal's officers that it would suit them if 
it was remodeled. They purchased it for $750,000 and spent an equal 
amount converting it. Universal moved into its new quarters in the sum-
mer of 1968. Over the years the building has been expanded twice. In 
1974 a two-story wing was added on the east side adjacent to the Down-
town Expressway. Covering 13,500 square feet, the new space was used 
to house green leaf accounting and general accounting. In 1988 an-
other wing was joined to the one erected fourteen years earlier. This 
addition, totaling 14,500 square feet, houses the Department of Hu-
man Resources, the insurance manager, the corporate relations man-
ager, the corporate director of administration, the internal auditors, 
some senior officers, and the Department of Processing and Engi-
neenng. 
With the completion of the new complex, Universal finally had its 
modern, attractive nerve-center for its worldwide operation. The sample 
room was built to take advantage of northern light to accurately judge 
tobacco; the executive offices were spacious; and there was ample park-
ing. Moreover, the company paid attention to esthetics in furnishing 
and decorating. Not only were there rules about decorations for private 
offices, but care was taken in selecting art for the lobby. Put in charge 
of that aspect of the move, Jan Laverge sought original works by local 
artists and also borrowed from local museums-the Valentine Museum 
and the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts-works that complemented the 
furnishings. In some cases artifacts from the history of tobacco, from 
Dutch urns to American cigar store Indians of the nineteenth century, 
were displayed. 
In its early years, Universal was a loosely run organization, one that 
relied on the strengths of people who were given a great deal of au-
tonomy. Early on Crenshaw realized that this casual attitude had to be 
modified. The company was growing so rapidly that more order had to 
be imposed. 
The man who contributed most in this vital area was Wallace Chan-
dler, whose tenure with the company spans both the Jackson and 
Crenshaw years. Born in 1926 into a rural family in South Boston, Vir-
ginia, Chandler was raised on a six hundred-acre tobacco farm. He 
entered the army at age seventeen and soon found himself in officer's 
candidate school, and became a commissioned lieutenant at age eigh-
teen. He was soon to be a company commander in combat. 
Following his release from service and subsequent graduation from 
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Elon College in 1949, Chandler was literally forced into Universal. He 
was headed for law school when a family friend, R.E. ("Bob") Clark, a 
Universal vice president, intervened. Against Chandler's wishes, Clark 
sent a chauffeured car for him, with instructions to the driver to stay in 
front of the house until the young man agreed to go to Richmond. 
Chandler acquiesced and learned during his interview that Universal 
would pay his way through law school if he gave them two years of 
service; he rethought his position and joined the company. In time he 
rose to become vice chairman as well as the architect of many opera-
tional and administrative changes in the Universal system before his 
retirement in 1991. 
Assisted by W.A. ("Billy") Winfree, treasurer; Elijah Roark, con-
troller; and Leroy Owen, assistant secretary of Universal, Chandler over-
saw the company's administrative procedures. When he was named as-
sistant secretary in the early 1950s, the administration consisted of old-
time officers, a few department heads, and assorted bookkeepers and 
record-keepers. Informally structured, it was overshadowed by the flam-
boyant men in the sales and leaf departments. 
When Chandler came to the Richmond office following a stint in 
the factories and the completion of law school, he assumed the duties 
of company attorney. The first area he overhauled and modernized 
was payroll. Next came the Finance Department, followed by Data Pro-
cessing. In time, Chandler was also involved in setting up the company's 
Accounting, Communications, Auditing, and Legal departments. A de-
termined man who did his work behind the scenes, Chandler played a 
central role in the company's modern history, first as a tax man, later 
an officer, then secretary and general counsel. 
Having grown up in the tobacco world, Chandler knew it well. But 
he also mastered administration and was willing to assume the burden 
for it at Universal, thus freeing other senior officers to devote their 
energies directly to tobacco. 
Wirt L. Grubbs Jr. was also an instrumental figure in office changes. 
A former tobacco buyer, affable and outgoing, he became the company's 
personnel officer and subsequently its first director of human re-
sources. 
The Crenshaw years saw more than Universal's growth to a world-
wide business, however. While company officials were exploring glo-
bal possibilities, changes were taking place in the headquarters at 
Hamilton and Broad Streets. Most of these were the result of Crenshaw's 
concept of how a large business should run. 
Not until the beginning of the twentieth century did the American 
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business world begin moving toward objective standards by which it 
could measure itself. Prior to that time businesses were likely to be run 
by the owner, or the strongest person he could find to put in charge. 
Crenshaw was on the forefront of a new concept when he began mov-
ing Universal into the arena that one might call modern corporate pro-
fessionalism. 
While at Harvard, Crenshaw was struck by the way faculty ap-
proached the study of the business world. He later observed that be-
fore that time he had as a student been accustomed to learning the 
contents of books and of professors' lectures. At Harvard, however, he 
was introduced to a system in which students were presented with hy-
pothetical circumstances that gave rise to a problem. They were then 
asked to provide ways to solve the problem. Called the "case system," it 
taught Crenshaw that business issues are best solved when experts pool 
knowledge rather than when one person makes unilateral decisions. 
One of the most important changes Crenshaw made was revamp-
ing the board of directors. Early on, he established himself as a leader 
who, as one colleague said, was "consultative." His method was to get 
the facts and consider all sides of the question, then have each point of 
view debated before reaching a decision. Sometimes his decisions went 
against the advice; nevertheless, he chose to have the advice before act-
ing. 
Crenshaw proposed board members with varied business interests 
because they could bring a broader base of experience. Under Crenshaw, 
the board, which meets five times each year, has the responsibility of 
following the affairs of the company in a general way and of serving 
specifically on committees that are also advisory. If there are special 
problems the board may be asked to meet more often. 
Chosen because of their expertise in their own businesses, directors 
provide an objective point of view. "When a board is comprised of in-
side members completely or largely," Crenshaw noted, "from the out-
side it is perceived that the chief executive officer is controlling the 
board. The real value is to have a board that is dominated by people on 
the outside who are not beholden to the chief executive officer. The 
chief executive officer is beholden to them." 
New names began appearing in the annual reports as members of 
Universal's board. Included among them were Fielding L. Williams, 
from the law firm of Williams, Mullen and Christian; T. Justin Moore, 
a lawyer and CEO of Virginia Electric and Power Company; Joseph A. 
Jennings, chairman of United Virginia Bank; Lawrence A. Blanchard 
Jr., vice chairman of Ethyl Corporation; A. Paul Funkhouser, president 
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of the CSX Corporation; Ronald E. Carrier, president of James Madi-
son University; State Senator ElmonT. Gray, president of Gray Lum-
ber Company; and-of particular significance-Fred G. Pollard, a law-
yer and longtime public servant, who had served a stint as lieutenant 
governor of Virginia. Like his colleague Fielding Williams, Pollard 
was affiliated with the law firm of Williams, Mullen and Christian, long 
associated with Universal. 
Emanating from the board are several committees: the Audit Com-
mittee, the Executive Compensation Committee, the Finance Commit-
tee, and the Executive Committee, the most important one in the sys-
tem. Other committees are responsible for in-house matters. 
Tracing its origin to the early years of the Jackson era, when it had 
little power and convened sporadically, the Executive Committee soon 
was meeting every Monday morning from one to three hours. It worked 
from a prepared agenda and took care of matters requiring ongoing 
attention, such as capital expenditures, liquidations, formation of new 
subsidiaries, and decisions having to do with employee benefits. In ad-
dition, liaison officers responsible for large territories presented peri-
odic reports to the committee. In a general sense, this was the commit-
tee that kept Universal running on a day-to-day basis. 
Under Crenshaw, Universal instituted in the mid-1970s a new form 
of compensation for both officers and rank-and-file employees. As far 
back as the 1920s the company had had a system of paying a regular 
salary and awarding an annual bonus. Bonuses varied in amount, and 
the only year one was not forthcoming was 1932. Under the system, 
one junior officer sardonically remembered, "they just got a great big 
goddamn hogshead full of silver dollars and turned it over in the middle 
of the sample room, and Mr. Jackson got a scoop shovel and the vice 
presidents each had a spade and some of us had knives; and you went 
in and got what you could out of the goddamn thing, and the fellow 
with a knife didn't have much of a chance against a guy with a scoop 
shovel; I'll tell you that!" 
Earlier, a stock purchase plan had been implemented by Jackson, 
who saw it as a way of bonding employees to the company because they 
would lose if they quit, but it was not until the 1970s that the Manage-
ment Performance Share Plan came into being. Based on merit and 
awarded by the Executive Compensation Committee with the concur-
rence of the chairman of the board, this plan offers additional compen-
sation to company executives. 
In earlier days, Universal hired young men, sent them to the facto-
ries, and all too often forgot they were there. The result was that prom-
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ising candidates for promotion left the business for other jobs where 
opportunities seemed greater. Crenshaw recognized this problem and 
set about to rectify it. Remembering his own case as a former Navy 
officer and Harvard graduate student who started at Universal sweep-
ing factory floors, he knew that some way must be found to let those at 
the bottom know what rewards awaited them at the top. 
To solve the problem, the company started a monitoring plan, which 
began the day the new employee was recruited. Two kinds of recruit-
ment evolved: a few were recruited because they happened to be friends 
of those in high positions at Universal and were known to be good 
workers. More often, however, recruitment began formally on college 
campuses but was limited, however, to Virginia and North Carolina. 
Recruiters sought young men and women with degrees in varied fields 
and considered primarily their grades, evidence of leadership quali-
ties, and evidence that the candidate could get along with others. When 
hired, the young person would be sent to the rigors of factory work but 
would be monitored by a senior staff member in Richmond. This way, 
more recruits knew they could look forward to rewards of a high order. 
Using this method to the present, Universal has been able to attract and 
hold almost all of its more promising employees, both male and fe-
male. "There is very little movement in our company, either departures 
or entries from the outside," Crenshaw noted. 
By the end of Crenshaw's first decade as CEO, Universal was in 
strong financial condition. Its modern corporate structure was in place; 
its overseas ventures had been successful; and the company had an ex-
cess of working capital. Net earnings steadily increased through the 
1960s, the end of which saw the company operating in fifteen countries 
outside the United States. 
At the decade's end Universal's annual report to stockholders con-
tained for the first time information about a new kind of venture. The 
company had acquired, in its initial move toward diversification, con-
trolling shares of a business outside of tobacco called Inta-Roto, which 
produced machines used in packaging and other fields, made designs 
for industrial use, and produced cylinders used to make imprints on 
packing materials. 
Herbert jackson had always considered moves into foreign tobacco 
markets to be diversification. He believed that Universal should be in 
the tobacco business only. However, the company's excess of capital, 
coupled with a far-reaching federal government report, made the com-
pany start thinking otherwise. 
In 1964, the tobacco industry began undergoing its most profound 
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and long-lasting change, when the surgeon general issued a report on 
the relationship of tobacco use to health. It garnered support and gath-
ered momentum, finally reaching into the highest echelons of govern-
ment when, in the late 1970s, the secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare under the Carter administration announced a federal campaign 
against the use of tobacco. The campaign continued into the 1980s, 
becoming even more vocal and sharply focused in the 1990s. To put 
teeth in its resolve, the government increased the cigarette tax. 
Antismoking campaigns were not new to the tobacco industry. How-
ever, never before had the effects of one been so far-reaching. Partly as 
a precautionary measure and partly because of its robust financial health, 
Universal began a tentative program of diversification, to be discussed 
later. Since 1968 the company has moved into various fields, such as 
fertilizer, modular homes, land development, agriproducts, title insur-
ance, and others. In 1988, as a holding company, it changed its name 
to Universal Corporation. This was the same year that Crenshaw re-
tired, and Henry Harrell became his successor. 
10 
Modern Foreign Operations 
When Gordon Crenshaw assumed the presidency, the company's Ca-
nadian and Rhodesian branches were solidly based, moves had been 
made into Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia, and another was planned for 
Angola. Greek tobacco interests had been developed, but Germany, 
briefly the site of the Microflake venture, would become a casualty of 
the business climate of the 1970s. Universal had for years been steadily 
growing, but greater enterprises were yet to come. 
By 1966, most if not all of Universal's top executives had had expe-
rience in foreign countries. One man in particular, however, was to be 
of major importance in the years immediately following Crenshaw's 
assumption of control. Reminiscent of Buck Duke's entry into China 
earlier in the century, Jan La verge saw more than anyone the potential 
for foreign operations. 
Although long an American citizen, he had kept close ties with 
European friends and family members. Laverge, who was at home on 
any continent, had been a key player in Universal's success in Rhode-
sia, had nurtured the fledgling company interest in Greece, and, with 
his brother Chris, had paved the way for the Microflake undertaking. 
But that was only the beginning. 
After Universal struck a successful deal with Deli-Maatschappij to 
operate a joint venture in Greece, La verge began looking westward to-
ward Italy and soon learned that all exports of Italian tobacco were in 
the hands of one man in Milan. He discovered that the country's entire 
tobacco business was under the control of the Italian Tobacco Monopoly 
headed by Dr. Pietro Cava, who later would figure in Universal's entry 
into Mexico. Those who wanted to raise tobacco could do so only if 
they had a concession from the monopoly. 
Ludwig von Hurter, who had previously assisted in establishing 
Universal's participation in Deli-Maatchappij's Greek enterprise, 
Gretoba, was also in charge of Deli's interests in Italy. Secretive by na-
ture, von Hurter was reluctant to talk about the Italian part of Deli's 
operation until he and Universal had struck the deal in Greece. Deli-
Maatschappij had entered the Italian market earlier by buying out a 
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local tobacconist named Giointella, who had held the flue-cured con-
cession in Umbria before he was overtaken by financial difficulties. 
After von Hurter concluded the deal for Deli and had named the new 
venture Deltafina, he selected Guy Norton as his successor. Norton too 
would later play a prominent role in Universal. 
Laverge began moving toward an agreement with von Hurter, re-
sulting in a meeting in Rome in 1966 between Laverge, assisted and 
supported by Chandler and Winfree, and his brother August, who with 
von Hurter, represented Deli. As a result, Universal bought into the 
Italian market by acquiring 50 percent of the Deli-owned Deltafina for 
just over a million dollars, but problems surfaced immediately. Although 
Universal officers had scrutinized Deltafina's operations on-site before 
entering the partnership, they could not have known that within the 
first nine months the company would lose half a million dollars. 
Troubled by such losses, La verge called a meeting in New York the 
following year. Attended by the two Laverges, Guy Norton, and Deli-
Maatschappij's Carol Goldschmidt, it began on a tense note when Jan 
Laverge pointed out that Deltafina's earlier projection of a half million 
dollar profit-which in reality had turned into a half million dollar loss-
bordered on being unacceptable to Universal. However, the meeting 
ended on an amicable compromise that had far-reaching effects for the 
company. It centered not on an exchange of cash or stocks but on the 
seed used in raising the Italian tobacco crop. 
Four years prior to Universal's entering into partnership with 
Deltafina, more than two-thirds of the Italian tobacco crop had been 
destroyed by blue mold. Following this turn of events, Deli-Maatschappij 
engaged a team of agronomists to develop a tobacco seed that was resis-
tant to the blight. The team developed a hybrid, which Deli-Maatschappij 
immediately patented. In order to produce the hybrid, a male and a 
female strain had to be used. And to keep the patent from being stolen 
in Italy, the female strain was kept in Bastia, Italy, the male in Heemstede, 
Holland. The pollen was gathered in Holland and flown to Italy, each 
female plant being fertilized individually. The compromise reached in 
1966 allowed Deltafina to buy the seed at a discount, which, as the 
Italian demand for tobacco increased, brought handsome profits from 
the sale of the seed. 
Universal's Italian holdings were further augmented by its entry 
into sales of burley, which was soon to become popular in Italy. Work-
ing out a deal with Roberto Memmo, who held burley concessions from 
the monopoly, Universal was now well established in Italy. Guy Norton 
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oversaw the business while Memmo, through his connections, dealt with 
Italian officials. Eventually, Universal and Deli bought Memmo out. 
Today, following the construction of new factories in 1972 in Francolise 
and in 1982 in Assisi, the Italian company handles a total of about 40 
million kilos of flue-cured, dark-fired, and burley annually. 
In addition to being quite successful financially, the Rome office is 
in many ways the showpiece of Universal's foreign operations. Its main 
quarters were once owned by a motion picture company that lavished 
both money and attention on the structure and its gardens. Magnifi-
cently furnished, and used for social occasions as well as work, the fa-
cility looks more like a private villa than a business office. Farther south, 
in Africa, Universal entered the Angolan tobacco market in 1966, mostly 
as a result of work by Donald F. Bell and Pierre Warwick, who later 
turned it over to Towers. 
Like so many other tobacconists worldwide, Bell came into the busi-
ness almost by accident. Born in 1924 in England, he served in the 
British army during World War II, returning in 1947 to what here-
membered as "a very depressed England with a Socialist government 
who were imposing all sorts of inhibitions." Young and willing to relo-
cate, he interviewed with the Liverpool office of the R.W. Noakes To-
bacco Company of Rhodesia. The interviewer, Bell recalled, said that 
"I was the 'nearest bloodybloke to Liverpool."' So he got the first inter-
view and the job offer, which he accepted. He afterward discovered 
there had been about fifty applicants for the position. 
In time Bell became a central force behind Universal's African ven-
tures, which revolved around the Rhodesian Leaf Tobacco Company. 
He rose to the rank of senior vice president and liaison to Europe and 
Africa with Universal but was killed in1987 when a family-owned plane 
piloted by his son struck an antelope and crashed while attempting a 
landing at Bumi Hills near Lake Kariba, Zimbabwe. Perhaps Towers 
best expressed Bell's efforts for Universal when he described him sim-
ply as the man "who so capably looks after Africa." 
Bell placed business in Angola under G.J. ("Gaby") Kremer, whose 
adventures in Angola could well be the script for an action-packed movie. 
A native Hungarian who had suffered in World War II concentration 
camps, Kremer immigrated to Rhodesia in 1948 when he was twelve 
years old. He learned English and prospered in his adopted country, 
and eventually acquired a thousand-acre farm on which, among other 
things, he raised tobacco. Relocating to Angola, he joined the Univer-
sal family as head of the local company, SET A, whose customers in-
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eluded Portugal, England, Germany, and japan. Relying on Kremer's 
knowledge of the Angolan government, the company departed from 
its usual way of doing business. For the first time, it became involved in 
the raising not only of tobacco but of other crops and livestock. 
Attempting to widen its base, Universal acquired through the work 
of Towers and Kremer vast land holdings from the Angolan govern-
ment, the only stipulation being that they be fenced and put into pro-
duction. Two tracts, totaling some twenty-five thousand acres, were soon 
the sites of farms, complete with houses and dependencies for the over-
seers, who with their families migrated from Rhodesia. The venture 
looked promising, with two hundred acres of tobacco being grown the 
first year, five hundred the second, and one thousand in the third. 
The Angolan enterprise was, Towers remembers, "the perfect com-
bination," in that Universal was growing, buying, and processing to-
bacco simultaneously. Moreover, operations there broadened with the 
introduction of corn crops, grown because tobacco badly depletes the 
soil and rotation is required. Next came the introduction of African 
cows bred to Rhodesian bulls. Disaster was lurking in the wings, how-
ever, in the form of an impending nationalist revolution followed by 
the collapse of the government. 
By the time political problems began fragmenting Angola in the 
mid-1970s, Kremer was married, the father of three, and the pilot of 
his own airplane. He also had in his employ or under contract a num-
ber of local tobacco farmers. 
As political conditions worsened, the factory, which Kremer de-
scribed as the best in Angola, came under siege from revolutionaries. 
Universal had been instrumental in constructing the new facility, using 
its staff from Rhodesia. On several occasions subjected to harrowing 
searches and mob intimidation, Kremer soon found himself in the 
middle of a revolution, in which rival factions, one with strong backing 
from Moscow, were vying to wrest the country from Portugal. A social-
ist government, Kremer feared, was only a matter of time. 
Kremer was forced to confront the gravity of the situation in May 
of 1974. Arriving at the office one morning, he was handed a message 
that had come in by mistake overnight on the telex. Addressed to a 
local official, it was from Moscow, requesting passports for ten Rus-
sians scheduled to come to Angola to lend assistance. Kremer could 
well guess what lay ahead. 
During the remainder of 1974 all semblance of order began disap-
pearing as the factions fought each other with increasing bitterness. 
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Many of Kremer's farm workers were successful in escaping the coun-
try by automobile, despite arriving at their destinations in bullet-riddled 
vehicles. 
As the fighting got closer to Benguela, the small town in which the 
Kremers lived, conditions worsened. Up to this time the fray, although 
violent, was not such that Kremer could not keep the business operat-
ing. Moreover, he thought the strife would soon cease. Because he was 
on friendly terms with members of opposing forces, he even found 
himself in the position of amateur military strategist when he convinced 
warring factions to engage in combat in an area that would not affect 
his business! 
As hostilities increased and more guerrillas drew nearer, however, 
the family spent a harrowing night huddled under the hallway staircase 
while the house was being heavily damaged by mortar fire. The next 
incident occurred when six partially intoxicated guerrillas-grenades 
on their belts and automatic weapons at the ready-arrived to search the 
house for military firearms. Their leader carried a sawed-off shotgun. 
Bragging that they had been trained in Russia, they held the women 
and children hostage while they searched. Tense moments occurred 
when weapons were pointed and grenade pins almost pulled. Finding 
only hunting rifles and a handgun that one of the guerrillas tried un-
successfully to steal, they calmed down and asked for a drink. 
"So when this was all finished," Kremer later recounted, "we ended 
up drinking Scotch with these guys. They weren't fighting an enemy in 
us, but they really didn't know what they were doing. They were just 
power crazy, and they had guns in their hands, and they had been sent 
out to do something." 
Following this incident, Kremer knew it was time to act. Gathering 
together his family and any employees who wanted to get out of the 
country, he and colleague Tom Phillips began some half dozen evacu-
ation flights in two small planes. Flying at treetop level to avoid small 
arms fire from the ground, they refueled from caches of previously 
hidden aviation fuel. All who wanted to made it to safety, never to 
return. "My wife and children have never set foot in Angola from that 
day," Kremer reported. "And they thought they were going away for a 
couple of weeks until that thing blew over." Kremer worked for Uni-
versal for many years and today is headquartered in Switzerland. Com-
pany interests in Angola have been terminated. 
Towers observed in retrospect that he, Bell, and Kremer misjudged 
the political situation in Angola. Additionally, they underestimated lo-
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gistical problems caused by Universal's being an absentee landlord of a 
series of farms. Owning farms, on which the farmer, his family, and 
often even his children's education ultimately become company busi-
ness, proved too problematical. 
Because Angola had long been racially integrated and politically 
quiescent, all three men erroneously thought it was one of the most 
stable countries in Africa. "We said that Angola would be the last place 
to fall," Towers ironically recalled. "And so that is why we kept throw-
ing money back into it." When Universal's Rhodesian interests were 
curtailed because of the sanctions, the company once again looked for 
other markets. What came immediately to mind were Oriental coun-
tries other than China, which had been closed to the West since 1949. 
The Rhodesian failure also contributed to Asian initiatives by making 
additional personnel available, some of whom spearheaded movements 
into such countries as Thailand, Korea, and the Philippine Islands. The 
man chosen for the job of tapping the Orient was John Pinks. 
Born in 1930, Pinks early left home in England and, at age seven-
teen, joined the Imperial Tobacco Company in Salisbury, Southern 
Rhodesia. Switching to Universal, he was in the perfect position for the 
Far Eastern assignment. At age thirty-six, Pinks headed for a new chal-
lenge, carrying with him, he recalled years later, only three things: his 
personal luggage, a briefcase, and a faint heart. His assignment was to 
survey the Far East, particularly the Philippines, and to set up two flue-
cured packing operations-one in the Philippines, the other in Korea. 
"It was, of course," he recalled with understatement, "a great challenge," 
even though he had prior experience in the area as a salesman for the 
Rhodesian Leaf Tobacco Company. 
Arriving in Manila, Pinks found his assignment even greater than 
he had thought because the tobacco market had already been organized 
and was under the control of one Harry Stonehill, an American ex-G.I. 
who had served in the Philippines, recognized the opportunities there, 
and returned following military service. Moreover, Stonehill had en-
listed the aid of the Philippine government, which had extended enor-
mous privileges to him. Thus Pinks faced what amounted to an infor-
mal monopoly. "They didn't want to become involved with us," here-
membered. 
Pinks reasoned there was only one thing to do. He had to get to the 
farmer, the source of the tobacco. Requesting assistance, which arrived 
in the form of Jim Southern, who had had experience in Rhodesian 
tobacco, the two began mapping a strategy. Before one could be planned 
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and implemented, however, the whole matter assumed the character of 
a Saturday night crapshoot. 
"We were sitting in the office one day," Pinks recalled some twenty 
years after the event, "talking as to how we could start this thing .... We 
had no idea really how we could get into it because we didn't have 
enough contacts, but as we were talking, two young Chinese fellows 
came into the office, one being Tom Santiago, and the other one being 
Vicente Yang, and they told us they thought they could help us buy 
tobacco in the provinces if we were interested. When I think about it, it 
was hair-raising. They told us that we would have to advance them 50,000 
pesos, about 2,500 U.S. dollars. We would just have to give them the 
cash, and they would go out and buy the tobacco for us and bring it 
back." 
Men of less daring might have balked at such a risky arrangement 
in a country they little understood. After investigation and discussion, 
however, Pinks and Southern agreed to take the gamble. "We decided 
not to tell Universal about it," Pinks recalled from the safety of retire-
ment, "because I think they would have died of heart failure. Anyway, 
[Santiago and Yang] went off, and a few weeks later the first truck loads 
arrived. To our relief, it was quite nice tobacco." 
As the Philippine business progressed, Santiago and Yang became 
Universal's main buyers. At the same time, Pinks and Southern began 
traveling to the provinces to monitor purchases. It was a job that pro-
duced little result but much danger. "One incident I remember very 
vividly," Pinks said, "I was coming back from the Ilocos Norte region 
traveling south back to San Fernando, one of the larger towns in the 
area to stay the night. My driver appeared to be putting his foot down 
and going faster and faster, and I said to him, 'Why are you going so 
fast?' He said, 'Listen Boss, I have got to get through the next town 
before four o'clock; otherwise all the gun shooting starts."' 
"So," Pinks continued, "I said, 'Okay. You just keep going, and 
don't stop 'til we get home.' The town we were talking about was noto-
rious as a center for one of the Philippine political factions, and they 
used to have a gun fight every night, and a lot of people got killed." 
On another occasion, Southern was attacked by a mob and then 
jailed for his own protection; he learned later that an automobile in his 
entourage had accidentally struck and injured a child in one of the 
provinces. Luckily, Southern was carrying a satchel of money to buy 
tobacco. Following payments to the jailers, and the attention of one 
official's wife who prepared special meals for him, Southern was al-
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lowed to go free. At the time of his departure the whole village gath-
ered to see him off, wishing him well and inviting him to return. "So 
you can see, it was not an easy job," Pinks said. "There were quite a few 
dangers involved in it." 
Within four years the Philippine business was running smoothly, 
with the aid of such other personnel as H.P. ("Chief") Parrish, Robin 
Carver, and Thomas ("Tommy") Meyer. Pinks and Southern rented a 
plant at A goo, La Union, and installed machinery that enabled them to 
turn out a better product. Today, Orient Leaf, as the Philippine branch 
is called, buys, processes and sells primarily flue-cured tobacco. Its main 
market is Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. 
Next Universal sought entry into Korea. 
At Universal, executives keep apprised of activities in the entire 
tobacco world. So it was that Towers, soon to be instrumental in the 
company's Korean endeavor, learned that the Gallaher group was buy-
ing substantial tobacco there. Following consultation with La verge who, 
although he never made a trip to the Far East, was concerned with all 
foreign operations, Towers suggested that Pinks go to Korea to assess 
the operation. 
Arriving on a cold February day in 1966, Pinks made contact with 
the Taiyang Trading Company and, with an interpreter, visited the 
provinces. Facing a government monopoly like the one in Italy, Pinks 
bought an initial five hundred tons of tobacco, which had to be guarded 
around the clock until it went aboard ship for transport. 
Pinks also brought samples of Korean tobacco back to the Rich-
mond office, where all who graded it were astonished at its superior 
quality. Clearly, there was the prospect of an excellent business in the 
country. The Korean venture quickly flourished, and soon Peter 
Osborne, Joseph Hines, and Maurice Bronley, all old Rhodesia hands, 
were on the scene. Osborne, a young man of twenty-three at the time, 
would later play a large role in Korea, where he married a Korean and 
settled. 
Ironically, the country in which some of the best tobacco is grown 
was also one of the hardest workstations in the Universal sphere. More-
over, Korea has harsh winters and hot, humid summers. When the com-
pany set up shop there, Korea was still suffering the effects of the bitter 
and divisive war that had ended in 1953. Roads were barely passable, 
accommodations sparse, and food strange-tasting to the Western palate 
(although Pinks noted that the local cuisine was never a problem for 
him). Bedrooms were small compartments used for living during the 
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day, and beds were rice-mat floors on which bed clothes were laid. The 
rooms were unheated. 
That conditions for Westerners in the provinces were difficult is 
clearly evident from a story of what happened to Towers during a lunch 
break with a factory manager and Pinks. "I will never forget it," Towers 
recalled. "Lunch time came and the factory manager gave us a bowl of 
stew and two hard-boiled eggs and a spoon. John turned to me and 
said, 'Unless you like dog, I wouldn't eat that stew.' He said, 'It's dog 
stew,' and put it down. He and I ate our two eggs, and the factory man-
ager ate all three bowls of stew." 
But Universal stayed and prospered. After ironing out problems in 
redrying, especially for the exacting English market, the Korean part 
of the business began to grow. In 1976 Universal and the Taiyang Trad-
ing Company formed Oriental Processors and Exporters of Korea 
(OPEK), which purchased the Jochiwon factory from the Office of 
Monopoly in 1977. After renovating the building, it installed modern 
processing equipment. 
The quantity of flue-cured and burley available in Korea is deter-
mined annually by the Monopoly and is based on supply and demand. 
Historically, the total crop has varied between 100 million and 110 mil-
lion kilos. OPEK is the largest exporter in the Republic of Korea. 
Although it now holds its own, Thailand, under the direction first 
of Warwick, then C.S. "Studie" Carr, and later Henry Harrell, has been 
the most problematical of Universal's ventures in the Orient. 
Universal originally entered the Thai market with Y.K. Hsu, the 
oldest son of Mohan Zee, who had long been instrumental in the China 
branch. Under the direction of Henry H. Morton, who followed Y.K. 
Hsu as manager, the company also buys tobacco farther north, near 
Laos and Burma. Thai Am Tobacco was established in Chiengmai in 
1973 to grow, cure, buy, process, and export flue-cured tobacco. A 
1973 merger with Opat Lertpruk formed a company that operated ten 
curing stations with 333 barns and dealt with some thirteen thousand 
farmers each season. Since 1981 Thai Am has also purchased burley 
for export. 
Despite these evidences of progress, the Thailand operation has 
been plagued by difficulties. The Monopoly often changed orders dras-
tically, having to make up for inaccurate estimates later in the season. 
Moreover, Universal has never been satisfied with the profit margin it 
maintains there. 
Another event occurred in the 1970s that deserves mention: the 
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reentry of Universal into China. Lucrative though it was, particularly 
in the 1920s and 1930s, China had been a problem child in the U niver-
sal family because of its unstable political situation. The company had 
to abandon operations there in 1941 with the coming of war and again 
when the communist takeover in 1949 forced the expulsion of Western 
interests. 
After President Nixon's 1972 Shanghai communique, it became 
legal for U.S. citizens to travel to mainland China. In the spring of 
1973 Norton Howe went there to make an informal survey. Howe re-
opened a door that had been shut since 1949 when he bought a small 
quantity of tobacco from the Chinese. He returned the following year 
with samples, and was able, through the Fritz Otto Lorje Company, to 
start trading in Chinese leaf. Before his retirement in 1989, Howe made 
some ten trips to China, not only for the purpose of dealing in tobacco 
but also, with the aid of Universal personnel, for the purpose of assist-
ing the Chinese in the growth and production of their tobacco. 
By 1970, Universal had expanded as far as possible in the Far East. 
An operation in Indonesia proved unsuccessful and had been aban-
doned; entry into Taiwan, which had been growing tobacco since the 
nineteenth century, proved impossible because of the opposition 
mounted by those in local markets. Universal also has a toe-hold in 
Guntur, the tobacco capital of India, where it supervises the grading 
and packing of tobacco for export, principally to Western Europe. In-
dia exports flue-cured, burley, dark-fired, and several native types. 
Beginning in the late 1940s, Pierre Warwick took charge of sales 
throughout Central and South America and soon was selling substan-
tial amounts of tobacco in Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, and the Dominican 
Republic. By the 1950s, however, approaching the end of his career, 
Warwick turned over sales in South American countries to Roulhac 
Ruffin, who in turn began sharing responsibilities with Walter 
Robertson, grandson of Universal's founder, J.P. Taylor. 
By the early 1960s, Central and South American flue-cured and 
burley increased to the point that the production covered most of the 
local needs. At roughly the same time these growths began being ac-
cepted by world manufacturers. An excellent judge of tobacco, 
Robertson took the lead in buying small quantities of the best South 
American growths for use in Universal's blended strip exports. Cau-
tious at first, he began with a modest fifty tons of Argentine flue-cured; 
however, he was soon buying several hundred tons in individual pur-
chases. 
By this time, Universal had expanded its European operations by 
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joint enterprises in Germany, Greece, and Italy with the Deli-
Maatschappij, whose cigar leaf branch, Koch Scheltema, was a substan-
tial dealer in northern Brazilian tobaccos. Koch Scheltema had been in 
the Bahia area as early as the 1920s, but by the late 1960s its interests 
had moved south to the Blumenau/Rio Grande provinces, in which 
flue-cured was starting to be produced. It was in this area that it pur-
chased a family-owned firm called Tabacos Blumenau. 
Because Jan La verge's brother Chris was president of Deli-
Maatschappij, Universal was privy to Koch Scheltema's expansion. 
Moreover, Universal soon learned that although the South American 
flue-cured was being moved at a competitive price, Koch lacked sales 
contacts and customers to take full advantage of the situation. By con-
sent of the Deli and Universal, Robertson was sent to visit Koch in the 
spring of 1969. He immediately saw the potential of the new growth, 
evidenced by his purchase of five hundred tons of tobacco, which re-
placed Universal's Argentine imports. Additionally, Robertson reported 
that the Deli seemed favorable to cooperation in the area. In late 1969 
a three-man delegation went from Universal to assess the situation. The 
delegation's report was mixed, and over the winter the company mulled 
over what to do. Should it try to go it alone in a new country or should 
it combine forces with Deli? 
Universal decided that it did not have the personnel to start a new 
enterprise in an unknown country. The decision was thus made in the 
spring of 1970 to approach the Deli-Maatschappij with a proposal to 
buy half its interest in southern Brazil, first the company in Blumenau, 
to be followed by participating in the purchase of Tabacos Tatsch in 
Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz was eight hundred miles south of Blumenau 
and was the center of a rapidly developing flue-cured area, in which 
Deli was negotiating. On his annual trip to Europe, Laverge and his 
brother struck a deal whereby Universal would buy 50 percent of 
Blumenau and Tatsch for just under one million dollars. 
The new Brazilian tobaccos caught on, with exports and produc-
tion showing a steady rise. Soon, an upgrading of facilities was needed, 
all the more so because the decade of the 1970s was also the period of 
consolidation of the cigarette manufacturing industry in Europe and 
of increasing demand by the manufacturers for the raw material to be 
delivered in "ready to manufacture" strips. The decision was made in 
1974 to install threshing machinery in the old Tatsch building in Santa 
Cruz, the first dealer threshing facility in Brazil. 
The South American business got an additional boost when in 197 4 
Philip Morris opened a cigarette manufacturing facility in Curitiba, 
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Brazil, not far from Blumenau, and asked Universal to be its leaf sup-
plier. Although near retirement, La verge agreed to represent the com-
pany for negotiations in South America, as did his brother August. At 
the time, the two companies' total production was four thousand tons 
annually, but the Laverges soon learned that Philip Morris wanted a 
whopping three thousand for the first year alone! Expansion of all fa-
cilities was of the highest priority. From a production of four thousand 
tons in 1974, Universal's Brazilian enterprise, now called Tabacos 
Brasileiros, produces and sells over sixty thousand tons annually. The 
production of flue-cured in Brazil currently exceeds that of Zimbabwe 
and is second only to China and the United States. Brazil's operation is 
now another independent and successful part of Universal, the largest 
outside the United States and today one of the training grounds for 
young tobacconists in the Universal system. 
The story of Universal's entry into Mexico is prefigured by a tale of 
intrigue and subterfuge that was played out on the international stage 
even before the company became involved. During World War II, a 
U.S. Army officer by name of Philip Betette, who was a member of the 
occupation forces in Rome, met the director of the Italian tobacco mo-
nopoly, Dr. Pietro Cova, who persuaded him to go to Mexico to grow 
tobacco. Italy's tobacco had just suffered a severe blue mold epidemic, 
and he was anxious to find other supply sources. Betette set up shop in 
the early 1960s in the town of Tepic in the western state of Nayarit. 
Although he knew nothing about tobacco, assuming it was all the same 
and simply had to be grown and packed, Betette made contracts with 
local farmers and in time built a processing plant. Soon he was making 
regular shipments to Italy. 
All went well until the Italian government discovered that the Mexi-
can tobacco, which was burley, was being marketed under the guise 
that it was a native Italian product. A number of Italians were arrested 
and charged with importing tobacco under falsified documents. Betette 
was left in Mexico with no export market. 
Now the sole man in control, Betette approached the K.R. Edwards 
arm of Universal, forming a working relationship with A.L. Hobgood, 
W.E. Parham, Louis Flowers, and Edward Dinnsenjr. In time Betette 
duplicated his earlier efforts for Edwards, for whom he again negoti-
ated with farmers and built a factory before he sold his interests to the 
company and settled in Rome. 
Known since 1972 as Casa Export, the Mexican facility was soon 
supplying about one-third of the export market for Mexican burley, a 
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tobacco readily accepted by cigarette manufacturers in Western Europe, 
the Far East, and North America. Increased domestic consumption of 
cigarette-type tobaccos in turn led to periodic shortages, prompting Casa 
to look for additional sources of burley. Programs were started in 197 2 
when Flowers and Dinnsen toured Central America, performing taste 
tests on tobaccos in Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Sal-
vador, Nicaragua, and Belize. The K.R. Edwards Company, working 
with Stuart Christian as liaison, decided to invest in Guatemala and 
continue expansion in Mexico. Following the identification of target 
growing areas, farmers were induced to try tobacco along with their 
traditional crops. 
As Universal's global sales of tobacco, procured from twenty or 
more countries, grew, coordination in sales efforts became increasingly 
important. Each of its overseas operations has retained autonomy in its 
sales effort, for the practical reason that customersprefer to deal di-
rectly with the people "on the spot." However, it was also necessary that 
Richmond be informed of each overseas affiliate's sales activities. Hence, 
the system of information flow to Richmond and in turn the dissemina-
tion of information from Richmond to the various affiliates was strength-
ened. Although not directly involved in each affiliate's sales, the re-
sponsible officers in Richmond continue to provide coordination and 
guidance for a more effective worldwide sales program. 
At the same time, the company began holding international sales 
conferences to bring together annually all foreign managers for the 
exchange of information and a better coordination of its global sales 
effort. 
One conference, typical of such meetings, was held in Richmond 
inN ovember of 1986. On that occasion members of Universal interna-
tional operations in Canada, Brazil, Italy, Greece, the Philippines, Thai-
land, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mexico, the U.K., and Holland gathered to 
devise ways to improve sales. Such problems as global oversupply of 
leaf tobacco and contract-buying directly from farmers were discussed. 
Information was also disseminated about barter, counter trade, and fi-
nance techniques on various markets. At the same time, salesmen 
learned of the upgrading of the London office in order to better coor-
dinate efforts at international sales and to strengthen customer service. 
11 
A Changing Industry 
By 1966 Universal had gained the level of technical proficiency with 
which it continues to operate today. Its partner companies were fading, 
some having been dissolved, others disappearing by attrition. Complete 
with all the technology that modern science could provide, the era of 
the super plant had arrived. Sales had become international in scope, 
and the change from selling with samples to servicing preexisting ac-
counts was firmly established. 
In earlier times, life on the markets was often a hectic catch-as-
catch-can existence. Transportation was by train and automobile, and 
amenities such as air-conditioning and rooms with private bathrooms 
were usually little more than wished-for luxuries. Since 1966 that has 
changed, however, as reflected in the seasonal activities of the late Billy 
("Senator") Pritchard, a native of Vance County, North Carolina, and a 
familiar and for many years a colorful Universal representative on the 
tobacco markets. 
One of Universal's top buyers from the 1950s until his death in 
1987, Pritchard led a typical tobacco buyer's life in the mid- to late 
twentieth century. Following a stint in the Army Air Corps, he entered 
the tobacco business by way of the J.P. Taylor Company in Henderson, 
North Carolina, and was soon sent to Greenville, Tennessee, where he 
ran the factory. Like other young tobacco men before him, he learned 
to grade tobacco by working on the hanging line, a job free from the 
pressures of buying but nevertheless a demanding one because the to-
bacco had to be graded precisely so that each bundle would be identi-
cal. 
Pritchard wanted to get into the buying side of the business and 
took every opportunity to "follow a line" during a sale. Often he would 
arrange to do so by asking a regular buyer to let him substitute for a 
row or two. "I tried to make myself as likable as possible," Pritchard 
remembered, "because I knew I needed some help when I started." 
Soon he was in Georgia serving as a driver and "relief man" for a regu-
lar buyer. 
Although Pritchard learned tobacco quickly and ultimately became 
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a company legend, in the beginning he was subjected to the same initia-
tion as all the others. Humorous only in retrospect, one anecdote cen-
ters on Pritchard's purchase of unsatisfactory tobacco when he was 
working for Ches Waddell. Waddell sent a regular buyer to relieve 
Pritchard, who was ordered to report to his superior. "Mr. Waddell was 
sitting on a pile of tobacco and had his head in his hands, and I thought 
he had become physically ill," Pritchard remembered. "I walked up 
and said, 'Mr. Waddell, what's wrong?' He said, 'Don't say anything to 
me right now. You've made me so sick that I just can't stand it!"' 
Pritchard mastered his trade, however, eventually buying on the 
flue-cured markets before moving on to the burley in Kentucky, then 
back to Maryland, where he had begun years before. The Lexington 
market, on which Pritchard also bought, has long been considered the 
most prestigious of all. Pritchard's responsibilities were increased when 
he was tapped to go to Thailand in an effort to straighten out internal 
problems there. He moved later to the Japanese account, on which he 
spent the remainder of his career. 
Pritchard's tenure spanned the times when tobacco buying changed 
markedly, even though the auction system itself did not. He began un-
der the old system, when a buyer left home to follow the markets had 
little more than sparse communication with the head office during the 
season. In that era, an individual farmer might grow less tobacco than 
the farmers of today but he had a greater concern for quality. In that 
time, also, tobacco was "pulled" more frequently than currently-mean-
ing the leaves were removed from the plant at different stages of matu-
rity in order to produce different kinds and qualities of tobacco. In 
addition, farmers often grew tobacco as one of many crops, whereas in 
modern times the majority of a farmer's acreage may be in tobacco. 
The farmer's emphasis now is on speed, which translates into profit, 
but this change necessitates careful buying, grading, and regrading once 
the crop is on the market. 
Because tobacco comes to the warehouse in fewer grades, the mod-
ern buyer must think in terms of what grades he is buying and also how 
they can be modified in the factory by the regraders and those on the 
blending line. The task might seem simple to an outsider, but often 
each client demands a different blend or consistency. Each buyer-and 
often as many as ten or twelve follow the same sale-must keep in mind 
what account he is buying for: domestic, Japanese, British, Australian, 
and so on. Additional pressure arises from having to buy while under 
the scrutiny of customers. More than ever before, customers from around 
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the world show up on the markets to observe their tobacco being bought 
and processed. 
Although a modern buyer faces fewer grades of tobacco and fewer 
bidders than in the old days, he still has to worry about the problem of 
"nesting"; now, however, the farmer is more often the culprit, whereas 
in the past it might have been the warehouse manager or someone work-
ing for him. The modern buyer also still has to know tobacco intimately 
and be willing to assert that knowledge in a split second, often working 
in front of an international audience that formerly would not have been 
there. 
Other changes in buyers' lives have also come about. Transporta-
tion is more rapid, and air-conditioned motel rooms now bring a wel-
come end to a day in warehouses where the temperature routinely hov-
ers above one hundred degrees. In the old days the buyer would come 
home in the evening after a sweltering day to an equally sweltering 
hotel or boardinghouse room, his only relief being an electric fan-if, 
indeed, he had brought one. 
The auction itself, however, which is the heart of the tobacco buy-
ing system in the United States, is still performed by auctioneers whose 
buyers communicate their bids, with occasional flares of temper, in 
gestures known only in this closely knit fraternity. It is an age-old sys-
tem carried on in colorful but uncomfortable warehouses in which, if it 
were not for the sounds of automobiles outside and jet aircraft over-
head, one could imagine himself a visitor to an earlier century. 
Although the market system has changed little since the 1960s, 
Universal's Leaf Purchasing department has undergone a substantial 
transformation. Initially reorganized and brought under the control of 
Humphreys, it subsequently passed to his tough-minded successor, John 
Rose, of Henderson, North Carolina. 
Rose's association with tobacco began in 1938, when he joined the 
J.P. Taylor Company in Henderson as a foreman. Following Army ser-
vice during World War II, he returned to the business and in 1970 was 
elected a vice president of Universal and was made responsible for all 
leaf purchasing and processing in the United States. During his rise, 
Rose had learned his trade from Humphreys. 
In some ways Rose was similar to Humphreys, although his deal-
ings with subordinates were not as harsh as the Kentuckian's. By some 
accounts, Rose was not interested in fine distinctions in grades of to-
bacco. He was known sometimes to buy for volume rather than quality, 
and he would brook no challenge to his decisions. W.C. "Bill" Lacy 
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remembered that for Rose there were no shades of grey: everything 
was either black or white. Also, he was known by those who worked for 
and with him as being cut from the same cloth as Humphreys. "He was 
jumpy. He was quick. [But] he was a little closer to ordinary people 
than Humphreys was," Will Tuggle remembered. 
Under Rose, Universal continued its aggressive buying; "Rose was 
a student of the dollar," as one associate remembered. Like Humphreys, 
he favored buyers who were assertive. During his tenure the company 
handled the most tobacco in the United States. At the time of his un-
timely death from a heart attack in 1978, Rose was touted as having 
contributed significantly to Universal's growth not only through ag-
gressive buying but, more important, through the concept of process-
ing centers as profit centers as well as customer service centers. Reflect-
ing the significance of his work, his position was split and given to two 
people shortly after his death. Lucius F. Cary III took over leaf process-
ing (and also the job of Philip Morris market liaison) while Lacy as-
sumed the duties as head of leaf buying. 
Lacy, who was already in the wings before Rose's death, brought a 
new theory of administration and leadership to the leaf department. A 
native of South Boston, Virginia, he had attended Davidson College 
before doing a stint in the Coast Guard. Following his discharge he 
came to Universal, where he had worked briefly as a weekly employee 
before being sent to the markets. He served as a foreman, relief buyer, 
buyer, supervisor, and district supervisor before assuming the top posi-
tion in the leaf department. 
Lacy was receptive to new ideas about how modern businesses should 
function-one of the hallmarks of the Crenshaw years-and he brought 
a refreshing openness to leaf purchasing. Soon he was supervising a 
part of the company that early on began to witness more and more 
involvement by other members of his department; formerly the top 
man had made all the decisions. Lacy admitted that often his job was to 
act as a moderator and coordinator. The autocratic hand of a 
Humphreys-or even of a Rose for that matter-was no longer at the 
helm in the leaf department. From the beginning, Lacy made it clear 
that he valued others' ideas and theories. 
First on Lacy's agenda was allowing people under him more au-
thority. J. Lee Rogers became responsible for Area A, Florida and Geor-
gia. R.F. ("Tiny") Angel took over the duties in Area B, the South Caro-
lina and Border Belt. Ralph Garrett supervised Area C, encompassing 
North Carolina and the lower part of the Middle Belt. Bill jordan was 
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in charge of Area D-the Northern Middle Belt, the traditional Old 
Belt, and Maryland. These people oversaw a total of sixty-six buyers 
who were also responsible for shipping in their areas. 
Each Friday morning a leaf meeting was held in the Richmond 
headquarters to summarize the week's activity; attendance was manda-
tory for those in charge of each area. By the conclusion of the meeting, 
each area supervisor knew how much tobacco his buyers were expected 
to acquire for each account during the following week, along with the 
prices they were to pay. As was customary, Lacy would also talk daily 
with supervisors, passing the information from these telephone con-
versations along to Towers, Crenshaw, or other account managers. By 
the early 1980s, when Universal was fully computerized, most of this 
information was available the next morning in the Richmond office. 
Also by then a formal program was put in place in the leaf depart-
ment to train young men to be managers and, perhaps, ultimately com-
pany officers. Meanwhile, in processing other changes were taking place. 
Since the 1960s, the decade that saw the introduction of the super 
plants, changes in processing have been more of degree than kind. 
Hundreds of workers have been replaced by automation, and the com-
pany has increasingly sought to provide customers with a more uni-
form product, aided by more accurate regrading and blending. In or-
der to do this though, major modifications of existing facilities and 
installation of new ones had to be carried out. 
By the 1970s and 1980s processing to exact specifications for each 
customer had become the largest segment of the company's operations, 
which in 1991 encompassed six states and twenty-three foreign coun-
tries. Although the company is worldwide, its main processing facilities 
still center in North Carolina. Great advances and major expenditures, 
however, have been made in facilities in Canada, Brazil, Italy, Zimba-
bwe, Malawi, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Mexico, and Turkey. 
After Rose's death, Lucius F. Cary III was the dominant figure in 
Universal's American leaf processing from 1978 to 1983, when his own 
career was cut short by death. One of the company's rising stars, he was 
forty-three at the time of his death. He was succeeded by Robert C. 
("Bob") Covington. 
Born in 1931, Covington was raised on a tobacco farm in Southside 
Virginia that had been owned by several generations of his family. Edu-
cated in local rural schools, and later at Richmond's Virginia Common-
wealth University, he early set his sights beyond the family farm. As a 
youth working in the tobacco fields, he had often envied the affluent 
tobacco men whose chauffeured cars regularly plied the area. "I was 
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harvesting tobacco and they were riding around, and I thought that was 
the job for me," he recalled years later. 
Following a tour of Army duty, Covington entered the tobacco busi-
ness in 1954 with the J.P. Taylor Company in South Boston and worked 
his way through various factory positions during the next few years. 
Unlike his predecessors, however, Covington had a career change when 
the company's first laboratory outside the Richmond headquarters was 
built in the South Boston plant and he was appointed manager. This 
event marked the beginning of a lifelong interest in quality control, 
one that led to a number of changes in the company's factories. 
In 1969 Covington joined forces with Skip Holt in the Richmond 
laboratory. Trading ideas with such early quality control proponents as 
Enoch Haley, factory manager at South Boston, and Robert ("Bob") 
Bostic, a Kentuckian who worked in various Virginia and North Caro-
lina factories, Covington found himself more and more interested in 
how to produce a better product. Working under John Rose, and later 
Lucius Cary, he was soon traveling the worldwide company circuit. 
Covington increasingly focused his attention on machinery and equip-
ment used in processing. By 1983, when he was put in charge of pro-
cessing, he and Frank G. Tedder had already taken steps to standardize 
quality control in both domestic and foreign factories. Quality control 
involves, among other things, constant experimentation and introduc-
tion of new technology, the hallmarks of Covington's tenure. Covington 
cites his early partnership with Tedder as instrumental in changing the 
way Universal approaches processing worldwide. Currently Covington's 
title is senior vice president and processing director. 
When Covington stepped into the newly created position of pro-
cessing director, he brought to it the same kind of openness as did Lacy 
to the leaf department. Operating on the theory that the worker whose 
voice is heard and heeded is the worker most dedicated to the com-
pany, Covington early began encouraging subordinates to be candid in 
their dealings with management and, insofar as possible, to approach 
their jobs in the ways they thought best. "If you can persuade people to 
do things on their own," he noted, "or make them willing to do things, 
you're better off," an observation he characterized as being at the cen-
ter of his management theory. 
When Lucius Cary was named head of processing, Universal began 
making strides in adapting the technology of the 1980s to the tobacco 
business. Cary combined energy with compassion and was also a per-
son who had the natural ability to elicit the best from those working 
under him. He had briefly attended the University of Richmond be-
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fore he entered Universal and started at the bottom in the factories. At 
the time of his death he had achieved the rank of executive vice presi-
dent. 
Company engineers saw in their new boss a man who was ready to 
listen. John Coleman, corporate director of engineering, remembers 
Cary as a superior who would give support to any new idea provided 
the initiator had conducted an examination of what he was proposing 
and was committed to the success of the project. This was indeed a new 
and refreshing atmosphere, far different from the days when C.H. 
Hinnant, Universal's first engineer, was told by a plant manager that 
his operation had never had an engineer, did not need an engineer, 
and never anticipated needing one! 
One of the first improvements to come from the engineering de-
partment during Cary's tenure was the Vertical Lift Separator, the fore-
runner of a new machine called the Counterflow. When Cary ordered 
the company's engineers to evaluate existing machinery in the facto-
ries, they found that the performance of these threshers needed up-
grading. Coleman modified Hinnant's original idea and came up with 
a device that could perform three separations of the tobacco in one 
machine. Following testing, the Counterflow was perfected and put into 
use. Universal has a patent on the machine, which is under license in 
five countries and marketed around the world. Over 350 of them have 
been sold, and royalties have been substantial. 
Engineering played a role in 1983 when the new Universal plant in 
Petersburg, Virginia, began operating with total computer control, all 
functions being performed with a screen and keyboard. Setting a stan-
dard for the industry, it was the prototype of similar systems now in all 
company plants. 
M. Dean Cheatham, another force in Universal's engineering de-
partment, best summed up the engineering contribution to the com-
pany in the last two or three decades. "Awareness in this company that 
engineering had a place," he noted, "was brought about by the change 
in where the profits would come from. In the old days they put their 
money into buying tobacco and putting it on the shelf and speculating 
on selling it for profit later. But stabilization came in and killed specu-
lation. Then we had to concentrate on being a service organization. 
That led to better factories, and more machinery and more mechaniza-
tion. All this caused engineering to take on more importance." 
Universal's commitment to technology is perhaps best exhibited by 
the Research and Development facility in Wilson, North Carolina, which 
was in full operation by 1990. Designed as a kind of think-tank where 
A Changing Industry 147 
ideas are generated and put into at least experimental practice, it is 
staffed by a mechanical engineer and an electronics specialist who origi-
nate techniques to aid in the production of a better product. The com-
pany also works with foreign companies on prototype technology. 
In addition to the new streamlined methods used in processing, 
Universal's tobacco in the modern age has become increasingly sub-
jected to scientific analysis. During jackson's presidency Universal had 
recognized the importance of such studies and the need to gather in-
formation about the chemical properties of tobacco and had opened a 
laboratory. Of prime importance was the moisture content in tobacco 
shipped to the English customer Gallaher. In addition, German cus-
tomers, Reemtsma for example, began requesting scientific data regard-
ing sugar, nicotine levels, and tar content in their purchases from Uni-
versal partner, K.R. Edwards Company. Also during this era, cigarettes 
were changing from the nonfilter to the filter type. As a result, changes 
in blends were needed. 
Today the Universal laboratory also has the responsibility of set-
ting standards for the size of residual stem and of measuring sand con-
tent, which has long been a problem in the tobacco business. It also 
develops methods of insect control and is studying the problem of blue 
mold, which for years has been the scourge of the tobacco business. 
(The 1980 outbreak, which devastated Cuba's crop, infested the United 
States by way of the prevailing summer winds and finally ended up 
destroying 75 million pounds of tobacco as far north as Canada. Ear-
lier, in 1962, it wiped out the entire Italian crop.) The lab augments by 
scientific study what until the late 1950s had been left to the subjective 
eye of the buyer. Although small, the laboratory in the Richmond head-
quarters provides an important function in modern Universal opera-
tions with its continual study of the properties of the leaf. 
Some people in the factories, where satellite laboratories were soon 
established, at first n~sented the activities of the lab personnel. Early 
on, when representatives of the Richmond lab arrived at some of the 
factories they often found themselves isolated, sometimes even shunned, 
and a few managers even initially refused to cooperate with them. Ulti-
mately, processing personnel and buyers generally accepted the new 
scientific methods when they realized they could augment, but not re-
place, subjective evaluations of tobacco. 
In earlier days, ending gradually during the 1950s, company factories 
were run by what Covington candidly described as "straw-boss think-
ing," a system centering on the dictum of, "You do what I say, or else." 
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That era has passed. Gone are the times when a manager could control 
his large workforce by firing half a dozen people on a whim, knowing 
that there were perhaps two dozen or more waiting at the factory door 
to take the jobs and probably perform them with fewer complaints. 
Gone also are the days when white men alone could expect favored 
treatment, or when hourly workers could not look forward to advance-
ment and therefore had little incentive to improve performance. 
In Universal's factories of the last two decades or so both the sala-
ried and the hourly employees are better educated-although many 
hourly workers still lack high school diplomas-and an attempt has been 
made to make them more knowledgeable about (and committed to) their 
workplace. For example, employees' views on such topics as methods 
for improving working conditions and increasing productivity are sought 
at all levels. Retirement benefits are offered, and a seniority system 
serves as an incentive for workers to remain. 
Of ever greater importance is the system of cross-training. Because 
tobacco factory work is seasonal, employees in the past had only annual 
layoffs to look forward to following the processing of the yearly crop. 
Under the modern system supervisory personnel (and permanent hourly 
personnel) are cross-trained so that, in addition to seasonal duties, they 
also remain employed during the off-season. 
This system was put in place when Bob Covington determined that 
multiple tasks could be done by the same factory people instead of by 
outsiders who were hired for short-term tasks. Thus, factory upgrades, 
changes in machinery, maintenance, and light construction jobs are 
performed by those who during the regular tobacco season are involved 
solely in processing. Covington's theory is that cross-training engen-
ders loyalty from workers because they can see that their needs and 
ideas are taken seriously. Many hourly employees, however, still prefer 
to work only during the processing season. Some return to seasonal 
jobs such as farming; others are women who prefer to stay at home; still 
others live during the off-season on unemployment benefits. 
For many years the company has made an effort to promote women 
and minorities into supervisory positions in domestic factories. For ex-
ample, at Tobacco Processors in Wilson, North Carolina, Kenneth 
Pittman is assistant plant superintendent. An African American with a 
bachelor's degree in business management, he works a racially mixed 
staff of roughly one hundred on each shift. He was recruited into the 
company in 1981 from his former job as a manager/buyer for a retail 
store. His goal is a company position in public relations or in sales. 
Burley tobacco-grown primarily in Kentucky and Tennessee-being offered for 
sale in a Kentucky warehouse. Buyers often work in sub-zero temperatures. 
Photo by Pamela Barefoot. 
A Thai woman stacks green 
leaves preparatory to processing. 
Stacking tobacco in a Universal facility in India at one of the smaller operations 
in the Universal family. 
I 
Tobacco stacked in the sample room in 
the company's Richmond headquar-
ters. It is from such samples that 
manufacturers' representatives 
worldwide select tobacco to ship 
around the globe. 
Tobacco prepared for human consumption, from the genus Nicotiana of the 
nightshade family Solanaceae, comes from tiny seed such as this. 
John Rose, shown here in the 1970s, 
who took charge of company leaf 
purchasing and processing following 
Humphrey's retirement, was "a student 
of the dollar" and a tough taskmaster. 
During his tenure, Universal contin-
ued to handle more leaf tobacco than 
any other dealer in the United States. 
Above, native children play with a bundle of Universal tobacco in 
Zimbabwe. Below, a native poses on his water buffalo in front of a 
small Universal buying station in the Philippine Islands. 
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A Universal 
employee stacks 
bundles of 
tobacco in the 
Philippine 
Islands. 
Joseph F. Cullman III (left), 
whose family has long been 
involved in Philip Morris and 
associated with Universal for 
some seventy years, and former 
Universal president and CEO 
Gordon Crenshaw in a North 
Carolina warehouse in the 
early 1980s. Photo by Howard 
Walker. 
Allen King became the first 
president in Universal's 
history not to rise through the 
ranks from the factories to 
the Richmond office when he 
was promoted to his current 
post in 1991. Photo by 
Maurice Duke. 
Instrumental in forming the early link 
between Universal and Philip Morris and 
also an early and forceful director of the 
China branch of the company, J. Pinckney 
Harrison was known for his air of sophis-
tication and studied use of the English · 
language. He was also Fred Harrison's 
cousin and confidant on business matters. 
Always working behind the 
scenes, Wallace Chandler was 
instrumental in reorganizing 
internal operations at the 
Richmond office. 
The Lytton processing plant in Harare, Zimbabwe; Universal operates three 
processing plants in the country. Africa is among the world's most impor-
tant sources of tobacco. 
Thomas R. Towers and Universal Hong Kong employee Y.C. Hsu atop the 
Great Wall of China in 1986. Universal executives regularly visit the 
company's worldwide facilities. 
Gretoba SA, the Greek Universal processing plant, which served as the 
stepping stone for Universal into other European countries, shown here in 
the early 1970s. 
Ready for shipment to manufacturers all over the world, hogsheads of tobacco 
are stacked six high in Universal's Henderson, North Carolina, warehouse. 
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Similarly, Alma Lucas, an African-American head picking supervisor 
in charge of from thirty-five to fifty people in the same plant, came to 
the company in 1965 expecting to be a seasonal hourly worker. At the 
K.R. Edwards partner company, Wayne Bagget started in the prizing 
room in 1978 and rose to be Edwards's first African-American plant 
supervisor, with roughly sixty workers in his charge. Glenda Davis, a 
white woman who started in 1974 in the same department as Bagget, 
worked her way through various jobs to become storage manager su-
pervising twenty-five people. Also, an ever-increasing number of white 
people are filling the ranks of the hourly employees, who in the past 
were exclusively African Americans. Workers may still punch the time-
clock at 7 A.M., but they know they will finish work on time or receive 
overtime pay. In the event there is insufficient work for the entire force, 
each person knows that he or she will receive three hours pay for ap-
pearing for work on time. In four company factories-Danville, 
Henderson, Smithfield, and Petersburg-employees have unions to rep-
resent their interests. There have, however, been no prolonged strikes 
or protracted negotiations between the unions and management. 
Another change in the new factories is the presence of specialists. 
Formerly, the factory manager was a leaf specialist first and a manager 
second, his managerial abilities often questionable. Today, in addition 
to the general manager, there is a production manager, a leaf specialist, 
a laboratory manager, and an engineer. No longer are there people 
milling about waiting for orders. Each factory is leaner and schedules 
are more closely planned. Men such as Thomas B. ("Red") Bennett, a 
former University of North Carolina basketball player and one of the 
first factory managers to hold a college degree, Frank Tedder, Agnew 
Galloway, and John ("Johnny") Moser were representatives of the new 
breed. 
A young man or woman coming into one of Universal's factories 
today can expect training in, and orientation about, the various depart-
ments. He or she can also expect to find a receptive ear for questions 
and ideas. Such an introduction to the system is quite different from 
the era when a person was hired and left largely alone to fend for him-
self on the theory that only the fittest would survive. No longer does a 
newcomer have to act as Covington did when he was sent as a young 
man to a Maryland factory. "I got there," Covington reported, and "the 
door was locked, so I got a crowbar and broke the lock off. The whole 
plant was filthy, and I found a hardware store next door and got brooms 
and cleaned it up and went to work all on my own ingenuity." 
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One area in which the company thus far is unsuccessful, however, 
is its inability to attract women who will proceed through the factory 
and buying apprenticeship. Mildred Wood, Universal's assistant trea-
surer, believes that the nature of the business itself may be at the center 
of the problem. Wood, who has given forty years of service to the com-
pany, noted the conditions on the markets. "There's a certain sacrifice 
that these men make that maybe the women haven't wanted to make," 
she observed. The conditions are "hot, dusty, hours are terrible, ... and 
at a moment's notice they might have to pick up and go overseas." But 
the question of how to attract women to the business remains unan-
swered and the problem unsolved. 
As the volume of tobacco throughout the worldwide company sys-
tem increased, tighter control was needed. John Meredith was appointed 
traffic manager in 194 7 and ultimately became traffic director. His job 
was to devise plans whereby tobacco in the Universal system in the U.S. 
would flow smoothly from the auction to the plant and then on to stor-
age or to the customer. 
Entering Universal as a bookkeeper following his graduation from 
Richmond's John Marshall High School, Meredith soon found himself 
on the markets as a "pencil and traffic" man. He became responsible 
for the tobacco as soon as the buyer had purchased it, and his primary 
task was to get it to the redrying plant. After the tobacco was redried 
and sold, he invoiced it, arranged for shipment, and executed neces-
sary paper work. Soon he was coordinating activities from the Rich-
mond office, with various traffic personnel, chief among them Swanson 
Waller, under his control. 
With the nationwide decline of the railroad system, Universal turned 
to independent truckers to carry its product. Faster and easier to load 
and unload than railroad cars, trucks had only one major drawback: 
the ease with which they could be hijacked. Tobacco was almost impos-
sible to mark or to identify-at least to the satisfaction of a court of law. 
Sometimes an independent trucker would lose two, or even three, trucks 
to thieves during a season. Although the company several times consid-
ered doing so, Universal never bought its own truck fleet because of 
the seasonal nature of the tobacco business. It was cheaper to let inde-
pendent truckers haul the leaf than for company trucks to sit idle dur-
ing the off-season. 
One innovation that occurred in transportation was the introduc-
tion of a safer and more efficient method of handling ship-bound to-
bacco. Formerly, hogsheads had been loaded into cargo holds-a costly, 
A Changing Industry 151 
unwieldy, and dangerous practice; under the new method they were 
first put into sea containers, then the whole container was hauled aboard 
ship by a crane. Because of their space-saving characteristics, these card-
board boxes of uniform sizes replaced the more cumbersome hogsheads. 
Today, Universal's traffic department is headed by M.S. ("Mac") 
Walker, who is in charge of a staff of nine. Ships' containers have been 
standardized, with identically packaged tobacco regularly departing 
from both East Coast and West Coast ports. Truck hijackings are ex-
tremely rare, owing to better markings on bulk tobacco. Transportation 
has become a major department of the company. 
As progress was made in buying, processing, and transportation, 
Universal's sales department continued to play a major role in the 
company's success. Following World War II, sales was under the lead-
ership of the senior officers. At that time (and for the most part even 
now) there was no formal training program. Buyers bought large quan-
tities of tobacco on speculation, the novice buyers learning customers' 
needs from samples. This experience was acquired in part as the vari-
ous tobaccos were brought from storage and prepared for viewing. 
In the early 1960s, American flue-cured and burley were the domi-
nant tobaccos used in cigarettes worldwide. American manufacturers 
made relatively little use of "off-shore" tobaccos, whether their prod-
ucts were manufactured for domestic or export sales. Universal's major 
domestic customer was Philip Morris. In the early days of the Philip 
Morris/Universal relationship, Pinckney Harrison had been in charge 
of the account, and he dealt directly with Wirt Hatcher, a senior officer 
at Philip Morris. In addition to their business relationship the two men 
were friends and companions at the bridge table and on hunting and 
fishing trips. 
Now one of the world's largest conglomerates, Philip Morris was in 
the early years exclusively a tobacco manufacturer with only a small 
percentage of the cigarette market. Perhaps difficult to comprehend in 
the modern day, Universal was from time to time called upon to fi-
nance Philip Morris's tobacco. In many ways, the growth of that com-
pany has influenced the growth of Universal. 
For more than a decade after World War II, Universal supplied 
more and more tobacco to Philip Morris. Operating decisions there 
were still being made by Hatcher, who worked closely with Universal's 
Pinckney Harrison. Soon George Macon, a longtime Universal em-
ployee, moved to Philip Morris and into Hatcher's position in leaf, while 
at Universal Ed Humphreys replaced Harrison. 
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Changes other than personnel were also taking place, however. 
Philip Morris acquired Benson and Hedges, primarily owned by the 
Cullman family, for whom Universal was already the supplier. With 
the acquisition the Cullmans became significant stockholders in Philip 
Morris. Joseph F. Cullman III and his first cousin Hugh became offic-
ers of Philip Morris and brought with them key people, among them 
Clifford Goldsmith and John Cookman, who ultimately rose to top 
positions. Soon Joe Cullman III, longtime friend of Pinckney Harrison 
and James Covington, became Philip Morris's chief executive officer. 
From the early 1960s until retirement, Humphreys handled the 
Philip Morris account. In his day-to-day dealings he worked closely with 
George Macon in Richmond and Joe Cullman in New York. With the 
dramatic growth of Philip Morris, and because of the importance of the 
relationship to both companies, the chief executive officer of Universal 
needed to be closely involved, to the extent of being the senior account 
executive in the business with Philip Morris. In the late 1960s Gordon 
Crenshaw assumed this role, working with the senior people at Philip 
Morris in New York-Joe Cullman, George Weissman, Ross Milhiser, 
and Hugh Cullman-and with George Macon in Richmond. The prin-
cipal person in New York with whom Crenshaw conducted business 
was Clifford Goldsmith, executive vice president in charge of leaf and 
processing, who became president of Philip Morris. The relationship 
between the chief executive officers of Universal and Philip Morris 
continues to this day. 
John Rose, who had replaced Humphreys as head of buying and 
processing, played a role in the handling of this rapidly growing busi-
ness with Philip Morris. His primary responsibility was to administer 
and execute Philip Morris's orders. During these years, Howard Cone 
was also a key man in the Philip Morris/Universal relationship, work-
ing with Hugh West, the leaf director of Philip Morris, in supervising 
the purchase of their tobacco. Cone was known and liked by virtually 
everyone in the trade. His rapport with farm leaders, warehousemen, 
and trade association officials proved to be a tremendous asset to both 
Philip Morris and Universal. 
Rose was succeeded by Lucius Cary who, in this capacity, did an 
effective job until his death, at which time he was followed by John 
Gregory on the leaf side and Bob Covington in processing. In the mean-
time, George Macon was succeeded by William Longest and subsequently 
by Witcher Dudley at Philip Morris. 
Traditionally, Universal had bought for Philip Morris virtually all 
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its U .S.-grown tobacco. With the worldwide expansion of both compa-
nies, it began supplying the lion's share of the foreign growths pur-
chased by Philip Morris as well. This arrangement continues today. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Philip Morris gradually began en-
trusting Universal not only with domestic and international buying but 
also with processing more and more of its tobaccos. Today, the major 
part of its tobacco is processed by Universal, which in addition renders 
a variety of other services. For example, the company assists and works 
on behalf of Philip Morris in relations with the government and the 
various farm groups. Total services involve many people in Universal 
in many different departments who work with their counterparts at 
Philip Morris. 
With one brief exception, the business between the two firms has 
expanded without interruption since its beginning. Following 
Congoleum's unsuccessful takeover bid for Universal, Philip Morris 
grew concerned as to what might happen if its principal supplier should 
fall under the control of people with no knowledge of tobacco and in 
whom they would have no confidence. As a consequence, Philip Morris 
began placing its own buyers on the markets and for a few years did in 
fact purchase tobacco with its own staff. The company finally deter-
mined, however, that this was not a prudent practice and discontinued 
the program, and Universal resumed its position of handling Philip 
Morris's order business in the United States. It continues to do so to-
day. Since resuming its position of Philip Morris's principal supplier 
there has been a continuing growth, not only in the volume of pur-
chases, but in processing as well. 
Other domestic cigarette companies supplied by the Universal Group 
are R.J. Reynolds, the American Tobacco Company, P. Lorillard, Brown 
and Williamson, and Ligget and Myers. Thorpe and Ricks and K.R. 
Edwards Company, Universal subsidiaries, have been suppliers to these 
same domestic companies for years. These manufacturers use both U.S. 
and off-shore flue-cured and burley tobaccos. 
Following Jim Covington's retirement, Stuart Carr handled the 
Reynolds business. He was succeeded by Stuart Christian, who in addi-
tion aided K.R. Edwards with its accounts. Some years later, James 
Starkey worked with all the domestics because of his knowledge of the 
U.S. tobacco programs gained through his prior position as U.S. deputy 
undersecretary of agriculture. In addition to the major cigarette manu-
facturers, Universal has traditionally supplied pipe and chewing tobacco 
manufacturers such as Pinkerton, Middleton, Lane, and Sutliff. 
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Although accounts at Universal are theoretically headed by one 
person, they are not the only ones involved in managing them. During 
his tenure, Humphreys was incharge of both leaf and processing. He-
and everyone working in these two departments-had to make it his 
business to know the customers and representatives from each of the 
many companies and to work closely with them. In time Bob Covington, 
Rose, Cary, and Lacy all played central roles in these activities. Cur-
rently, during the six-month growing, buying, and processing season, 
people from Universal are in constant contact with customers. During 
the off-season, contact is less frequent, but the company's sales force 
makes it a point to keep customers informed about the quality and size 
of the upcoming crop. Such interactions, part business and part social, 
let the customer know that his business interests and his personal friend-
ship are important to Universal. The company's account executives, 
who numbered roughly two-thirds more in the early 1990s than in the 
mid-1960s, continue to follow this method. 
During the 1960s and 1970s major changes occurred in the way 
tobacco was sold worldwide. In earlier times there were small compa-
nies whose clientele were primarily local. These companies consisted 
of manufacturers of all kinds of tobacco: cigarettes, cigars, snuff, pipe 
tobacco, and chewing tobacco. In order to service them Universal's sales-
men regularly made the circuits, carrying samples. 
Many smaller manufacturers were bought out by larger groups-
Anton Rupert's global holdings being a case in point-and there was a 
growing interest in American tobaccos on the part of government mo-
nopolies. Huge accounts began to evolve, lessening the need for sales-
men carrying samples. Although samples and offers remained impor-
tant, emphasis was increasingly placed on what other services the com-
pany could provide. Packaging, quality specifications, coordinated ship-
ping from different world points, and similar activities all became of 
concern. 
Because of the demand for changing services, the function of for-
eign-based Universal agents also changed. In the early decades of the 
century such agents were important as liaisons between company sales-
men and customers. Often the agent would accompany the Universal 
man as he visited customers. Because of the growing popularity of air 
travel, the consolidation of the manufacturers, and the increasingly di-
rect contact between manufacturers and suppliers at the sources, the 
services of agents grew less important. 
The company also had to achieve greater coordination in buying 
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and processing, as well as among the departments in the Richmond 
office. Sales and traffic had to work together, as did account executives 
and buyers on the markets. Sales also had to work closely with process-
ing in order to monitor the quality and uniformity of work in progress. 
Thus the whole company had to be restructured to function as a total 
(as opposed to a purely sales-oriented) organization, with purchasing, 
processing, and sales interwoven. 
Crenshaw, Towers, and Laverge were instrumental in restructur-
ing the sales department. Stuart Christian's principal responsibility was 
in domestic sales, but because of his experience in international sales 
he also had considerable responsibility in this area. James H. Abernathy 
coordinated sales for the foreign government monopolies, in addition 
to his responsibility for pool purchases. Experienced younger men, such 
as Henry Harrell, Lucius Cary, and Norton Howe, were elevated to 
positions in sales. These changes also involved a restructuring in the 
Richmond office administration. That task fell to Wallace Chandler. 
Despite the changes, the personal element remains important, be-
cause the tobacco business is a closely knit fraternity, built on relation-
ships and personal and family friendships of long standing. In addi-
tion, younger members of the sales force need to be introduced to cus-
tomers so that, when the older men step aside, younger ones can man-
age the accounts. 
As sales of non-U.S. tobacco increased, executives in Richmond 
became aware of and responsible for each customer's worldwide needs. 
Therefore, the international sales force had to have current informa-
tion about the world's tobaccos. From the 1960s, sales grew to be the 
business of many people and departments at Universal-from the ac-
count executives to the supervisors in the factories and the buyers on 
the line, men who knew on what days what customers would arrive to 
sec their tobacco bought and processed. Although some thirty or so 
company members work in sales, actually almost everyone in Universal's 
management has a hand in accommodating clients, some in direct con-
tact with the customers, others in leaf, staff services, agronomy, and 
processing. 
Universal found itself privy to information on the customers' re-
quirements and had to inaugurate a system, albeit informally, where 
each customer's account was handled confidentially. The large manu-
facturers did not wish to share the strategies they might be pursuing on 
the market, so account executives, buyers, and factory supervisors pro-
tected the integrity of each account by maintaining silence about specif-
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ics. This system was called the "Chinese wall." To be sure, information 
about the tobacco world in general was always shared. What was going 
on in an individual account, however, was known to only a few within 
the Universal hierarchy. The sales department, with rising figures such 
as Randolph ("Randy") Robins, Willem de Vries, and Edward ("Ned") 
Schaaf, still operates this way today. 
The personal relationships between salesmen and clients is typi-
fied by an event that occurred in Jordan. While on a business trip from 
the Richmond headquarters, Jim Abernathy contracted hepatitis and 
was hospitalized for almost six weeks. Knowing his condition to be seri-
ous, Abernathy's wife traveled to Jordan to be with him. Although she 
had planned to seek public lodgings, one of Abernathy's clients insisted 
she stay with his family, which she did for the duration of her visit. At 
a later time, when Abernathy was hospitalized in Richmond, the Jorda-
nian customer requested a fifty-thousand-dollar credit, which Abernathy 
readily approved from his hospital bed. The debt was repaid before it 
was due. 
With sales assuming an international flavor, some of the younger 
staff move upward into sales positions where they are given a great deal 
of autonomy in handling accounts. Each year at its international con-
ference, sales department personnel learn about developments and 
trends in the worldwide tobacco market. Frequently at these meetings 
account executives find they can give or receive aid from colleagues 
with expertise in different countries, thus allowing the company to re-
tain valued customers who otherwise may have sought tobacco outside 
the Universal network. 
The world in which the modern Universal sales executive moves is 
illustrated by an event that involved Towers while on a trip to Portugal 
with Pierre Warwick. At a formal dinner at the home of George Mello, 
a member of one of Europe's most prominent tobacco families, Mello 
turned to Warwick during a break in the conversation. There were some 
twenty guests, each with a serving maid behind the guest's chair. 
"Pierre, I understand you have been checking on my credit," Mello 
said. 
"That's right. I thought it was the prudent business thing to do," 
Warwick responded as the young Towers sat in stunned silence. 
"I don't mind," Mello said after a pause. "What did you find I was 
worth?" 
"Five hundred million dollars," Warwick responded. 
Mello thought for a second and calculatingly ended the conversa-
tion when he said, "Pierre, I wouldn't sell for that." 
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Universal has undergone a host of changes in its worldwide system 
since the mid-1960s. In the area of purchasing, changes revolved pri-
marily around the way the leaf department was organized. The old 
"one man as ruler" method disappeared, and those who worked in leaf 
gradually had more and more to say about how the department was 
run. At the same time, the department became more efficiently orga-
nized, and everyone dealing directly with tobacco knew what was going 
on in the Universal system and on the world tobacco stage. Although 
life on the markets changed little, the way tobacco was handled, as well 
as all dealings revolving around it, did. 
In processing, the period since the 1960s has been marked by enor-
mous technological advances, while parallel ones have occurred since 
then in the sales department, which became more global and more adept 
at servicing accounts. And Universal's transportation methods changed 
also in order to accommodate the expansion. In the nineteenth century, 
there was a saying that the sun never set on the British empire. At the 
end of the twentieth the same could be said of Universal Leaf Tobacco 
Company. It is the undisputed leader in its field. All company ventures 
were not so successful as those dealing with tobacco, however, as the 
following chapter will indicate. 
12 
Diversification and Litigation 
From its founding to the 1960s, Universal dealt exclusively in the pur-
chase and sale of leaf tobacco. In the middle of that decade, however, 
a report emanating from the United States surgeon general changed 
the complexion of the tobacco world. The government's 1964 report 
on the adverse effects of using tobacco products posed a much more 
serious challenge for the business than had critics of the past. For-
merly, criticism had been focused on arguments based on moralistic 
grounds. This time, however, concern centered on health, with the sur-
geon general arguing that tobacco use caused or exacerbated illnesses 
such as cancer, emphysema, and heart disease. Many tobacconists did 
not at first believe the report, but faced with a question as to what the 
future would hold, tobacco companies, particularly those in the United 
States, began to consider their options, the most logical of which were 
an expansion of markets abroad and diversification at home. 
Although diversification had been talked about in Universal's top 
offices for some time, it was clear that such a movement would have 
little or no chance of success so long as Herbert Jackson was president. 
Believing that his company should deal only in tobacco, he had already 
stated his official hostility to diversification, although several Universal 
partner companies had earlier undertaken such ventures on their own. 
"Our diversification is selling the same product to a lot of different 
peoples," Jackson had written. "There are some advantages to that too," 
he had further argued, "arising from the fact that good times and bad 
times and health scares don't hit all countries the same time or with the 
same force." Jackson also considered Universal's entry into foreign coun-
tries as examples of diversification. 
During an earlier era, Jackson's perception would have been cor-
rect, but in 1964, the picture was different. "We realized that there 
were some very, very dark clouds on the horizon confronting the to-
bacco business and that we ought to think about diversification," Tow-
ers recalled. 
The movement toward diversification was led largely by Crenshaw, 
Laverge, Towers, and Chandler and relied on earnings from tobacco. 
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Hesitant because of their lack of knowledge of other businesses, the 
men moved cautiously and agreed on certain methods. They would 
approach small, often family-owned, businesses; they would forswear 
hostile takeovers; they would seek ventures that were counter-seasonal 
to tobacco; and (as far as was possible) they would leave in place the 
established management of any company they bought. They decided 
not to become involved in businesses that would dilute the company's 
primary interest, which was tobacco. 
Because of this caution and inexperience, Universal's diversifica-
tion program got off to a slow start. Outside advisers suggested the 
purchase of two farm equipment companies, but the company declined. 
Other consultants suggested that it enter the insurance business. Again 
it declined. As Wallace Chandler observed: "the price was too high, and 
you worried about what you were getting involved in." Ultimately, 
Universal relied on the advice of Wheat First Securities, a Richmond-
based investment banking firm, but efforts at diversification remained 
largely in limbo between 1964 and 1968. 
When Crenshaw came to the presidency in 1966 he made diversifi-
cation a priority. Two years later his efforts seemed to pay off with the 
acquisition of two disparate companies. One was the Richmond-based 
Inta-Roto. The other was Overton Container Corporation of Smithfield, 
North Carolina. Inta-Roto was a machine manufacturing company com-
prised of three divisions: the machinery division, which engineered 
and built industrial machinery (principally laminators, coaters, and 
flexographic presses for use in packaging and other fields); the mill 
roll division, which manufactured engraved steel cylinders used in the 
making of designs, such as those on some automobile seat covers, leather 
products, and vinyl coverings; and the engraving division, which pro-
duced cylinders used on rotogravure presses to imprint designs and 
lettering on packing materials. Overton's primary business was supply-
ing containers to the tobacco industry. Universal's diversification pro-
gram was officially under way. 
In 1969 the company, advised by the Stanford Research Institute, 
acquired 100 percent of the assets of Magnolia Manufacturing Corpo-
ration, a South Hill, Virginia, business that specialized in modular home 
construction. From this acquisition was formed Universal's Unitized 
Systems Company (USCO), a subsidiary that would manufacture mo-
bile homes and sections for single-family homes. USCO was soon in 
production in three different plants. 
Next Universal joined with one of Richmond's best-known real es-
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tate developers and began to negotiate with E. Carlton Wilton, presi-
dent of E. Carlton Wilton Inc., until late in 1970, after which the two 
companies made an announcement of the formation of Universal-
Wilton, whose immediate goal was to construct a planned community 
in Richmond's West End. The intention of the new company was to 
build more than eight thousand housing units and additional facilities 
on twenty-three hundred acres of land at a site called Tuckahoe Vil-
lage, involving an expenditure to exceed $150 million. Prior to the an-
nouncement Universal had formed Universal Land Use Corporation, a 
subsidiary that began developing a low-cost housing project on two hun-
dred acres of land near Suffolk, Virginia, and a mobile home park in 
Currituck, North Carolina. 
Also during this time, Universal Woods, a company based in Louis-
ville, Kentucky, that manufactured a product designed to replace high-
pressure laminates such as Formica, was gathered under the company 
umbrella through the K.R. Edwards Company. Offering thirty-five dif-
ferent wood grain patterns in virtually any color, the company's prod-
ucts could be used on kitchen cabinets and on household, hospital, health 
care, and laboratory furniture. 
Perhaps the brightest prospect to appear on Universal's horizon 
during its early diversification attempts was announced in late Decem-
ber 1978 when it made public its tentative agreement to acquire Unifi, 
a fibers firm based in Greensboro, North Carolina. Disclosing an ac-
quisitions figure of $25 million, Universal reported that it planned to 
merge the company, which processed and sold synthetic fibers, into an 
undisclosed unit of Universal Leaf. At the time Unifi was the nation's 
second largest synthetic fibers firm. Merger negotiations were halted, 
however, when the two companies failed to agree on a price. 
Five years after the abortive attempt to acquire the synthetic fibers 
firm, Universal acquired the Blakely Peanut Company of Blakely, Geor-
gia. Blakely, a small satellite in the Universal sphere, bought and pro-
duced peanuts for domestic and export edible sales, oil stock sales, and 
peanut-hull pellet sales for livestock feed and fuel. The company also 
processed and sold seed peanuts to the retail and wholesale trade. Gross 
sales were in excess of $30 million for the year preceding the acquisi-
tion. Despite the work put into these ventures, Universal's early attempts 
at diversification were largely unsuccessful. 
After almost a decade of struggling with Inta-Roto, in particular 
trying unsuccessfully to trim its managerial staff, Universal's leaders 
realized that they could not make the business profitable. Late in De-
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cember 1977 they sold it to the people who were managing it. The 
modular home venture (USCO) failed because of a national recession 
in the home building industry. Universal was unable to rent or sell the 
units it had constructed and was forced to withdraw from the business. 
The relationship with the E. Carlton Wilton company proved most 
successful, but, because it involved the use of land in the Richmond 
area only, its life was limited. Universal-Wilton, operating on a fifty-
fifty partnership, bought land, obtained zoning permits, constructed 
external utilities and major roads, then sold the parcels to developers. 
The group also constructed and retained ownership in apartments and 
commercial properties that were subsequently sold. 
At its height, Universal-Wilton was able to accumulate large tracts 
of land-as much as thirty-five hundred acres-in one of the most desir-
able areas of metropolitan Richmond. As planned, most of the sales 
were made to E. Carlton Wilton, Inc.; however, as the area became more 
established and real estate values increased, the company began selling 
to other developers. By 1987 the project was complete and the relation-
ship was terminated. 
The first attempt at diversification on a major scale occurred in 
1980 when Universal acquired the Royster Company, headquartered 
in Norfolk, Virginia. Royster was a manufacturer and marketer of phos-
phate fertilizer materials, mixed fertilizers, and micronutrients. The 
company also stored fertilizer materials at deep water and inland termi-
nals and sold crop-protection chemicals, seeds, and grain. Organized in 
1885 by Sheppard Royster, the company was privately owned untill97 5 
when the first public offering of stock was made. Still under the control 
of the Royster and the Burroughs families, who held the major portion 
of the stock at the time of the merger, Royster was a financially healthy 
company that operated in a manner similar to Universal: it was a sea-
sonal agricultural business located in the Southeast; it had its business 
roots firmly planted in three-quarters of a century of experience; the 
executive and managerial staff was composed of personnel who had 
. begun at the bottom of the company ladder; and it was conservative in 
its approach to business. When it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Universal in 1980 it reported earnings for the previous year of $2.9 
million on sales of $227.8 million. Indications were that the acquisi-
tion would be a mutually satisfactory and profitable one for both com-
pames. 
Such, however, was not the case. By 1984 Royster had been sold to 
Superfos, a Danish company that had a large international fertilizer 
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operation and wanted to expand its position in the United States. An 
acquisition that had been announced in the 1980 annual report on such 
a promising note, with four pages of color photographs, a prose de-
scription, and pertinent statistics, quietly disappeared from the Univer-
sal family. 
Seen objectively, the failure of Royster was more a matter of cir-
cumstance than an error in judgment. There was no way to foresee that 
Universal was entering the fertilizer business just as that business (and 
American agriculture in general) was on the verge of one of its most 
severe depressions in its history. Through reorganization and improve-
ment in efficiency, Universal was able to achieve a satisfactory level of 
performance relative to other fertilizer companies; nevertheless, return 
on investment was not acceptable. Although Universal made no formal 
attempt to dispose of Royster, when it was approached with a suitable 
offer, it made the decision to divest. Royster went to the Danish firm 
for $ll5 million. Universal had paid $109 million for it four years 
earlier. 
In November of 1984 Universal purchased all outstanding shares 
of capital stock of Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation and Continen-
tal Land Title Company for a cash payment of approximately $ll5 
million. Founded sixty years before in Richmond, Lawyers Title em-
ployed just over three thousand people at the time of Universal's acqui-
sition and accounted for approximately 13 percent of title insurance 
underwriting in the United States. Shortly after this acquisition Conti-
nental Land Title Company became a subsidiary of Lawyers Title, fol-
lowed by the consolidation of several of the two companies' offices. An 
important part of Lawyers Title was its National Division, comprised of 
fourteen offices established in major metropolitan areas around the 
country. 
Almost immediately, Universal's insurance operations generated 
profits, and in 1987 they achieved the largest annual revenues in their 
sixty-year history, contributing over 50 percent to Universal's bottom 
line. Adding to this growth were high levels of commercial and indus-
trial activity, increased use of title insurance in residential transactions, 
a surge of residential refinancings, and the increased use of credit eq-
uity lines following passage of a new federal tax law. 
Lawyers Title's National Division also made immediate strides fol-
lowing its acquisition by Universal. Several major transactions set the 
course for its increased performance. Macy's leveraged buy-out of three 
shopping centers and eighty-eight department stores contributed to the 
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National Division's growth. At the end of 1986, with a network of more 
than thirty-seven hundred agency, branch, and subsidiary offices; more 
than twenty-six thousand approved attorneys; and offices in the nation's 
metropolitan centers, Lawyers Title was in a strong position. After al-
most twenty years of trial and error it seemed as if diversification were 
finally beginning to work. However, the tide turned abruptly in the late 
1980s when Lawyers Title began to lose large sums. In June 1991 the 
board of directors authorized management to proceed with a plan to 
separate Lawyers Title from Universal Corporation and to distribute 
all the outstanding shares of a newly organized holding company for 
Lawyers Title to shareholders in a tax-free spin-off on the basis of one 
share for each four shares of Universal's common stock. 
Capitalizing on negotiations begun years before by Jan Laverge, a 
far more successful step in diversification took place in Aprill986 when 
Universal acquired NV Deli-Maatschappij, which had operations in to-
bacco and also in commodity trading. A Dutch company originally en-
gaged only in the leaf tobacco business, Deli had in recent years diver-
sified into international commodities trading. At the time Universal 
acquired the company it was dealing in coffee, tea, rubber, vegetable 
oils, sun-flower seeds, and timber. Regarding the tobacco aspect of Deli's 
operations, the acquisition allowed Universal to gain a larger position 
in the flue-cured and burley markets of Brazil, Italy, and Greece and 
also to extend its current dark tobacco operations into several interna-
tional markets. 
The success of the diversification program was reflected in the an-
nual report of 1987. Despite the fact that Brazil had just experienced 
its worst tobacco crop on record and that the company's U.S. tobacco 
operations were below those of the preceding year, Universal still re-
corded improved results. Net income for the year rose from $4 7,106,000 
to $55,973,000. On a per-share basis, earnings rose 51 cents to $3.25. 
Gross revenues of $2.1 billion showed a sharp increase over the previ-
ous year's $1.4 billion. The gains could be traced directly to the success 
of the new acquisitions of Deli-Maatschappij and more importantly of 
the title insurance business. 
Had it not been for changing attitudes toward tobacco, Universal 
would probably never have seriously considered diversification. But by 
the late 1980s and early 1990s it was steadily becoming more than a leaf 
tobacco dealer. Company officials saw what Thomas Towers had said 
years earlier when the surgeon general's initial report on tobacco had 
been issued: there were "dark clouds on the horizon" for tobacco, and 
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diversification seemed the next logical step. Still, however, Universal's 
attitude was that it would not dilute its tobacco interest in its diversifica-
tion efforts. Tobacco was still to be the company's chief interest. 
Probably nowhere else in the modern corporate world are there 
people who transact business as do tobacconists, as has been alluded to 
many times throughout this book. While the world's international su-
per powers operate on the theory of "trust but verify," the world to-
bacco companies continue to operate essentially on trust alone. "We 
have a few contracts in our business," says Gordon Crenshaw, "as it 
relates to sales, but [they are] invariably with governments. The bulk 
of our business is still done on a man's word or a very inf ormalletter." 
How the tobacco business came to be one in which million-dollar 
transactions are confirmed with a handshake, a cursory note, or the 
annotation on the back of a matchbook or napkin, no one seems to 
know. Some in the business argue that the degree of trust has its roots 
in an idealistic code of ethics originating perhaps in Renaissance En-
gland where-according to custom-a man's word was his bond. Oth-
ers, Will Tuggle for example, approach the phenomenon more prag-
matically: "you can't describe tobacco," he notes. "This sample looks 
like this and you say 'It doesn't look like that to me'-subjective. I think 
this honor thing grew up because there was no other protection. I think 
it was very pragmatic rather than idealistic. There's no way that you 
can define or describe tobacco within the limits that are necessary for a 
contract." 
So respected is the code of mutual trust in the tobacco business that 
it has even affected some governments. Towers, who was in charge of 
Universal's Portuguese business at the time of that country's revolu-
tion, successfully convinced the Marxist-oriented board that had taken 
over the Mello family's Tabaqueira Company that unless the board paid 
the company's past bills its tobacco credit would suffer worldwide dam-
age. Over the six months following that meeting, the board paid the 
family's outstanding debt of $1 million. 
On another occasion, this one closer to home, one of Universal's 
people accidentally overcharged a customer $3 million. The person at 
Universal subsequently caught the error and called the customer with 
an offer to rectify it any way he wanted. The Universal man made 
several proposals, ending with, "or I can make a counterbalancing mis-
take over the next couple of weeks and wipe it all out and you'll never 
know the difference." 
"Why don't you do that," came the reply. 
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With attitudes such as these, it is understandable that tobacco com-
panies have traditionally retained only small legal departments. At 
Universal, where orders are verbal rather than written, there is little 
need for a large legal staff. "Ours is not a business run by lawyers and 
accountants," one senior Universal staff member once proudly confided. 
Nevertheless, all tobacco business cannot be conducted solely inside the 
world of tobacco, and like all corporations, Universal has had its days 
in court. 
Universal's first major encounter with the legal system took place 
on the eve of World War II in Lexington, Kentucky. The Lexington 
case began in 1940 and ended in the Supreme Court six years later. It 
centered on the charge that numerous domestic tobacco companies, 
including Universal, were in collusion to fix prices. Although only tech-
nically involved, the company became implicated because it was the 
buyer for both Philip Morris and Export Leaf of Kentucky. 
The Lexington case had its origins in governmental probes into the 
tobacco industry, which had begun as far back as the 1920s. With the 
implementation of the New Deal, Department of Justice investigators 
took a heightened interest in monitoring the nation's businesses. Fol-
lowing a lengthy investigation, Justice charged the tobacco companies 
with violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. This set the stage for a ourt 
battle. 
Held in an area long unhappy about tobacco prices, the trial dragged 
on through the summer of 1942. Centering their arguments on cir-
cumstantial evidence suggesting collusion between the tobacco compa-
nies, Justice Department attorneys had a sympathetic ear in a jury whose 
members were all in some way involved in tobacco. When the jury 
heard that the president of American Tobacco Company had a per-
sonal income of near three-quarters of a million dollars-and this dur-
ing the Great Depression-it was in no mood for legal niceties. The 
jury brought in a guilty verdict in October. Subsequently a circuit court 
upheld the district court, as did the Supreme Court in 1946. The story 
was reported in the Richmond papers, and the press played upon the 
local angle and mentioned Universal, who successfully entered a plea 
of "no contest." 
Although the company was not listed as a principal and was not 
fined, the litigation and public attention stung Universal's president 
Jackson for two reasons. He was personally an ethical man, and he 
headed a worldwide enterprise known for its honorable dealings. He 
thought that both his and his company's integrity had been impugned. 
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To make matters worse, Universal had to endure public censure as 
though it had been mentioned as a principal in the suit. Privately, how-
ever,Jackson could take some solace in the fact that it had not been. "I 
don't think we ever thought we belonged in the case," Laverge later 
noted, "because we were not principals. We were commissioned agents. 
We do what we're told by our customers to do .... We were simply told 
what to do. I think it was a very strong feeling at the time that we were 
involved in an unfair way." 
Following the Lexington case, Universal found itself embroiled in 
international legal difficulties when in 1958 it was indicted by the fed-
eral government for violating the Trading with the Enemy Act. This 
was an act instituted to prohibit trade with any country deemed by the 
government to be a real or oblique enemy of the country. 
After China was closed to Western interests in 1949, businesses that 
represented mainland China but still dealt with the West were based in 
Hong Kong. Under the direction of Cliff Sutherland, Universal con-
tinued to do business with Nanyang Brothers, formerly of Shanghai, 
which had long been a Universal customer. No one at Universal gave 
the matter much thought when a shipment of tobacco delivered to 
Nanyang in Hong Kong ended up in Red China; however, a govern-
ment agent discovered what had happened and began an investigation, 
following a paper trail that ultimately led back to Richmond. Techni-
cally, Universal was guilty, however unintentionally, of dealing with 
an enemy regime, as stated in the charges lodged against it by the gov-
ernment. 
Wishing to avoid adverse publicity in Richmond, Jackson answered 
the complaint in a federal court in Norfolk, one hundred miles away. 
Perhaps the company could have fought the charge, but, as Wallace 
Chandler pointed out, "It would have cost so much." He also noted that 
"it was a flat fact that the tobacco did move from the company in Hong 
Kong to Red China, and it was purely a question of did we know that it 
was going to happen. In fact, it did happen; so how do you refute it?" 
Universal was found guilty, with the brunt of responsibility for the sale 
falling on Sutherland's shoulders because he was the Chinese connec-
tion. 
The case was concluded when Universal agreed to plead "no con-
test" and pay a fifty-thousand-dollar fine. The matter, however, was 
not closed so far as Jackson was concerned. He was so angered over 
what had happened that twenty-five years later Will Tuggle recalled 
with vivid detail what took place. "I remember Mr. Jackson called [in] 
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all the officers and maybe managers, I'm not sure. One of the officers 
was late to the meeting and got one of the worst dressing downs I ever 
heard, which indicated Mr. Jackson's tension, how strongly he felt about 
this thing. And Mr. Jackson was angry, and very forceful and there was 
absolutely no question that he meant nothing like this was ever going to 
happen again. And that nobody was playing a game with this sort of 
thing." 
John Meredith, the company's traffic manager, who was also present 
at the meeting, recalls the event this way: Mr. Jackson "had a check for 
fifty thousand dollars in his hand. He said, 'This fifty thousand dollars 
is going to be a lesson to all of you. I'm turning it over to the United 
States government, and I hope I never have to turn another one.' I'll 
never forget it if live to be a million," Meredith concluded. "You could 
hear a pin drop in that place." 
The next legal problem for the company also began in 1958 when 
Pierre Warwick became embroiled with the Internal Revenue Service 
over whether he could have his wife accompany him on business trips 
abroad and declare her expenses as tax deductible. The contested taxes 
were collected from the Warwicks in 1958 and 1959. Warwick had 
taken the position that because of the close interpersonal relationships 
between agent and client in the tobacco business, his wife was central to 
his business success. Whether or not the case might have been decided 
differently had the IRS initiated the litigation is impossible to say. How-
ever, it was Warwick who sought the ruling, and the case ended up in 
the U.S. district court in Richmond. The verdict was rendered in 1964. 
Victories in cases of this kind had formerly been won on the basis 
that the wife was as knowledgeable about a product as was her husband 
and consequently the two of them functioned as a team. In this in-
stance, however, Warwick, with the blessing of Jackson, took a differ-
ent tack. It was Warwick's contention that his wife's contribution had 
nothing to do with her knowledge of tobacco. They argued that she 
was, as Jackson asserted on the witness stand, a "social lubricant," a 
spouse who-through personal interest in her husband's clients and their 
wives-facilitated the sale of tobacco. 
The initial verdict was returned against Warwick, but with the aid 
of Chandler and others he eventually won on appeal when the district 
court concluded that Sarah Warwick's trips were indeed related to her 
husband's work: "they were neither pleasure nor vacation trips in any 
sense of the words." It was a precedent-setting decision, invoked to the 
present-day as a textbook case. 
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Another case with important implications for the tobacco business 
at large centered on an antitrust suit that began in 197 4. Involving the 
tobacco markets of the two Carolinas and Kentucky, it carne about when 
farmers filed a class-action suit charging that the dealers and manufac-
turers were engaged in price fixing. In this case, Universal joined other 
dealers and manufacturers to present a joint defense. 
The key suit was filed in South Carolina; the judge in Kentucky 
waited for the announcement of the South Carolina verdict before he 
entered the case. John Peters, an antitrust expert with the Richmond 
firm of Williams, Mullen, and Christian, represented Universal's inter-
est. Legal action was halted, however, when the judge dismissed the 
case without a trial after rendering a decision that there was no class 
action. The case, Wallace Chandler later noted, "could have created 
havoc within the industry if [it] had gone the other way, but we felt very 
comfortable. We felt very confident that we had done nothing wrong, 
that the system that we had was a system set up by the government, and 
we were simply doing what the government said do. And we said that 
over and over. There was really no collusion whatever anywhere. We 
did everything we were supposed to do, exactly the way we were sup-
posed to do it." 
Of all the legal problems that Universal confronted over the years, 
however, none took so high a toll, both financially and emotionally, as 
did a major takeover attempt instituted against it. A mild precursor had 
occurred in the late 1960s shortly after Crenshaw succeeded Jackson. 
Short and abortive though it was, it paved the way for a much more 
serious and further reaching takeover attempt a decade later. 
In 1966 the New York company of Sun Chemical, whose major 
product was printing ink, took an interest in Universal. By chance, a 
broker who knew a member of the Sun organization was also acquainted 
with Pierre Warwick and approached him with the idea of a merger 
between the companies. Strategies have now been developed on how to 
fend off unwanted suitors in proposed merger situations, but at that 
time business executives were unacquainted with the importance of not 
dealing directly-at least in the early stages of the often-acrimonious 
negotiations-with those who sought unsolicited mergers. 
The head man at Sun Chemical carne to Richmond to discuss the 
situation and, following a weekend meeting of Universal's board and a 
dinner at the Commonwealth Club, Crenshaw rebuffed the merger idea. 
Sun backed off and, following an unaccepted invitation of key Univer-
sal executives to visit Sun's New York headquarters, the proposal was 
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dropped; but not, however, without Warwick taking some criticism for 
having let the matter progress as far as it did. 
Although allowing Sun Chemical's people to get a wedge in 
Universal's corporate door may have been unwise, it produced one 
positive effect: the company was better prepared when in 1976 it faced 
its greatest challenge yet in the form of a vicious battle waged by the 
Milwaukee-based Congoleum Corporation, makers of floor coverings. 
On Friday afternoon, October 7, 1976, secretary Esther Garrett, 
who served Universal for more than fifty years, put through a tele-
phone call to Gordon Crenshaw from the chief executive officer of 
Congoleum, whose board had met and decided to initiate a takeover 
bid for Universal. The caller, William D. Kyle Jr., announced that he 
was coming to Richmond that weekend to meet with Crenshaw, who 
spurned the overture. 
While Kyle waited at Richmond's John Marshall Hotel, trying to 
make contact with Crenshaw, Universal's board was devising its defen-
sive strategy. Soon, the company was served with the papers from 
Congoleum's lawyers making a definite offer, which under law the board 
had to act upon and also give reasons for its actions. James C. Wheat Jr. 
of Wheat First Securities, and Morgan Stanley, a New York company, 
provided a letter indicating that Congoleum's offer was too low. Mean-
while, Universal had hired a nationally known legal expert on take-
overs, Martin Lipton of New York City, but not before it learned that 
the other most famous lawyer in the field, Joseph Flom, was on 
Congoleum's team. Both men were members of firms that specialized 
in takeover cases and made their services available to clients on an 
around-the-clock basis seven days a week. The offer, which sought to 
merge Universal into Congoleum, amounted to approximately $153 
million. Universal responded by characterizing Congoleum's offer as 
"totally unacceptable." Citing a long record of uninterrupted growth, it 
further added that the company would not "flourish as part of a con-
glomerate such as Congoleum." 
On October 27, Congoleum announced it had filed statements with 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Common-
wealth of Virginia and that it would tender an offer directly to 
Universal's stockholders. Universal countered by setting up a roadblock 
by filing a request for a hearing before the Virginia State Corporation 
Commission. The company had bought time, just as it did three weeks 
later when it filed a suit, this time out of state. 
Registering its complaint on November 24 in district court in Chi-
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cago, Universal targeted the First National Bank of Chicago, which was 
reportedly heading a group of banks that had agreed to finance 
Congoleum's takeover bid. The suit alleged that Congoleum did not 
have a firm financial agreement from the bank group when it announced 
its proposed tender offer to purchase Universal. Universal further 
claimed that First National's action would violate the National Banking 
Act by making an equity investment for its own account in another 
company. As in the previous federal suit, Universal asked for at least 
$50 million in damages. 
Appearing before the Virginia State Corporation Commission on 
January 3, 1977, Kyle gave testimony that showed his hand not only to 
Universal but to the public as well. He hinted that he would most likely 
be prepared to up the ante to Universal stockholders when the time was 
appropriate. Kyle spent almost an entire day on the witness stand, testi-
fying that, among other things, he might be able to sweeten the deal 
because he had been able to increase Congoleum's financial base through 
the Canadian negotiations. With the extra money, the offer of $32.50 
per share for any of Universal's stock could be raised to $35. 
Crenshaw's report to stockholders following a January 21 special 
meeting was one he took great satisfaction in sending. He announced 
that almost 90 percent of the stockholders had been present or repre-
sented and that 96.5 percent had voted to amend company articles to 
require 80 percent of the shareholders to approve certain mergers, con-
solidations, and other business transactions. The remainder of the state-
ment expressed thanks for the stockholders' support. The company had 
won a significant legal and psychological battle. 
On January 25, Universal was once again back in court, this time at 
its own instigation. During a twelve-hour hearing in Richmond's dis-
trict court, it formally asked the judge for a preliminary injunction to 
derail Congoleum's takeover bid. 
Even before all the arguments were heard in the district court, 
Universal filed another motion with the State Corporation Commission 
requesting that the six-bank consortium that agreed to finance the take-
over be required to submit information statements. The banks, the 
motion argued, would be the prime beneficiaries of a successful take-
over because they were charging Congoleum a high interest rate and 
stood to obtain some of Universal's banking business as well. 
On February 8, the Richmond district court ruled against Univer-
sal, but the company again took the offensive when it appealed the 
decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The company had a 
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taste of the victory that was to come when, on May 19, that court or-
dered the district court judge to reconsider his denial of the prelimi-
nary injunction. The appeals court directed him specifically to proceed 
with the assumption that, unless restrained, Congoleum "will make a 
tender offer which probably will result in its acquisition or control of 
Universal." Included in the opinion was an order to seek an interpre-
tive ruling from the Federal Reserve Board as to whether a credit agree-
ment between Congoleum and the banks was in compliance with fed-
eral regulations. Clearly, more litigation was yet to follow. 
During the litigation, Congoleum had learned a great deal about 
the tobacco business, but the knowledge had come too late to be of use. 
Universal had warned the company that if the takeover were success-
ful, Universal's top officers would walk out and take the business with 
them. They had even made an offer to put Congoleum people in con-
tact with major Universal customers abroad. When Congoleum finally 
took the advice, the company's agents returned from Europe with con-
firmation of what Universal officers had predicted: foreign customers 
would withdraw their business from Universal if it became part of a 
nontobacco conglomerate. 
Universal finally had its day when officers were summoned to a 
hastily called meeting with key Congoleum people. The meeting was 
scheduled to take place in New York City and involve the two opposing 
attorneys; however, representatives of both litigating parties were asked 
to be on hand. Although no settlement was reached, Universal's people 
judged that they held the winning hand. The sweetness of victory was 
near, except for the bitter pill Universal had to swallow in the form of 
paying some of Congoleum's legal expenses. 
On June 9, Crenshaw sent stockholders a letter that began with a 
victorious statement, but the concluding paragraph brought the sting. 
In it Crenshaw said the company was covering Congoleum's legal ex-
penses to the tune of $1.2 million. "In retrospect, it was a bargain," 
Crenshaw recalled, but years after the settlement many at Universal 
harbored feelings of anger for having to give money away to the would-
be raider. In Universal's offices and halls the feeling at the time was 
one of righteous indignation, tempered, however, by a sense of relief. 
Ironically, the takeover bid had one positive side effect. Company 
stock was selling for less than $25 a share before Congoleum announced 
that it was prepared to up the ante to $32.50. When news of the offer 
was made public and it seemed that Congoleum had the wherewithal to 
achieve victory, the price immediately jumped to the point that the 
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company's shares actually began trading above what Congoleum pro-
posed in its offer. 
That Universal was able to defeat the Congoleum takeover was at-
tributable primarily to the fact that it set up roadblocks that for more 
than eight months frustrated Congoleum's efforts to make a public ten-
der offer. Chandler expressed it succinctly when he said, "We fought 
like cats and dogs." 
The frustrating ordeal had both its positive and negative effects on 
the company. There are, for example, those at Universal who contend 
that the crisis brought not only the entire staff, but particularly top 
management, closer together. The observation has been made that an 
already close team closed ranks even further because they realized that 
to win they had to be of like mind. Such closeness, though, had its 
negative side; some perceived that, for whatever reason, management 
had become less approachable than in pre-Congoleum days. On the 
positive side, several middle-level managers suddenly found themselves 
exercising greater authority within the company, simply because those 
at the top did not have, at least temporarily, sufficient time for the 
business of tobacco. 
The overall effect of the Congoleum matter, trying though it was, 
was basically good for the company. The loss of the $1.2 million aside, 
the lesson learned was that the business climate of the 1970s was radi-
cally different from that of previous eras. 
Finally, one additional point. Both government and public senti-
ment regarding tobacco have changed markedly in the recent years. 
Companies that for decades could count on tobacco as their sole asset 
no longer enjoy that luxury. Diversification is now seen as the most 
practical and pragmatic way to continue business, and, had Universal's 
top people known or recognized this at the time, the Congoleum crisis 
may not have arisen. One of the things that made Universal look so 
attractive as a takeover target in the 1970s was that it had an abundance 
of surplus cash on hand. Congoleum reasoned correctly that, if it were 
both careful and methodical, it would be able to use Universal's own 
nest egg to complete a transaction that it could not complete on its own. 
Mter the end of the Congoleum affair, Universal actively used its money 
to diversify, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Congoleum doubtless 
taught Universal about changes that were taking place in the corporate 
world, so that when the company began its own forays into other, and 
disparate, kinds of ventures it could rely on a backlog of bitterly won 
experience. Universal was no longer, as Chandler once described it, 
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"another good old Virginia gentleman company." The takeover attempt 
took it outside the world of tobacco and into a business climate it had 
not formerly known. In this new climate deals were done 
confrontationally rather than with a handshake. 
Epilogue 
The most recent major change to take place at Universal centers on the 
appointment of Henry H. Harrell as the company's president in 1987. 
A native Richmonder, Harrell graduated from the city's St. Christopher's 
school and later from Washington and Lee University, where he was a 
Phi Beta Kappa English major. He joined Universal in 1966 and, as all 
newcomers, was sent off to the factories. His introduction to the com-
pany was through a lifelong friendship with Jan La verge, who at first 
had serious reservations about the young man's ability to fit into the 
tobacco world. 
When Harrell was job hunting following his discharge from ser-
vice as a U.S. naval officer, he had several offers, all of which were 
more immediately lucrative than the one extended by Laverge. He 
settled, however, on Universal. When Laverge questioned him regard-
ing his decision, Harrell said, "Mr. Laverge, if I didn't think I could be 
president of this company within fifteen years, I wouldn't think of tak-
ing the job." 
Five years after his appointment he was already in sales and operat-
ing on the international level. He became an assistant vice president in 
1972, vice president in 1974, senior vice president in 1980, and presi-
dent in 1987. Follo~ing Crenshaw's retirement in October 1988, Harrell 
became chief executive officer. Like Crenshaw before him, Harrell is a 
consensus manager, but he has pushed Universal Corporation ahead 
on several fronts, as his closest colleague Allen King noted. His tenure 
thus far has been "primarily a continuation," King observed. "But we 
have expanded the tobacco business considerably through acquisitions, 
and we have reviewed our diversification strategy, one important result 
being the spin-off of our title insurance company." Introspective and 
unassuming, Harrell is an avid golfer, flower gardener, wine collector, 
and fisherman. 
Henry Harrell's chief strength before assuming the company's top 
post lay in his abilities with foreign operations. While in the Navy he 
had served in the Mediterranean and prior to that had been a student 
of Victorian literature and culture at the University of London, and 
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had thus had a good look at life outside the United States. When he 
entered sales, he at first worked with the Japanese account, but soon 
was responsible for coordinating all aspects of Universal's foreign in-
terests, a job at which he was most successful. Like so many others in 
the company, his primary concern is with tobacco, but in his position as 
head man, he also is of necessity centrally involved with non-tobacco 
interests as well. 
Another significant event in recent Universal history occurred at 
the October 1987 annual stockholders' meeting, at which time com-
pany officers asked formal approval of the creation of a holding com-
pany that would bear the name Universal Corporation, thus moving 
the name Universal Leaf Tobacco Company, which had defined the 
business since its inception, into a lesser position. Management and the 
board believed that it was in the company's interest to create a corpo-
rate structure that would result in a clearer delineation, separation, and 
understanding of the different businesses in which it was involved. Over 
the years it had diversified through acquisition and expansion both 
geographically and by product line. Despite the company's new name, 
tobacco remains the primary concern. Harrell has made a concerted 
and successful effort to increase its sales worldwide. In addition to its 
tobacco interests, the company trades in products such as rubber, cof-
fee, tea, and sunflower seeds from the countries of origin to various 
customers in the consuming industries throughout the world. It also is 
involved in lumber distribution in Holland, Belgium, and Germany. 
Diversification has come in response to a changing world and changing 
attitudes, particularly in the United States, toward the one product on 
which Universal has from its inception depended. 
Opposition to the use of tobacco has never been so strong world-
wide, particularly in the developed countries, as it has since the epoch-
making surgeon general's report of 1964 followed by a more recent 
surgeon general's highly publicized effort to make American society 
smoke-free by the year 2000. Despite increased taxation and mounting 
health concerns, however, the demand for tobacco is still strong. Far 
from leveling off, it rises annually on a worldwide basis. As late as the 
summer of 1990, for example, with public use of tobacco being banned 
in locale after locale, even reaching into the tobacco capitals of Virginia 
and North Carolina, Universal had more orders than ever. Before the 
harvest began, company officials had worried that supply might fall 
below demand. And this in a season when the crop looked exception-
ally good. 
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The increasing importance of American blend cigarettes in world 
markets and the major manufacturers' commitment to leaf from the 
United States has led to this demand and to obviously larger domestic 
crops as the decade of the 1990s begins. Export sales of cigarettes from 
American manufacturers, for example, rose an astonishing 64 percent 
from 1987 to 1990, while marketing of flue-cured tobacco was up to 
almost 800 million pounds, an increase of more than 16 percent over 
the volume sold in 1987. At the same time, burley tobacco was up al-
most 9 percent over the 1987 crop. 
Net income for the last year of Crenshaw's leadership was almost 
$61 million, up $5 million from the previous year. The company also 
saw a 9 percent increase in earnings on a per share basis, and gross 
revenues of nearly $2,500,000,000. When Crenshaw assumed the top 
post in 1966, gross revenues were $329,952,000. 
Nor were there signs of anything other than continued growth, as 
the first annual report issued by Harrell the following year indicated. 
With worldwide tobacco consumption on the rise, particularly in the 
form of cigarettes for developing countries, many manufacturers were 
turning more and more to independent leaf dealers such as Universal 
to fill their needs.Thus the company showed a 30 percent increase in 
processing volume between 1988 and 1989. 
The company's international operations also handled an increased 
volume of tobacco, and Universal entered into partnership with a Turk-
ish company for the purpose of exportingTurkish Oriental tobaccos. A 
modern processing plant constructed in Turkey is now in operation. 
Other vital interests continue to grow in Africa, Asia, South America, 
Europe, and the Far East; the company's involvement in tobacco world-
wide is still growing. 
Alone in its decline in the Universal family was LawyersTitle In-
surance, whose fifteen nationwide offices reported a sharp decline in 
the late 1980s, primarily because of a softening in the national real 
estate market and an increase in claims. Universal has spun off Law-
yers Title into an independent company, giving Universal sharehold-
ers one share in Lawyers Title for each four owned in the parent com-
pany. 
One of the major goals of the emerging Harrell years has been to 
make Universal a smoothly running international organization. In the 
summer of 1991 a territorial management system was implemented. 
For example, in the Far East one man was formerly in charge of the 
Philippines, another in charge of Thailand, and a third in charge of 
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Korea, while a London office was looking after India and still another 
office overseeing China. That system was recently replaced; now one 
man is responsible for each region, and each man reports to Allen King. 
Perhaps indicative of things to come at Universal, King is the first 
person to reach the top ranks of the company without first having served 
an apprenticeship on the auction floors and in the factories. He started 
in the accounting department in 1969 and worked his way through the 
business end of the company until in the mid-1970s. Crenshaw made 
him an offer that led to his entering line management. King was edu-
cated at Richmond's Thomas Jefferson High School and the city's Vir-
ginia Commonwealth University. He and Harrell work as the company's 
top team. 
The African operation is a good example of the way the interna-
tional part of the company does business. In the past the company had 
separate organizations in Zimbabwe and Malawi, while Tanzania was 
run from a distant United Kingdom office. One man, who lives in 
Malawi, now coordinates them all. Similarly, France, Spain, Italy, Greece, 
and Turkey are headed by one person. South America has also been 
reorganized along similar lines. As Harrell expressed it, "We now have 
a series of head men rather than offices. It's all based on the individual." 
Each of these individuals functions as a member of a board that advises 
King and Harrell. 
Other current concerns at the company center on tobacco expan-
sion as well as diversification. During Harrell's brief tenure, Universal 
has acquired Thorpe-Greenville, a leaf dealer based in Rocky Mount, 
North Carolina, the German-based trading company Gebrueder 
Kulenkampff, and a major competitor, Casalee, with extensive world-
wide activities. A significant acquisition took place in the late summer 
of 1993 when Universal acquired controlling stock in Nyidofer To-
bacco Processing Company. Hungary's leading processor, Nyidofer has 
some four hundred employees and contracts with approximately ten 
thousand Hungarian producers. It is Harrell's conviction that growth 
in tobacco plus prudent and manageable diversification is the way of 
the future for Universal Corporation. 
For western tobacco interests, probably one of the most significant 
recent worldwide events has been the collapse of communism and the 
opening of former Iron Curtain countries to western tobacco business. 
Although the figures are not yet available, Universal is selling signifi-
cant amounts of tobacco in Central European countries, while at the 
same time its customers are sending vast quantities of cigarettes in. An 
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idea of the market's magnitude can be judged by the fact that the Soviet 
Union recently extended to the tobacco world a 50 billion cigarette con-
tract. 
For Universal, an important alliance took place in the fall of 1993 
when Philip Morris announced an agreement with the government of 
Kazakhstan, a republic of the former Soviet Union, to acquire 49 per-
cent of the state cigarette company. Universal is scheduled to work with 
Philip Morris in the venture; its specific task will be to develop and 
implement a comprehensive agronomy and leaf-processing program. 
Looking to the future, Harrell hopes to articulate clearer goals for 
the company as it prepares to enter the twenty-first century. In ten years, 
he hopes the company will see significant product diversification, al-
though he admits it is far from realizing a definite goal. 
On the brink of the twenty-first century, Universal, the small business 
that began life some seventy-five years ago as a fledgling American leaf 
tobacco dealer, is now a worldwide company, with tobacco leaf still domi-
nating its center. Of necessity, one begs the question in order to ask, 
"How did Universal do it? How has this business, founded in the shadow 
of the American Civil War and in the blighted and beaten American 
South, managed to be the leader among the world's independent leaf 
tobacco dealers?" The definitive answer is uncertain, but several obser-
vations, taken together, may offer at least a partial expla-
nation. 
First and foremost, leaders at Universal have from the beginning 
kept in mind the ambitious name of their company and have made 
efforts to move into new foreign markets. Universal was the first leaf 
tobacco dealer to attempt organization on a global level, an initial ad-
vantage that paid well as success bred success. In addition, Universal's 
foresight led it to be a pioneer in the use of science, technology, and 
engineering in the processing of tobacco. Its laboratory, efforts at qual-
ity control, and constant monitoring and updating of mechanical facili-
ties (such as the super plants) have all helped give the company a com-
petitive edge. Universal was also a pioneer among tobacco companies 
in the area of diversification, although not always successful. 
Moreover, all activities of the company have been presided over by 
men whose vision reached much farther than tobacco. A strong liberal 
arts undertone permeates the company's highest ranks (Henry Harrell's 
studies in Victorian literature before he joined the company; Thomas 
Towers's lifelong hobby of military history; and Jan Laverge's avoca-
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tion of collecting seventeenth-century Dutch art, to mention only three). 
Universal's leaders, well and broadly educated, are concerned with far 
more than tobacco; most enjoy a knowledge of what is going on in their 
communities and in the world at large, as well as in the worlds of books 
and the arts. Company personnel at various levels have served and con-
tinue to serve on countless local and statewide philanthropic commit-
tees and institutional governing boards that have no relation whatever 
to tobacco. Such activities have given Universal people an overview that 
might otherwise be absent. 
In its business dealings, Universal, despite its conservative stance, 
has always taken risks in cultivating customers with long-range poten-
tial. Numerous tobacco manufacturers around the world owe their suc-
cess at least in part to the company's willingness to finance them when 
they were starting, and such risks have usually paid well. One prime 
example is that of Dr. Anton Rupert. Arriving unknown and unan-
nounced at the end of a work week, he received aid that put him on the 
road to worldwide prominence. Along the way he became, and remains, 
one of the company's most highly valued customers. In like manner, 
Philip Morris, once a small company, has remained a Universal cus-
tomer during its climb to international status.That relationship is based 
on Universal's willingness to be there when needed years ago. 
Probably the two most central words in defining Universal, how-
ever, are "trust" and "continuity." In the panoply of American busi-
nesses tobacco dealers occupy a unique spot in that absolute trust is 
imperative. Within Universal an atmosphere of trust comes from each 
individual's knowledge that he or she alone is in charge of a particular 
job and the better it is done the more everyone will prosper. There is 
little competition within the company; rather people of like minds and 
like cultural backgrounds work together to deliver to customers the best 
product they can. 
Almost all the people who run Universal are recruited locally and 
therefore have shared philosophical outlooks. Although diversity of 
temperaments exists, seldom is found the worker who has a personal 
agenda to implement. Similarly, in the foreign satellites, the company 
places indigenous people in charge and allows them to operate on their 
own with as little control as possible from the Richmond office. In short, 
the sprawling worldwide company works as a team with maximum free-
dom and support and minimum interference given each key player. At 
Universal there is surprisingly little bureaucracy,especially given the 
international scope of the business. Junior employees know that senior 
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executives' doors are open and they may enter without formal appoint-
ments whenever the need arises. In an atmosphere such as this, im-
promptu meetings, sometimes on matters of considerable significance, 
can be hastily called. Also, because key officers are often key account 
executives, they have an overview that serves them efficiently when 
dealing with large sums of company money. 
Moreover, with one exception, nowhere within the executive ranks 
at Universal is there a person who did not start out sweeping floors, 
sharing modest meals with hourly workers, or working round-the-dock 
shifts in 1 00-degree-plus heat in tobacco factories or on tobacco auction 
floors. When company executives periodically visit the factories, they 
still are ribbed in a spirit of camaraderie by former bosses for the ways 
they performed years ago when they were starting out. The company 
leaders served apprenticeships as difficult as in any American business 
in the twentieth century. They did so, however, with full knowledge of 
the rewards that waited at the top as they worked their way, in a classical 
example of American capitalism, step-by-step up the company ladder. 
Trust is also the operative word in customer relations. Loans to 
customers are approved quickly following authorization, sometimes by 
only one company executive. Orders are taken and filled by verbal agree-
ment, often based on a telephone conversation between the various world 
offices and an executive in a country thousands of miles away. Bonds 
based on business over time blend into bonds of friendship as custom-
ers become first business associates, then friends, then the families be-
come lifelong friends. Examples are Pierre Warwick's friendship with 
Portugal's Mello family; one of Jim Abernathy's Mideast customers in-
sisting that Mrs. Abernathy stay with his family when Abernathy was 
hospitalized; and Will Tuggle's discovery and admission of a major 
financial error he made in billing Philip Morris. The Philip Morris 
contact person simply said to make a counter-mistake for the same 
amount in order to solve the problem. 
Universal's methods of operating are also based on continuity. The 
company almost always promotes from within rather than recruiting 
from outside. Therefore employees-Henry Harrell, for example-can 
set their goals high and know that if they are good enough they can 
expect to achieve them. No one will be hired from the outside and 
placed in a position someone within the company had an eye on. In 
corporate America of the twentieth century the rule is most often to 
canvass the country to find nationally the best-qualified candidates to 
fill high-level positions. Universal's theory is exactly the opposite: it 
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assumes that the best candidate is already in the company's ranks and 
that it is only a matter of identifying him or her. Such an attitude leads 
to productivity, institutional loyalty, informed leadership at the top, 
and aspiring young people in the lower ranks. It also means that U ni-
versal executives are personally known by employees at all levels of the 
company. 
Continuity offers another reward, especially as it pertains to top 
officers. Long tenures by the leaders, each of whom contributed some-
thing unique to Universal, has tended to give the company a personal-
ity, even a heritage, that permeates its day-to-day life. In a very real 
sense, Fred Harrison set the moral tone of the company in the 1930s 
and 1940s, while Herbert Jackson pointed it on its conservative, and 
highly successful, business path in the years following World War II. 
Recently Gordon Crenshaw modernized the company and thrust it into 
a worldwide arena. 
Continuity and commitment have over time given a style to Univer-
sal. Bucking the national trend, the company has fewer than five attor-
neys, keeps as low a profile as possible, does not advertise, and is rarely 
the subject of newspaper and magazine articles. Office doors are al-
ways open, even when business is being discussed, and people work 
without suit coats, an obligatory item of dress in many businesses. When 
one telephones an executive at Universal one's call is routed directly to 
that executive's office instead of to an intermediate secretary. Most ex-
ecutives answer their own phones; Universal's theory is that when people 
are accessible, business is conducted with fewer delays. When the daily 
lunch hour arrives at I P.M., the whole executive branch departs in 
groups, some together, some to lunch with other company employees. 
Finally, anyone walking the halls at Universal is likely to see behind 
some of the desks people who have long since retired but who still come 
to the office for at least a few hours or days each week just to keep a 
hand in. 
APPENDIX 1: 
A Short History of 
Tobacco Consumption 
Although the exact date is lost, we know that tobacco was first cultivated by the 
Mayans of southeastern Mexico and Central America in the centuries before 
Columbus made his 1492 voyage to the Caribbean. At that time, tobacco was 
being used not only in the immediate Caribbean area but also by other native 
North Americans who were soon to feel the full force of European coloniza-
tion. 
Two of Columbus's men were the first Europeans to see tobacco being 
smoked. While on an inland scouting mission, Louis de Torres, Columbus's 
official interpreter, and Rodrigo de Jerez, able seaman, saw natives inhaling 
the burning plant and reported their discovery to the admiral. 
Within fifty years of this late fifteenth-century discovery, the Spanish had 
begun to produce tobacco on their own in the West Indies. Soon the plant was 
known in Spain, particularly around the seaport towns, and in Portugal, where 
in 1560 the French Ambassador Jean Nicot sent some seeds to Catherine de 
Medici, who at the time was visiting France. She began using the leaf as snuff, 
thus putting royal approval on tobacco. She also called tobacco nicotaine, thus 
forever after associating Jean Nicot's name with the product. 
During the next twenty-five years the English discovered tobacco, and by 
1585 it was soon enjoying great favor among the colonists in Sir Walter Raleigh's 
ill-fated settlement in what is now North Carolina. Raleigh introduced tobacco 
to the English court, further popularizing its use both there and elsewhere in 
Europe. 
One of the earliest significant advancements in the growing of tobacco 
occurred in 1612 when Virginia colonist John Rolfe, remembered also as the 
husband of Pocahontas, defied Spanish restrictions by smuggling tobacco seeds 
from Caracas and Trinidad. After risking his life in this venture, Rolfe acci-
dentally hit upon the combination of soil and seed to produce the best tasting 
tobacco of the time. Indeed, it was tobacco that saved the Jamestown colony 
and ensured the permanent English presence in the New World. Soon there 
was such a demand for Virginia tobacco that the colonists were growing it for 
export in the main street of the tiny Jamestown community. 
Physicians and other learned men of the time soon began to study, debate, 
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and write about tobacco. England's King James I vehemently denounced it, 
arguing that smoking produced "a perpetual stinking torment," but others were 
not so harsh. The medical world of the day thought that tobacco use was good 
for the lungs and the brain, that it cured coughs and evaporated phlegm. It 
was often used as a medicine, particularly during London's Great Plague of 
the 1660s. Soon English school children were required to bring pipes and 
tobacco to school so they could be taught to smoke properly. By the time 
of Queen Elizabeth l's death in 1603 all classes of English society accepted 
smoking. 
Portugal was the next country to play a major role in the spread of tobacco 
use. Portuguese sailors, along with those from other countries, carried tobacco 
across the world by way of the major sea routes of the day. The leaf was soon 
being used in Holland, India, Japan, Turkey, and South Africa. Russia was 
also introduced to tobacco, and the Thirty Years War (1618-48) spread it to all 
countries involved in that conflict. By the late eighteenth century, the Siberian 
Eskimos had become acquainted with tobacco, and the commodity soon made 
its way to Australia and New Zealand with the British colonists. As a matter of 
fact, tobacco caught on so firmly around the world that during the American 
colonial era as many as two hundred ships laden with tobacco would annually 
leave the Chesapeake Bay in convoy, sailing together to thwart hostile navies 
and avaricious pirates. Soon ships' captains, plantation owners, and English 
merchants were becoming wealthy by dealing in the plant. Throughout the 
colonies tobacco was legal tender. 
At the time of Columbus's arrival, Native Americans chewed and smoked 
tobacco and also dipped snuff. They daily paid homage to their gods by spread-
ing tobacco on the waters of local rivers, carried it with them to assuage hunger 
on long hunting trips, and smoked it ceremoniously in pipes. 
Apart from the religious rites, early Europeans followed the same cus-
toms, but soon fashion intruded and made tobacco the object of numerous 
fads. By the end of the eighteenth century smoking was going out of style and 
snuff dipping, with the tobacco carried in all sorts of elaborate, often bejew-
eled boxes, was all the rage. In the nineteenth century, clay and metal pipes 
gave way to briar, which burned cooler, and cigars increased in popularity. 
The Crimean War (1853-56) saw the rise of the cigarette throughout Eu-
rope and soon in North America as well. By 1885 the Prince of Wales was 
serving them at formal lunches, and Frances Folsom Cleveland, the U.S. 
president's wife, followed suit in the White House just four years later. To-
bacco was firmly entrenched in all walks of life-from the day-laborer who 
took solace in his inexpensive pleasure to the visitor to the chief executive's 
mansion; but tobacco has always had detractors. 
Tobacco has sparked controversy since its introduction into European so-
ciety in the sixteenth century. From the early days to roughly the mid-twenti-
eth century few scientific studies of its possible adverse health effects were 
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conducted, and even today the Tobacco Institute continues to question the 
results of numerous investigations centering on tobacco. Although they are the 
most far-reaching ever conducted, modern studies have their precursors in 
centuries-old aversion to tobacco. 
As early as 1603 King James I mounted a campaign against the leaf; 
"Counterblast to Tobacco" was one of the first published attacks against its 
use. In 1612 tobacco was banned in both China and Japan, and in 1617 a Mo-
gul emperor placed the death penalty on both smoking and snuff dipping. 
Tobacco fared badly in many other places throughout the world in former 
times. In Persia, hot lead was poured down the throats of tobacco merchants, 
and in 1634 the Czar of Russia had snuffers' noses amputated, while a host of 
other national figures with the power to do so banned tobacco and persecuted 
users in numbers of ways. For example, in the mid-eighteenth century, the 
Empress of Russia ordered all snuff boxes brought to church to be confiscated, 
and the Duke of Wellington forbade junior officers to smoke by a 1845 direc-
tive. Clearly, tobacco has been at the center of a storm almost constantly since 
the Europeans discovered and started using it. 
The bombshell dropped, however, in 1964 when the surgeon general of 
the United States released a report to a nation of smokers informing them of 
research that directly linked smoking to cancer and heart disease. This was no 
Carry Nation, who was jailed in 1907 while lecturing against tobacco, nor was 
it a Billy Sunday, the fiery professional baseball player turned evangelist who 
mounted a 1916 campaign against tobacco. Indeed, this was the full force of 
the United States government issuing a stern warning to its citizens. 
The surgeon general's 1964 report actually had its origin in government 
actions that began almost a decade earlier. As early as 1955, the Federal Trade 
Commission ordered the cigarette industry to make no health claims in its 
advertising, a practice that had formerly been standard procedure. Two years 
later the surgeon general made public a statement based on statistical findings 
that cigarette smoking was a causative factor in lung cancer. In 1964, however, 
tobacco was characterized as "a health hazard of sufficient importance ... to 
warrant remedial action." Four years later the FCC proposed a ban on broad-
cast cigarette advertising, and such advertising has been prohibited since J anu-
ary 1971. By that date, cigarette packages were required to carry the state-
ment: "The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking is Dan-
gerous to Your Health." 
Following a spate of regulations and warnings, the government once again 
put its weight behind its antitobacco stance during the Carter administration, 
when the secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare announced in May 1976 
that one of the administration's top priorities would be to decrease the number 
of smokers in the U.S. The following month, he announced plans to put his 
department behind a vigorous antismoking campaign. By the fall, the plans 
were beginning to be implemented. They recommended a yearly "no-smok-
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ing" day, an end to federal tobacco programs, social welfare programs to ease 
losses of small tobacco farmers, additional taxes on cigarettes, and similar mea-
sures. 
Two years later, on the fourteenth anniversary of the surgeon general's 
report, the secretary went even further; he initiated a mail campaign to the 
nation's top five hundred corporate executives asking them to impose smoking 
restrictions in their buildings. Over the ensuing months, tobacco came under 
closer and closer government scrutiny until, in 1979, the surgeon general is-
sued a report on smoking and health at the expense of a quarter of a million 
dollars. 
Although much of the information in the twelve-hundred-page report 
reiterated previous government caveats, the intent was both obvious and revo-
lutionary: the government had as its ultimate goal the halting of tobacco use by 
the American public. In 1983, the tax on a package of cigarettes doubled from 
eight to sixteen cents; another four-cent increase was added in 1991. By that 
date Congress had also voted to bar smoking on all domestic airline flights of 
six hours or less, which meant all those within the continental United States. 
Where future legislation will leave the American tobacco industry is by no 
means clear. Although the government is centrally involved in its campaign to 
make America "smoke free" in the foreseeable future, and although American 
tobacco companies are diversifying in order to meet the financial challenge, 
major countries are still consuming large quantities of tobacco. Moreover, new 
political alliances following the end of the Cold War will doubtless affect the 
tobacco business in unforseen ways. 
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Universal Corporation 
Annual Earnings 
Universal Corporation Historical Data on Annual Earnings (in thousands) 
Year Net Income Revenues Assets Equity 
1918 1,291 13,848 7,044 
*1920 @3,769 28,244 19,832 
1921 270 31,593 20,103 
1922 438 29,419 20,647 
1923 1,450 14,200 28,369 20,632 
1924 179 18,924 20,019 16,365 
1925 1,018 13,312 19,128 16,146 
1926 1,221 18,344 19,897 16,493 
1927 1,169 17,620 13,083 11,903 
1928 1,284 17,900 14,149 12,244 
1929 1,312 21,254 13,912 12,612 
1930 964 14,466 14,414 11,929 
1931 1,228 14,182 15,139 11,973 
1932 861 12,310 14,686 11,303 
1933 1,242 17,362 13,184 12,147 
1934 1,503 13,983 12,944 11,827 
1935 1,589 18,012 13,765 12,416 
1936 1,631 20,973 14,927 12,966 
1937 1,636 27,361 14,193 13,116 
1938 1,538 24,917 14,397 13,282 
1939 1,529 21,676 16,550 13,490 
1940 1,520 33,908 16,719 13,697 
1941 1,445 22,710 16,022 13,914 
1942 1,379 33,688 16,150 14,004 
1943 1,408 55,854 16,641 14,375 
1944 1,475 57,528 17,152 14,784 
1945 1,421 82,139 22,108 15,282 
1946 1,492 76,992 32,673 16,025 
1947 1,501 73,596 26,373 16,181 
1948 2,010 58,184 21,831 17,145 
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Historical Data, continued 
Year Net Income Revenues Assets Equity 
1949 1,897 79,558 24,827 17,603 
1950 2,003 75,335 26,110 18,503 
1951 2,202 108,910 28,368 19,209 
1952 1,917 78,014 36,525 19,539 
1953 2,244 96,035 33,467 22,014 
1954 2,746 100,729 27,427 23,064 
1955 2,480 93,134 35,657 23,898 
1956 2,677 119,386 43,173 25,040 
1957 2,752 111,540 40,404 25,962 
1958 2,593 118,413 43,511 26,623 
1959 3,018 143,676 36,525 27,826 
*1960 3,462 131,120 57,740 29,323 
*1961 4,565 214,984 98,222 45,498 
1962 6,156 251,085 126,507 48,453 
1963 5,363 233,508 121,432 50,985 
1964 6,362 265,603 110,925 54,770 
1965 7,163 309,925 119,322 60,242 
1966 7,266 348,351 121,834 60,887 
1967 7,568 367,729 139,151 64,410 
*1968 @7,755 #396,244 -127,637 +74,861 
1969 7,827 397,281 143,070 73,415 
*1970 7,513 #410,354 143,469 +75,381 
1971 8,273 463,349 144,814 79,855 
*1972 @8,672 #499,545 -140,508 +83,188 
*1973 9,988 *545,406 186,629 88,046 
1974 11,398 626,231 212,855 94,812 
1975 13,992 760,649 237,198 103,414 
*1976 17,989 #700,813 172,995 115,804 
1977 19,581 737,586 182,103 127,731 
1978 21,294 839,465 208,796 136,618 
1979 25,491 978,458 215,337 147,893 
1980 28,368 992,887 402,062 160,575 
1981 31,272 1,041,835 405,779 178,868 
*1982 34,271 #934,306 -356,264 197,236 
*1983 36,641 #1,046,221 -417,242 215,430 
*1984 38,282 #891,790 -454,397 233,263 
*1985 46,386 #1,088,833 389,013 261,017 
*1986 47,106 #1,047,123 -737,523 293,774 
1987 55,973 1,700,900 819,021 325,745 
1988 60,719 1,996,673 870,461 356,874 
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Historical Data, continued 
Year 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Net Income 
54,035 
45,105 
20,224 
70,721 
80,242 
Explanations: 
Revenues 
2,462,608 
2,389,346 
2,896,464 
2,989,018 
3,047,213 
Appendix 2 
Assets Equity 
900,288 386,438 
1,011,012 397,059 
1,275,621 389,829 
1,261,449 301,696 
1,561,995 417,913 
*1920: No Income Statement available. Used Surplus as Net Income 
@: Includes difference in Surplus 1918 and 1920 
*1960: Includes Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 
*1961: Includes Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. and Consol. Cos. 
*1968: Used revised amounts from 1969 statement: 
@, #, -, +: Reflects restatement for pooling of interest 
*1970: Used revised amounts from 1971 statement: 
#: Includes dividends 
+: Reflects change in Income reserved for business use 
*1972: Used revised amounts from 1973 statement: 
@, #: Reflects change in dividends received and equity in net income in 
unconsolidated companies 
-: Reflects change in stocks of affiliated companies 
+:Reflects change in earnings retained for business use 
*1973: Used revised amounts from 1974 statement: 
#: does not include equity in net income of unconsolidated companies 
*1976: Used revised amounts from 1977 statement 
#: Reflects change in sales and other operating income 
*1982: Used revised amounts from 1987 statement 
#: Reflects change in sales and other operating income 
-: Reflects an overall change in all asset balances 
*1983: Used revised amounts from 1987 statement 
#: Reflects change in sales and other operating income 
--: Reflects an overall change in all asset balances 
*1984:Used revised amounts from 1987 statement 
#: Reflects change in sales and other operating income 
-: Reflects an overall change in all asset balances 
*1985: Used revised amounts in 1987 statement 
#: Reflects change in sales and other operating income 
*1986: Used revised amounts in 1987 statement 
#: Reflects change in sales and other operating income 
-: Reflects an overall change in all asset balances 
1985-1991 Revenues and Assets restated to equity basis for Lawyers Title 
APPENDIX3 
Tobacco Grades 
Following is a government-originated calendar of the various grades of to-
bacco commonly found on the U.S. tobacco markets. Tobacconists at all levels 
of the business must be intimately familiar with these categories in order to 
make sound judgments regarding the leaf. This explanation refers only to flue· 
cured. 
I. CLASS 
Based on characteristics connected with varieties, soils, climatic con-
ditions, or method of cultivation, harvesting, or curing. The pri-
mary criterion for class distinction is based on how long the to-
bacco leaves were ripened while still in the field. Leaves are "pulled" 
from the stalk at different intervals to create different classes. 
II. TYPE 
A. Grade 
A subdivision of type, based on a combination of group, quality, 
and color. 
1. Group. The first and basic factor of a grade, based on certain 
characteristics related to stalk position, body, or the general 
quality of the tobacco. Groups in flue-cured tobacco are 
a. Wrapper (Grademark A). Leaves from either leaf or 
cutters, mature to ripe, elastic, with small and blending 
fibers and a low percentage of injury. 
b. Leaf (Grademark B). Usually found at or above the 
mid portion of the stalk, leaves have a pointed tip, tend to 
fold, are usually heavier in body than other groups, and 
show little or no ground injury. 
c. Smoking Leaf (Grademark H). Usually found at or above 
the midpoint of the stalk, leaves show a high degree of 
maturity, more open leaf structure than those in B group, 
and a material amount of injury characteristic of very ripe 
leaf tobacco. 
d. Cutters (Grademark C). The leaves of this group are 
usually grown at or just below the mid portion of the stalk; 
they have a tendency to roll, thus concealing the stem, 
and usually have a rounded tip, are thin to medium in 
body, and show some ground injury. 
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e. Lugs (X). Usually grown near the bottom of the stalk, 
most leaves have a blunt tip and open face and show some 
ground injury characteristic of the group. 
f. Primings (P). Round-tipped leaves from the lowest 
portion of the stalk; such leaves ripen prematurely as a 
result of starvation and show a material amount of injury 
characteristic of leaves grown close to the ground. 
g. Nondescript (N). Common tobacco that does not meet 
the minimum specifications or that exceeds the tolerance 
of the lowest grade of any other group except scrap. 
h. Scrap (S). A by-product of stemmed and unstemmed 
tobacco accumulated from handling of the plant in farm 
buildings, warehouses, packing and conditioning plants, 
and stemmeries. 
2. Quality. The second factor of a grade, based on the relative 
degree of one or more elements of quality. Quality takes into 
account such factors as the tobacco's ripeness, accuracy of 
grading, cleanliness, and whether or not it has been burned 
by the sun or damaged by the weather. 
a. Choice (1) 
b. Fine (2) 
c. Good (3) 
d. Fair (4) 
e. Low (5) 
f. Poor (6) 
3. Color. The third factor of a grade, based on the relative hues, 
saturations of chromas, and color values common to the type. 
a. Lemon (L) 
b. Orange (F) 
c. Orange Red (FR) 
d. Red (R) 
e. Variegated (K) 
f. Walnut (D) 
g. Green (G) 
h. Lemon Greenish (LV) 
i. Green Lemon (GL) 
j. Green Orange (GF) 
k. Green Red (GR) 
I. Green Variegated (GK) 
m. Gray Green (GG) 
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n. Variegated Lemon (KL) 
o. Variegated Orange (KF) 
p. Variegated Greenish (KV) 
q. Variegated Mixed (KM). 
r. Lemon Slick (LS)* 
s. Orange Slick (FS)* 
t. Rank Red (RR)* 
u. Rank Green (RG)* 
v. Lug Side (XL)* 
*Combination symbols 
Key to Standard Grademarks 
For example, cutters (C) of good quality (3) in orange color (F) would 
be written C3F. Each symbol used in a federal grade for tobacco has 
therefore a definite and known meaning. 
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Group Quality Color Color 
A Wrappers 1 Choice L Lemon GG Gray Green 
B Leaf 2 Fine F Orange KL Variegated 
Lemon 
H Smoking 3 Good FR Orange Red KF Variegated 
Leaf Orange 
C Cutters 4 Fair R Red KV Variegated 
Greenish 
X Lugs 5 Low K Variegated FV Orange 
Greenish 
P Primings 6 Poor D Walnut KM Variegated 
Mixed 
N Nondescript G Green LS Lemon 
Stick* 
S Scrap LV Lemon FS Orange 
Greenish Stick* 
GL Green RR Rank Red* 
Orange 
GF Green RG Rank 
Orange Green* 
GR Green Red XL Lug Side 
GK Green 
Variegated 
APPENDIX4 
Company Officers and Directors 
Abernathy, James H., Jr.: assistant vice president, 1954; vice president, 1966; 
senior vice president, 1974; retired, 1983. 
Aliberti, Giovanni: assistant vice president, 1984; resigned, 1986. 
Andrews, Robert M.: assistant treasurer, 1922; assistant secretary, 1923; re-
signed, 1924. 
Baldwin, Sterling T.: assistant vice president, 1982; vice president of Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 1984. 
Beale, Cyrus W.: vice president and director, 1918; resigned, 1918. 
Bell, Donald F.: senior vice president, 1983; died in office, 1987. 
Benson, Edward H.: director, 1968; died in office, 1980. 
Berry, William H.: director, 1968. 
Blanchard, Lawrence E., Jr.: director, 1975; retired, 1991. 
Campbell, F. Scott, III: assistant vice president, 1978; vice president of Univer-
sal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1982. 
Cary, Lucius F., III: assistant vice president, 1970; vice president, 1974; execu-
tive vice president, 1982; died in office, 1983. 
Carr, Charles S., Jr.: assistant vice president, 1957; vice president, 1958; direc-
tor, 1962; retired, 1975. 
Carrier, Ronald E.: director, 1979. 
Carter, Charles H., Jr.: assistant treasurer, 1970; vice president of Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 1985. 
Chandler, Wallace L.: assistant secretary, 1953; secretary, 1963; general coun-
sel and secretary, 1966; director, 1966; vice president and secretary, 1969; 
senior vice president, 1974; executive vice president 1982; vice chairman, 
1986; vice chairman of new holding company, Universal Corporation, 1987; 
retired, 1989. 
Christian, Stuart G., Jr.: vice president, 1969; senior vice president, 1974; re-
tired, 1986. 
Clark, Robert E.: assistant vice president, 1944; vice president, 1946; director, 
1950; retired as vice president, 1960; retired, 1963. 
Cobb, John B.: director, 1918; resigned 1919. 
Cone, Howard B.: vice president, 1967; senior vice president, 1974; retired, 
1984. 
Connell, Cleveland E.: assistant vice president of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 
1982. 
Coronado, William J .: controller, 1990. 
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Covington, James E.: director, 1933; vice president, 1941; executive vice presi-
dent, 1955; retired as executive president, 1956; retired and elected direc-
tor emeritus, 1969. 
Covington, Robert L.: vice president, 1983; senior vice president and process-
ing director of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co, 1987. 
Crenshaw, Gordon L.: assistant vice president, 1954; vice president, 1958; di-
rector, 1962; president, 1965; chief executive officer and president, 1975; 
chairman and chief executive officer, 1982; chairman and chief executive 
officer of new holding company, Universal Corporation, 1987; retiredas 
chairman, 1991; retired as director, 1992. 
Cullman, Joseph F., Jr.: director, 1918; resigned, 1918. 
Cullman, Joseph F. Sr.: director, 1918; resigned, 1924. 
Davis, Edward G.: assistant treasurer, 1946; resigned, 1951. 
Dawson, Robert C.: director, 1985; vice president of new holding company, 
Universal Corporation, 1987; retired, 1989. 
Devries, Will em L.J .: assistant vice president, 1982; vice president of Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 1983. 
Dozier, Curtis M.: assistant treasurer and assistant secretary, 1920; secretary, 
1922; secretary and assistant treasurer, 1923; director, 1924; retired as sec-
retary, 1951; retired, 1962. 
Dozier, Curtis M., Jr.: assistant secretary, 1948; secretary, 1951; retired, 1963. 
Dozier, 0. Kemp: treasurer, 1975; vice president and treasurer, 1986; trea-
surer of new holding company, Universal Corporation, 1987; vice presi-
dent and treasurer, 1989. 
Eagelburger, Lawrence S.: elected director, 1993. 
Edwards, K.R.: director, 1922; vice president, 1924; resigned, 1938; reelected 
director, 1946; retired, 1966. 
Foster, Charles H., Jr.: director and vice president, 1989; resigned, 1991.. 
Funkhouser, A. Paul: director, 1976. 
Garrett, R.M.: director, 1939; died in office, 1955. 
Gay, Peter M.: vice president, 1971; resigned, 1983. 
Gaylord, Richard W.: assistant vice president, 1969; vice president, 1970; re-
signed, 1983. 
Godthep, J aap: elected director, 1991. 
Goodson, William A.: director, 1955; retired, 1960. 
Gordon, R.L.: director, 1920; treasurer, 1920; resigned, 1922. 
Gorman, Patrick H.: director, 1918; vice president, 1918; resigned, 1929. 
Gray, ElmonT.: director, 1977. 
Gregory, John M.M.: assistant vice president, 1977; vice president, 1982; se-
nior vice president of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1987. 
Gregory, Oscar C.: director, 1918; vice president, 1923; died in office, 1930. 
Grubbs, Wirt L., Jr.: director of human resources, 1982; retired, 1989. 
Hamlett, H.W., Jr.: director of internal audit, 1977; corporate director of in-
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ternal audit for new holding company, Universal Corporation, 1987. 
Harrell, Henry H.: assistant vice president, 1972; vice president, 1974; senior 
vice president, 1981; executive vice president, 1982; director, 1984; presi-
dent, 1986; president of new holding company, Universal Corporation, 1987; 
president and chief executive officer, 1988; chairman and chief executive 
officer, 1991. 
Harrison, Frederick N.: director, 1919; vice president, 1923; president, 1924; 
resigned as president and elected chairman of the board, 1946; resigned 
and elected director emeritus, 1968. 
Harrison, James P.: director, 1922; assistant secretary, 1923; vice president, 
1924; on military leave, 1942; vice chairman, 1947; chairman of the board, 
1950; retired, as chairman of the board, 1965; acting chairman of the board, 
1966; reelected chairman of the board, 1967; died in office, 1968. 
Hatcher, Vance R.: assistant vice president, 1944; vice president, 1946; direc-
tor, 1950; resigned, 1956. 
Hatcher, Wirt H., Jr.: assistant vice president, 1965; vice president, 1969; re-
tired, 1986. 
Henderson, Joe F.: assistant treasurer, 1923; treasurer, 1923; director, 1924; 
vice president and treasurer, 1946; vice president, 1955; retired as vice presi-
dent, 1956; retired, 1963. 
Hessels, Jan-Michael: director, 1987; resigned, 1989. 
Hildt, Thomas: director, 1920; resigned, 1923. 
Hitchcock, Harry: director, 1960; retired, 1966. 
Hobgood, Alfred L., Jr.: director, 1966; retired, 1987. 
Holder, Richard G.: elected director, 1922. 
Holt, Bernard S., Jr.: assistant vice president, 1970; corporate director, Infor-
mation Services, 1987; vice president of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1990. 
Howe, M. Norton, Jr.: assistant vice president, 1970; vice president, 1974; se-
nior vice president, 1981; senior vice president of Universal Leaf Tobacco 
Co, 1987; resigned, 1989. 
Humphreys, Edwin W.: vice president, 1957; director, 1958; senior vice presi-
dent, 1966; retired as senior vice president, 1974; retired, 1977. 
Jackson, Herbert W., Jr.: director, 1933; vice president, 1933; president, 1946; 
chairman of the board and chief executive officer, 1965; died in office, 1966. 
Jennings, Joseph A.: director, 1973; retired, 1990. 
Johnston, J.E.: assistant secretary, 1920; resigned, 1923. 
Johnston, P.H.: director, 1919; resigned, 1924. 
King, Allen B.: assistant treasurer, 1977; assistant vice president, 1978; vice 
president, 1981; senior vice president, 1985; vice president of new holding 
company, Universal Corporation, 1987; director, 1989; executive vice presi-
dent, 1989; president and chief executive officer, 1991. 
Lacy, William C.: vice president, 1976; senior vice president of Universal Leaf 
Tobacco Co, 1982. 
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Laverge,Jan: assistant vice president, 1946; vice president, 1951; director, 1953; 
senior vice president, 1966; retired, 1978. 
Leavell, John N.: assistant vice president, 1957; vice president, 1970; retired, 
1976. 
Lelong, Chaffraix A., Jr.: assistant vice president, 1983; vice president of Uni-
versal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1988. 
Lewis, James E.: assistant vice president, 1977; vice president, 1982. 
Lowden, Francis V., III: assistant general counsel, 1977; assistantsecretary, 1989; 
secretary and associate general counsel, 1987; assistant secretary, 1991. 
Luckett, William S.: director, 1918; vice president, 1918; resigned, 1922; re-
elected director, 1923; resigned, 1924. 
McAdams, Thomas B.: director, 1925; resigned, 1926. 
Meredith, John F.: assistant vice president, 1977; retired, 1980. 
Miller, James 1.: director, 1918; vice president and treasurer, 1918; resigned as 
treasurer, 1919; resigned, 1924. 
Moore, David C.: assistant vice president, 1986; vice president of Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 1990. 
Moore, T. Justin, Jr.: director, 1969; resigned, 1973. 
Morris, Joseph B.: assistant treasurer, 1922; resigned, 1923. 
Mullen, James: president, 1918; director, 1918; resigned as president, 1918; 
retired, 1963. 
Munford, John D.: director, 1988. 
Owen, Leroy D.: assistant secretary, 1964; retired 1985. 
Parnell, John Q., Jr.: director, 1980; retired, 1982. 
Parrish, Hamilton P.: vice president, 1978; died in office, 1981. 
Pettus, Hunter R.: director, 1930; vice president, 1933; resigned, 1946. 
Phillips, D.C.: treasurer, 1919; resigned as treasurer, 1920; secretary/assistant 
treasurer, 1920; resigned, 1922. 
Pollard, Fred G.: director, 1976; retired, 1988. 
Poulson, James H.: director of management information services, Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 1985. 
Powell, W.R.: director, 1982; resigned, 1984. 
Ratcliffe, Clyde H., III: assistant vice president, 1976; director corporate de-
velopment, 1990. 
Roark, Elijah B., Jr.: controller, 1973; retired, 1986. 
Robertson, WalterS., Jr.: assistant vice president, 1961; vice president, 1964; 
senior vice president, 1986; retired, 1987. 
Robins, Charles R., III: assistant vice president, 1986; vice president of Univer-
sal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1988. 
Robins, W. Randolph: assistant vice president, 1981; vice president, 1983; se-
nior vice president of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1990. 
Robinson, William L.: director, 1939; vice president, 1939; resigned, 1941. 
Roper, Hartwell H.: assistant controller, 1977; assistant vice president, 1981; 
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vice president, 1983; vice president and controller, 1985; controller of new 
holding company, Universal Corporation, 1987; vice president and con-
troller, 1989; vice president, 1990. 
Rose, John D., Jr.: vice president, 1970; director, 1973; senior vice president, 
1974; died in office, 1978. 
Ruffin, Roulhac: assistant vice president, 1964; retired, 1966. 
Schaaf, Edward M., III: assistant vice president, 1981; vice president, 1983; 
senior vice president of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1990. 
Shivers, S.J .: assistant secretary and assistant treasurer, 1918; resigned, 1921. 
Stallard, Hubert R.: elected director, 1991. 
Starkey, James H., III: vice president, 1983; senior vice president of Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 1987. 
Stone, L.K.: assistant secretary, 1920; resigned, 1922. 
Sutton, F.T., IV: assistant vice president, 1983; vice president of Universal 
Leaf Tobacco Co., 1985. 
Taylor, Herbert D.: assistant treasurer, 1949; died in office, 1953. 
Taylor, Jaquelin E.: director, 1944; retired, 1974. 
Taylor, Jaquelin P.: director, 1918; chairman of the board, 1918; resigned, 
1922. 
Taylor, Ronald J.: assistant controller, 1985; assistant vice president, 1988; cor-
porate director, 1990. (Remains corporate director, administrative liaison 
of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.) 
Taylor, William L.: vice president, 1990. 
Tompkins, Seldon T.: assistant vice president, 1977; vice president of Univer-
sal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1982. 
Towers, Thomas R.: assistant vice president, 1961; vice president, 1964; direc-
tor, 1966; executive vice president, 1969; president, 1982; vice chairman, 
1986; retired as vice chairman, 1987. 
Tucker, Edwin W.: assistant vice president, 1946; resigned, 1949. 
Tuggle, Aubrey, G.: assistant vice president, 1969; vice president, 1974; died 
in office, 1978. 
Tuggle, Richard W.: assistant treasurer, 1953; assistant vice president, 1959; 
vice president, 1967; senior vice president, 1981; retired, 1982. 
Veinouis, A.J.: assistant secretary, 1925; resigned, 1933. 
Walker, Walter M ., Jr.: director of transportation, Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 
1985. 
Warwick, Pierre C.: vice president, 1946; director, 1950; senior vice president, 
1966; retired as senior vice president, 1971; retired and elected director 
emeritus, 1975. 
Watson, R.P.: director, 1921; died in office, 1932. 
West, Hugh P.: assistant vice president, 1954; resigned, 1961. 
West, James W., Jr.: assistant treasurer, 1957; retired, 1973. 
White, James M., III: assistant secretary, 1970; secretary, 1973; secretary and 
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general counsel, 1982; secretary and general counsel of new holding com-
pany, Universal Corporation, 1987. 
Williams, Fielding L.: director, 1963; retired, 1975. 
Williams, Lewis C.: secretary and treasurer, 1918; director, 1918; resigned, 
1918. 
Willingham, E.W.: director, 1922; vice president, 1924; resigned, 1932. 
Willingham, William A.: director, 1918; vice president and secretary, 1918; 
president, 1923; chairman of the board, 1924; died in office, 1945. 
Wilson, George P.: assistant vice president, 1924; died in office, 1962. 
Winfree, William A., Jr.: assistant treasurer, 1953; treasurer, 1955; director, 
1963; director of corporate relations, I 97 5; retired as director of corporate 
relations, 1977; retired, 1983. 
Winstead, William A., Jr.: director, 1918; died in office, 1962. 
Winston, HenryS., III: assistant vice president, 1985; vice president of Univer-
sal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1988. 
Wood, Mildred].: assistant treasurer of Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 1983. 
Yarbrough, Fred W.: assistant treasurer, 1970; corporate director of adminis-
trative services, 1987; retired, 1989. 
Yuille, Thomas B.: director, 1918; president, 1918; resigned as president, 1923; 
resigned as director, 1923; reelected director, 1929; resigned, 1933. 
Bibliographical Note 
Unpublished Sources 
The story of Universal Leaf Tobacco Company as told in this book is based, 
above all else, on some two hundred interviews conducted with company offic-
ers, employees, and former employees between 1982 and 1992. There are no 
archives containing individuals' or company correspondence; such materials 
are discarded periodically. Chief among the interviews was the information 
collected from Jan Laverge, who joined Universal in 1934 and who, in the 
early 1990s, was still coming to the office almost daily. His interview, taped 
over a period of several years, runs well over five hundred pages and contains 
an array of information that could, in itself, be the subject of a separate vol-
ume. John N. Leavell, A.l. McOwan, E.D. Allen, and R.W. Tuggle provided 
particularly valuable and lengthy oral commentaries as well. 
Other major interviews-with senior officials, factory workers, custom-
ers, competitors, market buyers, and supervisors from throughout the United 
States and beyond-were granted by James H. Abernathy, Jr., E.D. Allen, Wayne 
Baggett, W.S. Bost Sr., James T. Botkin, C. Stuart Carr Jr., Garland Carter, 
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BernardS. Holt Jr., Robert B. Horine, H. Neal Howard Jr., M. Norton Howe 
Jr., Mrs. Edwin W. Humphreys, William Thomas Hunt, E. Hilda Johnson, 
W.L. Jordan, Bruce E. Koonce, Gabriel J. Kremer, William C. Lacy, A.T. 
Laverge, M.L. Dawson Jr., Henry H. Harrell,JosephJ. Lepine, Howard Todd 
Livesay, Alma Lucas, George W. Macon Jr., John E. Markle, Mr. and Mrs. A.l. 
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Benjamin E. Schramme Jr., Leo T. Stephenson,Jaquelin E. Taylor, C.W. Tho-
mas III, Mrs. Ralph Thompson, Thomas R. Towers, Henry K. Towler, J.C. 
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Waddell, A.W. Walker, Mrs. Pierre C. Warwick, Hugh P. West, J.J. White, 
William A. Winfree Jr., and James B. Winstead. These interviews, all now 
transcribed, constitute perhaps the most comprehensive oral history yet at-
tempted of a major segment of the tobacco business. 
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Cameron, George, 4 
Cameron and Cameron, 4 
Campbell, F. Scott, III, 193 
Canada, history of tobacco industry in, 46-
47 
Canadian Leaf Tobacco Company: estab-
lishment of, 30, 47, 77; before World 
War I, 47-51, 52; during Great Depres-
sion, 68, 70; during postwar years, 90, 
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War II, 73-74; during postwar years, 81, 
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domestic, 151-54; modern foreign, !54-
57; trust based business practices, 164-
65, 180; by Universal Corporation, 176 
sales conferences, international, 139, 156 
Santiago, Tom, 133 
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